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Die Dissertation untersucht ob partizipative Governance ein effektives Mittel ist um 
lokale Regierungen in Guatemala dazu zu bewegen ihren Wählern gegenüber verstärkt 
Rechenschaft abzulegen und den Haushalt mehr an den Bedürfnissen der Armen auszu-
richten. Das erste Papier bereitet die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse zur Wirkung von 
und den Bedingungen für effektive partizipative Governance auf. Das zweite Papier 
stellt ein neues Verfahren zur Kalibrierung qualitativer Interviewdaten für fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) vor. In einer qualitativ-vergleichenden Ana-
lyse von zehn ländlichen Gemeinden untersucht das dritte Papier wie sich effektive par-
tizipative Governance, politischer Wettbewerb und Zugang zu lokalen Medien auf die 
Haushaltsgestaltung einer Lokalregierung auswirken. Das vierte Papier analysiert mit 
derselben Methode die Bedingungen für effektive partizipative Governance. Das fünfte 
Papier präsentiert eine Fallstudie zweier Gemeinden und diskutiert Politikoptionen für 
die Implementierung von partizipativer Governance in Guatemala. Die Ergebnisse der 
Papiere zeigen, dass effektive partizipative Governance in Kombination mit starkem 
politischem Wettbewerb zu einer armutsorientierteren Ausrichtung öffentlicher Ausga-
ben in den zehn Gemeinden führt, da Wähler besser informiert sind. Jedoch deuten die 
Ergebnisse auch darauf hin, dass partizipative Governance wegen des geringen Grades 
zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisation, des niedrigen Bildungsniveaus und hoher Armut in 
Guatemala nicht effektiv implementiert wird. Partizipative Governance kann also lokale 
Regierungen dazu bewegen Rechenschaft abzulegen und den Haushalt armutsorientier-
ter zu gestalten. Ihre effektive Implementierung wird jedoch in Guatemala lange dauern 
und einen hohen Ressourceneinsatz erfordern. Daher sollten politische Entscheidungs-
träger und Geber auch die Stärkung anderer Informations- und Rechenschaftslegungs-



















This thesis analyses whether participatory governance is an effective means for increas-
ing local government accountability and for making local government spending more 
responsive to the needs of the poor in rural Guatemala. The first paper evaluates the 
scientific evidence on the impact of and the conditions for effective participatory gov-
ernance. The second paper presents a new technique for calibrating qualitative interview 
data for fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). In a qualitative compara-
tive analysis of ten rural Guatemalan municipalities the third paper examines how effec-
tive participatory governance, competitive elections, and access to local media influence 
the allocation of local government spending. The fourth paper analyses the conditions 
for effective participatory governance with the same empirical method. The fifth paper 
presents a comparative case study of two municipalities and discusses policy options for 
implementing participatory governance in Guatemala. Overall, the papers’ findings 
show that effective participatory governance is sufficient for local government respon-
siveness in the study area when it is combined with competitive elections, because it 
increases voter information about local government performance. Yet, the findings also 
suggest that it will be difficult to implement participatory governance effectively in 
Guatemala due to the low degree of civil society organization, the low level of educa-
tion of the population and the high level of poverty. The conclusion drawn from these 
findings is that effective participatory governance arrangements can make local gov-
ernments more accountable and responsive, but that it will require much time and re-
sources to implement them. Policy makers and donors should therefore also consider 
strengthening other information mechanisms, as well as existing accountability mecha-
nisms, such as elected Municipal Councils. 
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1. Research Agenda 
“Few would disagree that governments should be responsible for the provision of key services: 
children should learn, roads should be passable, bridges should not fall down, people should 
get healthier, water should arrive to crops. There is perhaps more, but still little, dispute that to 
accomplish these objectives the institutions and organizations of service delivery should satisfy 
certain adjectives: be ‘accountable,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘responsive,’ and ‘transparent.’ There is tre-
mendous controversy as to exactly how to bring about such institutions and organizations.” 
(Prichett & Woolcock, 2004, pp. 203–204, emphasis added) 
 Research Motivation 1.1
Basic public services have been shown to foster economic development and to improve 
the livelihoods of poor people in rural areas (Bardhan, 2000; Calderón & Servén, 2004; 
World Bank, 2003). For example, paved roads have been found to facilitate access to 
product and labor markets and functioning water and sanitation systems have been 
shown to save time for obtaining drinking water and reduce the likelihood of being af-
fected by waterborne diseases (Kauneckis & Andersson, 2009; Prichett & Woolcock, 
2004). Moreover, scholars widely agree that service providers need to respond to the 
needs of service recipients and that service recipients need to be able to sanction service 
providers if they fail in this task (Ackerman, 2004; Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Przewor-
ski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). Hence, there is a broad consensus among social scientists 
that efficient and sustainable service delivery requires responsive and accountable ser-
vice providers. However, so far there is little agreement on which governance reforms 
contribute to this aim. 
Accountability and responsiveness play a key role in the debate on the governance of 
public service provision. The concept of accountability in this thesis refers to “(…) both 
answerability-the obligation of public officials to inform about their activities and to 
justify them-and enforcement-the capacity to impose negative sanctions on officeholders 
who violate certain rules of conduct” (Schedler, 1999, p. 26). Government responsive-
ness is defined as the achievement of congruence between the preferences of the majori-
ty of voters and government spending decisions (Fried & Rabinovitz, 1980). 
Over the last twenty years one of the most widely implemented reforms in developing 
countries was the decentralization of responsibilities for public service delivery to lower 
levels of government (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006). The main rationale for promoting 
decentralization is that it is expected to increase service provider responsiveness to the 
needs of the majority of voters by strengthening electoral accountability.  
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More specifically, decentralization is expected to increase the probability that the degree 
of satisfaction of voters’ needs determines the re-election chances of a government 
(Seabright, 1996; Tommasi & Weinschelbaum, 2007). 
Yet, local elections have turned out to be insufficient for holding local governments to 
account.1 In spite of decentralized responsibilities for service delivery, public resources 
for the provision of these services continue to be distributed unequally in many develop-
ing countries. Studies on the impact of decentralization find that local governments of-
ten favor campaign supporters in the allocation of public works projects or divert re-
sources from overvalued public works projects to their clientele or to their own pockets 
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Crook, 2003; Crook & Manor, 1998; Ruttan, 1997). 
Hence, poor people continue to be excluded from social services. 
To overcome these problems, donors, policy-makers, and civil society movements have 
experimented with several forms of participatory governance, including participatory 
planning, participatory budgeting, and participatory auditing. All forms of participatory 
governance aim to “(…) facilitate the participation of ordinary citizens in the public 
policy process” (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007, p. 1090). They give citizens the 
opportunity to exercise voice and vote in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of 
public service provision. Participatory governance mechanisms also allow citizens to 
seek answers from public officials, to question these answers, and to impose sanctions, 
e.g., by demanding corrective actions or by denouncing illicit behavior at higher levels 
of governments. Therefore, participatory governance mechanisms are expected to in-
crease local government responsiveness and accountability. 
Participatory governance has been implemented in a large number of developing coun-
tries, such as India, Uganda, Peru, Brazil, South Africa, Guatemala, etc. Yet, as Goetz 
and Gaventa contend, “a vast number of citizen-voice initiatives (…) are under-
researched and poorly documented” (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001, p. 4).  
                                                 
1 This finding has been explained by the fact that the political contestability of local elections is con-
strained by the prevalence of information asymmetries, multiple issue problems, ethnic cleavages, and 
clientelism in many developing countries (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Jenkins, 2007; Keefer & Khemani, 
2005). Limited contestability of elections implies that, “(…) leaders may be susceptible to capture by 
special interest groups, slacken effort to improve public services, or be incompetent, without facing any 
risk of losing their positions” (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006, p. 102). 
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Hence, so far, there is only little substantial evidence on the impact of participatory 
governance on government performance and service quality. Moreover, though numer-
ous studies explain the success of participatory governance in a few places with highly 
favorable context conditions, we know little about how to implement these new forms 
of governance in places with less favorable conditions. Both types of knowledge are 
essential for judging whether implementing participatory governance is a feasible and 
effective strategy to improve the governance of public service provision in developing 
countries. 
 Research Purpose and Scope 1.2
The overarching goal of this research project is to contribute to the literature on partici-
patory governance by assessing whether it is a suitable means for increasing local gov-
ernment accountability and responsiveness. More specifically, the aims of the thesis are:  
1) To evaluate whether the effective implementation of a participatory governance 
forum leads to more responsive local government spending 
2) To assess the feasibility of implementing participatory governance effectively in 
an unfavorable context 
To reach these two aims, I examine two central research questions:  
1) How does effective participatory governance influence the allocation of local 
government spending? 
2) Under what conditions does participatory governance work as an effective ac-
countability mechanism? 
By providing an answer to these two questions the thesis is supposed to contribute to the 
task of comparative institutional analysis to “(…) clarify what class of problems are 
handled well by differing combinations of institutions” (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 6). 
Thus, it is expected to generate policy-relevant knowledge on the suitability of partici-
patory governance as a reform strategy for making rural service provision more pro-
poor. 
The research for this thesis is carried out in ten rural Guatemalan municipalities. I chose 
Guatemala to examine the research questions of my thesis because many of its local 
governments are unresponsive to the needs of their voters and its central government 
has tried to address this problem with a participatory governance reform. So far howev-
er, there is hardly any evidence on the impact of this reform or the effectiveness of its 
implementation at the local level. 
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The empirical analysis focuses on rural areas, because poverty and low access to ser-
vices are even more pronounced in these areas than in Guatemalan cities. More than 
70% of the rural population was estimated to be poor and 24% were estimated to live 
below the extreme poverty line in 2006 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 2006). 
Also, large parts of the rural population do not have access to adequate basic social in-
frastructure. According to National Census Data, in 2002 only 5.7% of rural households 
were connected to a sewerage system and only 52.7% had access to an improved source 
of drinking water (INE, 2002). 
Participatory governance is implemented in Guatemala in the form of so-called “Devel-
opment Councils”. In 2002 the central government embarked upon a range of “second 
generation” or “post-Washington consensus” reforms to improve the process of public 
service provision. These reforms included the Decentralization Law, the Municipal 
Code and the Urban and Rural Development Council Law (Congreso de la República de 
Guatemala, 2002a-c). The Development Council Law mandates the establishment of a 
five tier system of Development Councils for civil society participation in the planning, 
monitoring and evaluation of public services.2 
The empirical research for the thesis is conducted at the municipal level, i.e., I analyze 
primarily the Municipal Development Councils (MDCs).3 I focus on this level of the 
Development Councils because the thesis aims to compare the conditions for and the 
outcomes of participatory governance across several cases within the same national in-
stitutional and cultural context. It is not supposed to examine the influence of differ-
ences in the design of participatory governance laws and other political institutions, 
such as the party system and the electoral system, on participatory governance out-
comes. 
The MDCs are deliberative forums for involving citizens in the planning, monitoring, 
and evaluation of social infrastructure projects. This form of participatory governance 
has been widely implemented in developing countries, e.g., in Uganda, Bolivia, the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Nicaragua.  
                                                 
2 For a detailed description of the Guatemalan governance structure, see Appendix 1. For an account of 
the history of the participatory governance reform and the context for implementing it in Guatemala, see 
Appendix 2. 
3 Guatemala is administratively divided in eight regions, 22 departments, and 333 municipalities. The 
system of Development Councils comprises the National, Regional, Departmental, Municipal, and Com-
munal Development Councils. 
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Yet, participatory governance forums have received much less attention from social 
scientists than participatory budgeting and public social audits, which have been the 
focus of extensive research in Brazil and India (Goetz & Jenkins, 2001; Goldfrank, 
2007; Shah, 2007). 
The thesis analyses the effect of participatory governance on the allocation of local gov-
ernment budgets, because this is the most direct effect of participatory governance ac-
cording to theory. Effective participatory governance is expected to influence the alloca-
tion of the local government budget by providing information on voter preferences to 
public officials and by increasing the incentive for these officials to satisfy them. The 
empirical analysis does not assess how participatory governance influences access to 
social services or indicators of poverty, well-being, and human development, which can 
be indirect effects of implementing participatory governance. They can theoretically 
follow from the first order effect of participatory governance on the allocation of public 
resources, but several intervening variables make it difficult to pin down the influence 
of participatory governance on these outcomes. 
The criterion that I apply for evaluating the quality of the allocation of public spending 
is the degree to which it matches the preferences of the majority of voters in a jurisdic-
tion. In the study area this corresponds to a pro-poor allocation of public resources be-
cause the majority of voters in rural Guatemalan municipalities live below the poverty 
line (INE & Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia 
(SEGEPLAN), 2006).4 
Regarding the conditions for effective participatory governance the thesis extends pre-
vious research by analyzing how these forums can be implemented in an unfavorable 
context instead of focusing on success stories in favorable environments. Numerous 
studies of a few cases in Brazil, South Africa and India have found that participatory 
governance can be successfully implemented when it is supported by a strong coalition 
of civil society actors and a pro-participatory party (Avritzer, 2009; Heller, 2001; 
Wampler, 2008).  
                                                 
4 In the empirical analysis local government responsiveness is measured by the share of the budget that a 
local government allocates to social services that have been indicated as needed and preferred by village 
representatives in previously conducted interviews. 
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But should we conclude from these findings that top-down participatory governance 
reforms in countries that lack such a strong bottom-up participatory movement are 
doomed to fail? This question is addressed in the empirical analysis of Guatemalan mu-
nicipalities to find out what conditions would need to be addressed in such countries to 
foster the effective implementation of participatory governance. 
Finally, the empirical analysis in this thesis generates new policy-relevant knowledge 
for the Guatemalan government and the international donor community by evaluating 
the impact of and the conditions for an effective implementation of the Municipal De-
velopment Councils. The scarce literature on the implementation of the System of De-
velopment Councils in Guatemala and its impact consists in working papers, book chap-
ters, and donor reports in Spanish. It is mostly descriptive and does not assess the 
effects of the Development Councils on outcomes, such as local government respon-
siveness, service provision or well-being of the population. Besides, there is hardly any 
evidence on the degree of implementation at the local level across the country.5 The 
thesis reduces this knowledge gap by providing the first systematic empirical analysis of 
the conditions for successful implementation of the MDCs in rural Guatemalan munici-
palities and their impact on resource allocation decisions of the municipal governments. 
 Theoretical Approach 1.3
The next sections outline the most important aspects of the theoretical approach of the 
thesis. They outline the basic assumptions on actor behavior and the context conditions 
that influence their choices (Section 1.3.1), the definitions of the two principal theoreti-
cal concepts of the thesis (Section 1.3.2), and the justification for the choice of theories 
that guide the analysis (Section 1.3.3). 
  
                                                 
5 For further details on what we know about the context for participatory governance and the actual im-
plementation of the Development Councils, see Paper 4 (Chapter 5) and Appendix 2. 
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1.3.1 Basic Assumptions on Actors and Context Conditions 
The central theoretical assumptions of my thesis are based on “rational choice institu-
tionalism”6 (Weingast, 2002). Rational choice institutionalism comprises two major 
elements: first, human decision-making is modeled as boundedly rational (Simon, 1985) 
and second, institutions are defined as the main structural element of decision situations. 
Institutions are thus taken to be the crucial aggregation mechanism between individual 
intended behavior and social outcomes (Shepsle, 1989; Sabatier, 1993; Scharpf, 2000).  
By explicitly acknowledging the bounded rationality of human beings rational choice 
institutionalism accounts for the failures of classic rational choice based models to pre-
dict human behavior correctly (for examples of such failures, see Kahneman & Tversky, 
2000). There are three main assumptions on actor behavior in classic rational choice 
models: a) the assumption that actors have perfect cognitive abilities to receive, process, 
and retain information, b) the assumption that actors value actions and outcomes based 
on their material benefits (utility), and c) the assumption that actors select options 
through maximization (Ostrom, 2005). 
My research strategy is to employ theories that relax one or two of these assumptions at 
a time, but not all three of them simultaneously. This allows me to continue to draw on 
the analytic toolkit of economics and to acknowledge at the same time that the rationali-
ty of human behavior is limited. More specifically, the theory I apply for the assessment 
of the impact of participatory governance on local government responsiveness in Papers 
3 and 5 stresses the role of imperfect information. In the analysis of the conditions for 
effective participatory governance, I employ theories that relax the assumption that ac-
tors are motivated by the utility they obtain from material benefits. In this paper the rea-
sons for actors to choose an action are assumed to include immaterial benefits, such as 
prestige, and positive and negative feelings about the reactions of other actors, such as 
pride and shame (see Paper 4). Hence, the theoretical approach of my thesis accounts 
explicitly for information asymmetries, emotions, and other-regarding preferences.  
  
                                                 
6 Sabatier refers to the same approach as the “institutional rational choice paradigm” (Sabatier, 1993). 
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Besides individual-level factors, such as cognitive and motivational aspects, the context 
in which actors interact plays an important role for explaining their behavior. In this 
thesis, two kinds of context factors are assumed to influence actors’ decision: first, actor 
behavior is assumed to be constrained and enabled by institutions in the form of rules, 
norms, and strategies. Second, non-institutional factors, such as the resources that actors 
have at their disposition and the characteristics of a group are assumed to affect actors’ 
decisions. Such non-institutional factors can influence the capacity of actors to carry out 
certain actions and they can change the costs and benefits associated with an action 
(Ostrom, 2005). 
1.3.2 Definitions of Key Concepts 
The two key concepts for understanding the theoretical framing of the two research 
questions are institutions and governance.7 Therefore, it is important to lay out how the-
se concepts are defined and interpreted in this thesis.  
In line with Ostrom institutions are defined as “(…) prescriptions that humans use to 
organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 3). Three 
approaches to interpreting institutions have been widely established in the literature I 
draw on: institutions as equilibrium strategies, institutions as norms of behavior, and 
institutions as the rules of the game (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). All three types of insti-
tutions shape incentives for actors as non-compliance with them is sanctioned (Knight, 
1992). Institutions are adhered to because it is in the interest of all actors to comply with 
them (strategy) or because they are enforced. They can be enforced by a third party 
(rule), by other actors of society (social norm) or by actors themselves with emotions 
(personal norm) (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Grasmick, Harold G., & Bursik, 1990; 
Posner & Rasmusen, 1999). Therefore, all three types of institutions in written or un-
written form are seen as structural determinants of actor behavior and taken into account 
in the theoretical approach of this thesis. 
  
                                                 
7 For an overview of the conceptual debate among economists and political scientists about the definition 
of an institution, see e.g., Aoki (2000), Hodgson (2006), and Ostrom (2005). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of definitions and usages of the term governance, see e.g., Brunnengräber (2004) and Mayntz (2005). 
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The use of the term governance in rational choice institutionalist theories is based on the 
transaction cost theoretic work of Williamson.8 Therefore, I draw on his definition of 
governance as the design of contractual relations (and their enforcement mechanisms) in 
an effort to “(…) craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” 
(Williamson, 2000, p. 599, emphasis in the original). According to this definition, par-
ticipatory governance is the aggregate of institutional and organizational arrangements 
that structure the interaction of citizens and politicians in the provision of local public 
services. Thus, I transfer Williamson’s definition of governance to the political context 
and apply it to the allocation of public funds instead of the exchange of private funds. 
1.3.3 Principal Theories 
The theories that guide the empirical analysis in this thesis emanate from the public 
choice and the law and economics tradition, i.e., they constitute applications of econom-
ic methods to the study of politics and law. The theories I use to derive my research hy-
pothesis are political agency theory (Barro, 1973; Besley, 2007; Ferejohn, 1986), imper-
ative and behavioral theories of law (Cooter, 1998; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Scott, 
2000), distributive bargaining theory (Knight, 1992), and collective action theory 
(Ostrom, 2007). 
These theories are fruitful tools for studying the outcome of a governance reform, such 
as the introduction of participatory governance, and the conditions for its implementa-
tion. Political agency theory is well suited for analyzing the impact of participatory 
governance, because it shows how a change in governance mode can change the incen-
tives for actors in a context of imperfect information. Thus, it allows the researcher to 
study the mechanism through which participatory governance changes government per-
formance at the level of the individual. By employing both imperative and behavioral 
theories of law, I can evaluate the influence of both, self-interest, and other-regarding 
preferences on the decision of a local government to implement participatory govern-
ance. 
  
                                                 
8 In his work Williamson stresses the importance of the characteristics of an economic transaction for the 
choice of the most efficient governance mode (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2000). 
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These aspects are usually not addressed in detail in empirical analyses of participatory 
governance that draw on theories of deliberative democracy or empowerment, as these 
theories have a different focus of analysis.9 Finally, combining distributive bargaining 
theory and collective action theory allows me to derive and test theoretical predictions 
on the influence of group characteristics and socio-economic conditions. Both types of 
factors been found to influence the implementation of participatory governance in de-
veloping country contexts, but so far they have not been integrated into a theoretical 
framework for analyzing it. 
In the following I restate the research questions of the thesis to show how they are 
framed in terms of the outlined concepts and theories. Moreover, I add two sub-
questions to the second research question which will guide the empirical analysis. 
1) What impact does effective participatory governance have on the incentives of a 
boundedly rational politician to allocate the government budget according to the 
interest of voters who have only imperfect information about this decision? 
2) Under what conditions is a written institution on participatory governance im-
plemented in practice? 
a) What types of incentives motivate a boundedly rational politician to adopt 
participatory governance? 
b) What socio-economic factors and group characteristics enable civil society 
actors to enforce and implement participatory governance? 
 
  
                                                 
9 For a more detailed analysis of the main theoretical approaches that are used for guiding empirical anal-
yses of participatory governance, see Paper 1 (Chapter 2). 
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 Research Design 1.4
1.4.1 Sequencing of the Research Process 
How were the research questions examined? The main stages of the research process 
and the sequence of these stages are illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The research process 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
As Figure 1 shows, I started the research process with an exploratory fieldwork phase in 
four rural villages in June and July 2008.10 The goal of this first fieldwork phase was to 
find out what public services are relevant for satisfying the needs of the rural poor and 
how the provision of these services is governed in Guatemala. For obtaining this infor-
mation I conducted focus group discussions (six groups), and standardized, semi-
structured interviews with experts (12 interviews), village leaders (six interviews), local 
service providers (13 interviews), and households (58 interviews).  
  
                                                 




The analysis of these data increased my understanding of the livelihoods and the service 
situation of rural households, as well as my knowledge about the state of implementa-
tion of governance reforms at the local level. Both types of information were essential 
for refining the research questions of my thesis. The data showed that the Communal 
Development Council (CDC) is the most important organization for obtaining social 
infrastructure projects and for holding mayors accountable if they fail to deliver these 
services. Yet, I also found that a CDC cannot succeed in this task if the next higher level 
of the system, the Municipal Development Council (MDC), does not work (Speer, 
2009). These insights were essential for refining the research problem and the central 
research questions in the research definition phase between January and September 
2009. They also helped me in choosing theories for deriving my research hypotheses. 
Moreover, the first fieldwork phase taught me important lessons on how to design an 
appropriate empirical strategy for rural Guatemalan municipalities and how to prepare 
the second round of fieldwork. 
In the second fieldwork phase I collected data to answer the two central research ques-
tions on the impact of and the conditions for effective participatory governance in the 
MDCs in ten municipalities in six different regions. The first part of this second field-
work phase was conducted from October 2009 to December 2009 and the second part 
from January 2010 to March 2010. Together with the first fieldwork phase I spent five 
months in the study area. 
Finally, I prepared, analyzed and interpreted the data from the second fieldwork phase 
from April 2010 to April 2011. During this time I tested my research hypotheses, I re-
fined the theoretical predictions on the impact of and the conditions for participatory 
governance based on my findings and I elaborated policy recommendations for policy 
makers and donor representatives. 
The papers of this thesis are primarily based on data from the second fieldwork phase. 
Consequently, the following descriptions of the empirical strategy (Section 1.4.2), of the 
case selection (Section 1.4.3), and of the methods for data collection (Section 1.4.4), 




1.4.2 Empirical Strategy 
The empirical analysis of the two research questions needs to address two main chal-
lenges: first, for evaluating the research questions several multi-dimensional concepts 
need to be measured appropriately in the context of the studied cases. Second, Guatema-
la is characterized by a high degree of socio-economic and cultural heterogeneity be-
tween its regions. This heterogeneity implies that findings from one region may not ap-
ply to other regions. Both challenges are typical problems for research on participatory 
governance in developing countries. Due to the first challenge, most studies on this top-
ic have been conducted in the form of case studies and meta-analyses of these case stud-
ies. The second challenge however cannot be addressed by case studies, as it requires 
investigating a larger sample of cases. Quantitative studies on participatory governance 
with large samples of cases are scarce and those that have been carried out suffer from 
measurement problems because detailed data on participatory governance are not avail-
able for developing countries.11 
To address both challenges the empirical analysis of this thesis is based on an innovative 
research strategy. It draws on a systematic comparative study of ten cases and a case 
study. This empirical strategy is supposed to overcome both, the limited external validi-
ty of a case study and the limited internal validity of quantitative studies. Comparing the 
experiences of an intermediate number of cases from all of Guatemala’s main socio-
economic regions means that I can test a number of explanations that have been pro-
posed in case studies and generalize my results moderately. At the same time, collecting 
qualitative data allows me to measure the functioning of participatory governance and 
its effects in a comprehensive and context-sensitive way, which would have been im-
possible in a survey of a large number of cases. In sum, studying an intermediate num-
ber of cases has the advantage of having a higher external validity compared with a case 
study, without compromising as much internal validity as studies with large samples 
(Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007) 
  
                                                 




The comparative analysis in the thesis is based on data from ten municipalities which 
are analyzed with fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000, 
2008). FsQCA is a systematic and transparent method for analyzing data from an inter-
mediate number of cases. Causal relationships are determined in a fsQCA based on the 
necessity and the sufficiency of an explanans (condition) for an explanandum (outcome) 
and not based on the probability with which the explanans has an effect on the ex-
planandum. Hence, fsQCA determines causal relationships based on a deterministic 
notion of causality as it is promoted in Mill’s methods (Mill, 1967 [1843]). Its epistemo-
logical foundation differs substantially from the probabilistic understanding of causal 
relationships that underlies statistical methods (Ragin, 1987, Ragin, 2006; Rohwer, 
2010). 
FsQCA systematically compares the characteristics of cases using an algorithm that is 
based on fuzzy-logic12.The result of this comparison, the so-called solution formula, 
indicates the necessity and sufficiency of the conditions for an outcome. The validity 
and utility of the solution formula is then evaluated by drawing on qualitative data from 
the cases to ensure that the solution formula is consistent with the case-level evidence 
and that it increases our understanding of the cases (Ragin, 1987; Schneider & Wage-
mann, 2010).  
One of key advantages of fsQCA is that it can reveal patterns of multiple conjunctural 
causation (Ragin, 2000; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Specifically, fsQCA allows for patterns 
of causality where conditions affect an outcome in combination with other conditions, 
where conditions affect an outcome in different ways depending on the context, and 
where different combinations of conditions lead to the same outcome (Berg-Schlosser, 
de Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009). Hence, causality is interpreted in fsQCA as complex 
and context specific. 
The qualitative comparative analysis is complemented with a case study. By examining 
how and why differences in conditions lead to differences in outcomes in two extreme 
cases the case study provides a deeper insight into the mechanism behind the general-
ized pattern of causation that the fsQCA solution formula reveals. Thus, it adds to the 
validity of the findings of the qualitative comparative analysis (Yin, 2003). 
                                                 
12 Fuzzy logic is a superset of Boolean logic. It is a multi-valued logic that is derived from fuzzy-set theo-
ry and allows for calculating values between zero and one (Zadeh, 1965; Zadeh, 1972). 
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The empirical strategy links deductive and inductive elements in a continuous dialogue 
between theory and evidence. On the one hand, I derive the research hypotheses from 
theory to contribute to theory development with my findings. Moreover, to be able to 
make analytic generalizations I carry out the case selection based on the conditions that 
theoretically influence the outcome. Besides, the data collection instruments are de-
signed to capture the conditions that are theoretically predicted to affect the outcome. 
On the other hand, the empirical strategy includes inductive elements to reduce meas-
urement error and to gain new insights beyond the confirmation or rejection of the re-
search hypotheses. For example, I adjust the fuzzy-set value definitions for the calibra-
tion of the data according to my substantial case and context knowledge. This is done to 
ensure that differences in expressions of attributes are measured in a meaningful way 
across cases. Furthermore, I use open and in-vivo coding of the interview data to cap-
ture additional dimensions of a concept and to gain new insights on the causal relation-
ship between the conditions and the outcome.13  
The perspective of the empirical analysis is predominantly static. The fsQCAs exploit 
differences in configurations of conditions and outcomes at one point in time for analyz-
ing causal relationships. Similarly, the case study compares the current dynamics in two 
municipalities. The empirical analysis does not track the processes that lead to these 
differences in detail. Thus, it sacrifices some of the depth of a qualitative case study.14 
1.4.3 Case Selection 
The criteria for the case selection are guided by Mill’s (1967 [1843]) indirect method of 
difference, or, as it was later called by Przeworski and Teune (1970), the Most Similar 
Systems Design (MSSD). In the MSSD cases (systems) are similar in their characteris-
tics, but they vary in their outcomes. The idea behind this quasi experimental case selec-
tion design is that we can identify the factors that cause differences in outcomes by 
eliminating factors that cases share, i.e., by discovering in what factors the cases differ 
despite their similarity (Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 2009; Blatter, Janning, & Wage-
mann, 2007). 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed description of the interplay between theory and evidence in the qualitative compar-
ative analysis, see Paper 2 (Chapter 3). 
14 For a more comprehensive discussion of the limitations of the thesis, see the Chapter 7.3. 
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For selecting the ten municipalities for the qualitative comparative analysis, I applied 
the MSSD as follows: the universe of cases consisted of all 333 Guatemalan municipali-
ties. The selection of municipalities from this universe was done in five steps in which I 
reduced the number of cases to ten. In the first step, I defined all rural municipalities, 
i.e., the 155 municipalities in which more than 70% of the population live in rural areas, 
as the population of cases. Then, in the second step, I randomly selected 45 municipali-
ties that varied in their outcomes to make sure that cases with high and low government 
responsiveness are included. In the third step I eliminated municipalities that differed 
strongly from other municipalities in key characteristics. Thus, I kept only 35 munici-
palities in the selection that have similar systems, which means that these cases share 
important characteristics that could affect the outcome. After that I reduced the selection 
to 27 “most likely” and “least likely” cases, i.e., to cases that are likely and cases that 
are unlikely to display the outcome according to their configuration of causal condi-
tions. Finally, in the fifth step, I chose ten out of the 27 municipalities so that both in-
digenous and non-indigenous municipalities, as well as cases from all major socio-
economic regions of the country were included. Appendix 3 contains a detailed descrip-
tion of the case selection, a map indicating the location of the cases, as well as two ta-
bles that summarize their main characteristics. 
1.4.4 Data Collection  
In the data collection for the empirical analysis I combined a range of instruments, 
which I applied with the support of my Guatemalan fieldwork assistants. Upon arrival 
in a municipality, we set up a focus group or conducted an interview with a key inform-
ant to get an overview of the actor constellation and the socio-economic context of the 
municipality. For this purpose, we used an open interview guideline and visual inter-
viewing techniques, such as influence and information flow mapping (Schiffer & Waale, 
2008). 
After this entry meeting, we collected qualitative primary data using semi-structured 
interviews. In each of the ten municipalities we conducted between eight and ten exten-
sive interviews with the mayor, representatives of Communal Development Councils 
(CDCs) and local civil society organizations, as well as local journalists. Overall we 




The interview guideline for these interviews contained both structured and open ques-
tions. The main topics we covered were: 1) mayor, 2a) civil society, 2b) community 
representatives, 3) central government, 4) social and economic conditions, 5) infor-
mation flows, 6) elections, 7) Municipal Development Council, and 8) allocation of 
public funds. For typical questions on each of these topics, see Appendix 4 which con-
tains an exemplary interview guideline. 
To obtain supplementary primary quantitative data on the cases, e.g., on the frequency 
of meetings of the participatory governance forum or municipal spending, we used a 
pre-structured data collection sheet. For each municipality we filled this sheet with the 
information that we had gathered in several departments of the municipal administra-
tion. Moreover, we collected secondary qualitative data, such as minutes of meetings, 
Municipal Development Plans, and local media reports in each municipality. We also 
retrieved secondary quantitative data, such as demographic, economic, political, and 
social indicators for all ten cases from the national statistics institute. 
Lastly, we carried out semi-structured interviews with eleven key experts in Guatemala 
City at the beginning and at the end of the fieldwork phase to complement the data on 
the cases with background information on the national context for the implementation 
of participatory governance. 
1.4.5 Data Preparation and Analysis 
During the interviews and focus group discussions my fieldwork assistant and I took 
notes and we recorded the interview. We conducted all interviews in Spanish. After en-
tering the interview notes into a text editor, we revised them; for processing complex 
and long interviews we also compared our notes with the recording or transcribed the 
interview. 
After completing the data processing, I conducted a content analysis of the qualitative 
data with the help of the software Atlas.ti to categorize the data for the case study and 
the fsQCA. For this analysis I developed a list of codes based on the theoretical framing 
of the research questions and the research hypotheses. This initial list was complement-
ed during the coding process with new codes that I created through open and in-vivo 
coding. The final list of codes with the initial and the newly created codes is presented 
in Appendix 5.   
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For the fsQCA the coded qualitative data were then calibrated as fuzzy-sets. Fuzzy sets 
can have values between zero (full exclusion from the set) and one (full inclusion in the 
set). For the calibration, I summarized the code output in qualitative classifications for 
each case. Next, I determined the fuzzy-set scale and defined the fuzzy-set values. Last-
ly, I assigned and revised the fuzzy-set values of the conditions and the outcome for each 
case. This calibration process is described in detail in Paper 2 (Chapter 3). 
The quantitative data that I use in the fsQCA were calibrated as fuzzy-sets with the direct 
calibration technique which is outlined in detail in Ragin (2008, pp. 85–94). For the di-
rect calibration of the data I determined the fuzzy-set anchor points “fully out” (0), “nei-
ther in nor out” (0.5), and “fully in” (1) based on my case- and context knowledge. 
Then, I employed the algorithm contained in the software fsQCA to calibrate the quanti-
tative data (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006). 
After calibrating the raw data as fuzzy sets, I used the fsQCA software to assess the ne-
cessity and sufficiency of the conditions for the two main outcomes that are evaluated in 
this thesis, local government responsiveness and effective participatory governance. The 
details of the fsQCAs are provided in Paper 3 and Paper 4 (Chapter 4 and 5). 
For the case study of two municipalities in Paper 5 (Chapter 6), I used the query tool of 
the Atlas.ti software after coding the interview data. With this tool I extracted the coded 
quotes from the two municipalities that provided information for answering the research 
question of the case study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This information was then re-
viewed, organized, and interpreted by drawing on the criteria that my co-author Markus 
Hanisch and I present in the theoretical part of the case study. 
 Thesis Outline 1.5
The five papers of the thesis contribute to the overall research goal and provide part of 
the answer to the two central research questions. In the following I outline the sub-
research question, the approach and the contribution of each of the five papers. At the 
end of each section, I also lay out how the paper connects to the other papers. The main 
results of the papers, the implications of these results for theory development and policy 
making, as well as the limitations of the thesis and areas of further research are dis-
cussed in depth in the conclusion (Chapter 7). 
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1.5.1 Paper 1: Literature Review on Participatory Governance 
The first paper of my thesis aims at summarizing and evaluating the existing evidence 
on participatory governance. It reviews the international literature on the impact of par-
ticipatory governance and the conditions that are required to make it work. Hence, it 
addresses the sub-research question:  
What do we know about the impact of and the conditions for effective participa-
tory governance from previous research? 
The literature review begins with an overview of the development of the key strands of 
the literature and a brief description of their focus and normative perspective. Then, I 
proceed to a summary of the main findings on the impact of and the conditions for suc-
cessful participatory governance. Finally, I discuss the strength and weaknesses of the 
reviewed literature and outline indications for future research. 
The literature review shows that participatory governance has become an integral part of 
the good governance agenda of the international development community and that it has 
been implemented in a number of countries in order to increase government responsive-
ness. There is however not much evidence on the assumed positive effects of participa-
tory governance on government performance. Previous research also suggests that im-
plementing participatory governance effectively requires a high level of capacity and 
motivation among public officials and citizens. 
By summarizing and critically discussing the literature on a range of participatory gov-
ernance experiments Paper 1 brings together the findings from different disciplinary and 
conceptual backgrounds and identifies advances and remaining challenges in this di-
verse field of research. Thus, the literature review motivates and informs the theoretical 
and empirical analyses in Papers 3, 4, and 5. 
1.5.2 Paper 2: Refinement of the Main Empirical Method 
The second paper of my thesis has the goal to develop a structured approach for using 
qualitative data in fsQCA. In this paper Xavier Basurto and I address the research ques-
tion:  
How can qualitative data be collected systematically and calibrated reliably as 
fuzzy sets for fsQCA? 
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To answer this question, we propose a transparent and replicable procedure for collect-
ing and calibrating qualitative data for fsQCA. We illustrate each of the steps of the pro-
cedure with an example from my empirical analysis. The procedure we propose begins 
with the determination of the conditions and the outcome of a study and the derivation 
of the research hypotheses. It ends with the assignment and revision of fuzzy-set values 
of the conditions and the outcome for each case. In between, we describe the operation-
alization of the conditions and the outcome, the development of anchor points for fuzzy 
sets, the formulation of the interview guideline, the content analysis and summary of the 
interview data, and the definition of fuzzy-set values.  
By putting forward a systematic procedure for calibrating qualitative interview data we 
complement available calibration techniques for fsQCA, which have covered only quan-
titative data so far (Ragin, 2008). We also make the application of fsQCA more trans-
parent for other researchers and facilitate the replication of fsQCA studies. Thus, we 
expand the range of best practices in the application of interview data based fsQCA. 
The procedure we propose is followed in the collection, preparation, and analysis of the 
data for the two qualitative comparative Papers (Paper 3 and 4) in which I use fsQCA. 
The second paper hence makes the empirical analysis in these two papers more compre-
hensible and reproducible, which lends support to their findings. 
1.5.3 Paper 3: Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Participatory Governance 
The aim of the third paper is to determine the conditions for local government respon-
siveness in the ten case municipalities. It contributes to answering the first central re-
search question about the influence of participatory governance on the allocation of 
public resources. Specifically, it addresses the sub-research questions:  
What is the impact of participatory governance on local government responsive-
ness? How is this impact linked to the presence of other accountability mecha-





The main research hypotheses of the paper are derived from political agency theory. 
According to this theory effective participatory governance, competitive local elections, 
and good access to local media are all potential solutions to the agency problem be-
tween voters and a politician. Hence, the main research hypothesis of the paper is that 
these three mechanisms together contribute to local government responsiveness. More-
over, theoretical arguments suggest that the effectiveness of the three accountability 
mechanisms is promoted by economic equality, ethnic homogeneity, and a high level of 
education. The research hypotheses are examined in a two-step fsQCA of the ten munic-
ipalities. In addition, I draw on qualitative case-level evidence for interpreting the 
fsQCA solution formulas and for shedding light on the processes that generate it. 
The contributions I make with this paper are: first, I point out and test the conjunctural 
causation of three accountability mechanisms that are often in place at the same time but 
have so far not been analyzed collectively. Second, I take the context-sensitivity of the 
effectiveness of these accountability mechanisms seriously and test for it explicitly with 
an innovative fsQCA technique, which has not been done in previous studies on local 
government responsiveness. 
The key finding of the paper is that participatory governance and competitive elections 
need to be jointly present for local government responsiveness. The combination of in-
formation about government actions in participatory governance forums and the credi-
ble threat not to be re-elected increase the incentives for a government to act in the in-
terest of its electorate. This finding provides an empirical argument for implementing 
participatory governance, which motivates the analysis of the conditions that are likely 
to facilitate this process in Paper 4. It also raises the question how participatory govern-
ance complements elections, which is examined in detail in Paper 5. 
1.5.4 Paper 4: Comparative Analysis of the Conditions for Participatory Governance 
The fourth paper aims at explaining the deeper reasons for the variation in the effective-
ness of participatory governance within Guatemala. It contributes to the second central 
research question, i.e., to the question what conditions need to be present for the effec-
tive implementation of participatory governance. Precisely, the paper seeks to answer 




What motivates a mayor to adopt participatory governance forums? And, what en-
ables civil society actors to exert pressure on their local government to establish 
and run a participatory governance forum effectively?15 
In the theoretical part of the paper I derive a research hypothesis on the incentives for a 
mayor to implement participatory governance based on imperative and behavioral theo-
ries of law. For the second sub-research question, I derive a research hypothesis on the 
factors that influence civil society capacity to engage in debates with office-holders 
from distributive bargaining theory and collective action theory. In the empirical part of 
the paper I test the two research hypotheses with two fsQCAs and draw on case-level 
evidence to discuss the validity and utility of the fsQCA results. 
The findings of the paper indicate that a mayor can be motivated to run a participatory 
governance forum by the combination of seeing a benefit in running the forum, self-
enforcement of the obligation to run the forum and social enforcement of the law by 
civil society actors. The paper’s findings also suggest that social enforcement can only 
take place when there is a large number of civil society organizations, when citizens 
have a high capacity to engage in public debates and when the cost of attending meet-
ings are relatively low. 
These findings deepen the debate on what institutional incentives can lead to the im-
plementation of participatory governance and they highlight interaction effects of group 
characteristics and individual level factors for effective citizen participation. They show 
what conditions would need to be addressed to make participatory governance more 
effective and, thus, to increase local government responsiveness, as was shown in Paper 
3. The feasibility of fostering these conditions in Guatemala is discussed in Paper 5. 
  
                                                 
15 The paper focuses on these two sub-research questions because the historic and social context of the 
participatory governance reform in Guatemala suggest that the two key factors that are likely to constrain 
its effective implementation are the rejection of the reform by mayors and the low level of civil society 
capacity. This argument is explained in more detail in Paper 4 (Chapter 5) and Appendix 2. 
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1.5.5 Paper 5: Case Study on the Link between Participatory Governance and Re-
sponsiveness 
The aim of the fifth paper is to examine the potential of participatory governance fo-
rums to provide information to voters in rural areas effectively and to discuss policy 
options for strengthening this potential. Hence, it contributes to both central research 
questions. In this paper Markus Hanisch and I address the sub-research questions:  
Can participatory governance forums effectively reduce the information asym-
metry between voters and a politician and contribute to local government respon-
siveness? How and under what conditions can they fulfill this task? And, which 
policy measures can improve these conditions? 
In the conceptual part of the case study we derive the research proposition that a partici-
patory governance forum that provides information effectively can contribute to local 
government responsiveness. We evaluate this proposition in a case study in which we 
contrast the dynamics in two municipalities, one with a Municipal Development Coun-
cil (MDC) that provides information effectively and one with a MDC that does not 
function in this way. Then we examine the performance of the local governments in the 
two municipalities. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the differences in the per-
formance of the two MDCs and, thus, explore the conditions that need to be in place for 
effective information provision through participatory governance. After that, we discuss 
the policy implications of the case study.  
The case study findings lend further support to the key result of Paper 3 that the combi-
nation of effective information provision through participatory governance and competi-
tive elections leads to local government responsiveness. Thus, it contributes to the em-
pirical literature on the mechanisms through which participatory governance improves 
the quality of government. The case study also shows how the conditions that are found 
to be necessary and sufficient for civil society enforcement of participatory governance 
in the comparative analysis of Paper 4 influence the functioning of two specific MDCs. 
Finally, the paper provides an assessment of the feasibility of policy measures for in-
creasing the effectiveness of participatory governance forums in Guatemala by address-
ing these conditions; hence, it adds to the policy debate about the viability of achieving 
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Abstract: Over the last twenty years participatory governance reforms have been wide-
ly promoted in developing countries. Participatory governance has come to be perceived 
as an integral part of good governance because it is claimed to increase the accountabil-
ity and responsiveness of local governments. Thus, it is believed to make public service 
provision more efficient and sustainable. This paper evaluates these claims by conduct-
ing a critical review of the literature on participatory governance. It concludes that so 
far there is little substantial evidence of a positive effect of participatory governance on 
government responsiveness and the quality of public services. The reviewed studies also 
suggests that making participatory governance arrangements work as effective account-
ability mechanisms requires a level of capacity and motivation among public officials 
and citizens that is unlikely to be present in many developing countries. 





 Aims and Scope 2.1
“[O]pening up of the core activities of the state to societal participation is one 
 of the most effective ways to improve accountability and governance.” 
(Ackerman, 2004, p. 448) 
“I believe that in the light of the available evidence it is important to temper present-day  
excessive optimism about the short-run prospects of participatory development.”  
(Platteau, 2009, p. 27) 
In the last twenty years, the promotion of participation in developing countries has in-
creasingly included the adoption of various forms of participatory governance, such as 
participatory planning and participatory monitoring and evaluation. Nowadays, partici-
patory governance is widely implemented and firmly anchored in the development 
strategies of most donors and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Participatory governance mechanisms are broadly defined as institutional arrangements 
that aim to “(…) facilitate the participation of ordinary citizens in the public policy pro-
cess” (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007, p. 1090). They involve citizens in decision-
making over the distribution of public funds between different communities and the 
design of public policies, as well as in auditing past government spending. Hence, par-
ticipatory governance mechanisms differ from community-based development schemes 
in which community members participate in the planning, implementation, and monitor-
ing of a development project within their community. 
Donors, NGOs and political parties who promote the implementation of participatory 
governance in developing countries argue that it is both a means to improve public ser-
vice delivery and a strategy to deepen democracy. Participatory governance is stated to 
increase local government responsiveness and accountability. Thus, it is claimed to im-
prove the efficiency and sustainability of public service delivery, as well as the match 
between public services and beneficiaries’ preferences (Ackerman, 2004; Shah, 2007; 
World Bank, 2003). Involving citizens in decision-making over public policy is also 
argued to consolidate young democracies by breaking up patterns of particularistic poli-
cy-making and promoting public deliberation and citizenship (Avritzer, 2002; 
Schönleitner, 2004). 
In the hope to realize these benefits a large number of laws on participatory governance 
have been passed and many civil society initiatives for increasing participation in public 
decision-making have been established all over the developing world.   
 
33 
Reformers have experimented with various forms of participatory governance including 
public hearings (India, Philippines), vigilance committees (Bolivia, Philippines), partic-
ipatory budgeting (Brazil, Peru) and forums for participatory planning and decision-
making over public service provision (Bolivia, Mali, Uganda, Mexico) (Ackerman, 
2004; Blair, 2000; Commins, 2007). 
This literature review aims to provide an overview of the scientific evidence on the con-
ditions for and the effect of participatory governance in order to evaluate the validity of 
the deeply rooted claims about the benefits of participatory governance in the develop-
ment community. The review focuses on the effect of participatory governance on gov-
ernment accountability and responsiveness. Thus, it assesses the potential of participa-
tory governance to improve the efficiency, equity, and sustainability of public service 
provision. In addition, it summarizes the empirical evidence on the conditions that are 
required to make participatory governance work to asses the feasibility of implementing 
it effectively in developing countries. 
The literature review shows that empirical studies have so far not established a causal 
link between participatory governance and the positive effects it is assumed to have on 
government performance and service quality. Moreover, research on the conditions for 
participatory governance suggests that effective participatory governance requires a 
level of capacity and motivation among public officials and citizens that is unlikely to 
be present in a large number of developing countries. All in all, the reviewed evidence 
does seem to justify the promotion of participatory governance as a panacea for improv-
ing local public service provision. 
The next section provides a short overview of the background, the focus and the norma-
tive perspective of the main strands of research on participatory governance and their 
links to the literature on decentralization and community development (Section 2.2). 
Then, Section 2.3 summarizes the main findings on the effect of and the conditions for 
successful participatory governance. After that, Section 2.4 discusses strengths and 
weaknesses of the literature on participatory governance. The final section concludes 




 Background, Partitioning, and Delimitation of the Literature 2.2
Arguments for and against citizen participation have been discussed in development 
theory and policy for many years and, as Hickey states, “[f]ar from being defeated, the 
eighty-year history of participation within development thinking shows little sign of 
abating.” (2004a, pp. 20–21). Various forms of participation have been tried out in de-
velopment cooperation projects and development country politics.1 For most of the 
time, development policy practice and theory have concentrated on the participation of 
beneficiaries to incorporate local knowledge into the planning, implementation and 
monitoring of development projects. From the early 1990s onwards academics and do-
nor agencies have increasingly stressed however that citizens should also participate in 
public policy processes to make government institutions more accountable, legitimate, 
and responsive (Gaventa, 2004). Thus, participatory governance has entered the devel-
opment policy agenda about twenty years ago. 
The move towards participatory governance was motivated by failures in centrally pro-
vided public services and shortcomings in conventional systems of accountability, as 
well as by an increased emphasis on “getting governance structures and institutions 
right” to make the state more effective (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001; Prichett & Woolcock, 
2004; World Bank, 1997). In addition, the so-called “third wave of democratization” 
and the widespread decentralization reforms in developing countries have fostered the 
demand for improving accountability relationships between local governments and citi-
zens (Bräutigam, 2004). Participatory governance has thus become an integral part of 
the good governance agenda as one of the most popular mechanisms for strengthening 
vertical accountability. 
Participatory governance is not a neutral development technique and all research on this 
topic is based on a normative perspective that is rarely made explicit or discussed 
(Goldfrank 2007a). This perspective determines the focus of a study and thus the scope 
of its findings. Therefore, I take into account the normative perspective of the studies I 
evaluate in this literature. What is more, I organize the reviewed literature in four 
strands based on the four different normative perspectives that studies on participatory 
governance usually adopt.  
                                                 




The four strands I propose to define are: 1) the democratic decentralization strand (lib-
eral perspective), 2) the deliberative democracy strand (radical democratic perspective), 
3) the empowerment strand (leftist perspective), and 4) the self-governance strand (pol-
ycentric perspective). In the following I briefly outline the key characteristics of each of 
these strands. An overview of these characteristics is provided in Figure 1. 
To begin with, scholars from the democratic decentralization strand of the literature 
argue that participatory governance is crucial for increasing the accountability and re-
sponsiveness of local governments (Blair, 2000; Harriss, Stokke, & Törnquist, 2004; 
Crook & Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999). This literature emerged from political economy 
studies of the implementation of decentralization in Africa and Asia. Authors from this 
strand of the literature tend to take a liberal stance on participatory governance accord-
ing to which participatory governance is seen as one of several so-called “second gener-
ation” reforms for improving the institutional set-up of developing countries. Participa-
tory governance is expected to remedy problems of elite capture and clientelistic 
policymaking at the local level that have been observed in decentralized developing 
country governments (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000; Crook, 2003; Ruttan, 1997). Thus, 
participatory governance is predicted to increase the legitimacy of a government and to 
prevent social exclusion from public services. This perspective on participatory govern-
ance is also adopted in parts of the broader development policy literature on good gov-
ernance of public service governance (Ackerman, 2004; Prichett & Woolcock, 2004; 
World Bank, 2003).  
In a second strand of the literature participatory governance is primarily perceived as a 
means to come closer to the ideal of deliberative democracy. Scholars from this strand 
of the literature tend to take a radical democratic view on participatory governance. Ac-
cording to this view participatory governance should make a political system more 
democratic by strengthening deliberative forms of decision-making. The deliberation 
and contestation of ideas that takes place in participatory governance bodies is also pre-
dicted to lead to better policy outcomes and to make state decisions more transparent 
and equitable (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Bucek & Smith, 2000; Weeks, 2000). Delibera-
tive democracy scholars draw mostly on experiences with participatory budgeting in 
Brazil, but they have also examined cases in Asia and Africa (Abers, 1998; Avritzer, 




In a third strand of the literature authors take the view that the ultimate goal of participa-
tory governance reforms is the empowerment of the poor. This perspective is inspired, 
on the one hand, by the theoretical discourse on the role of power in societal order and 
political institutions (Dahl, 1957; Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Giddens, 1984; Lukes, 
1974; Gaventa, 1980) and, on the other hand, by Sen’s (1999) capability approach. 
From the late 1990s onwards researchers at development cooperation think tanks, such 
as the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) in Sussex and the World Bank, have in-
vestigated the potential of participatory governance mechanisms to increase human ca-
pabilities and to empower the poor in order to overcome existing societal and political 
power structures (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2006; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Narayan-Parker, 
2000; Nelson & Wright, 1995). These researchers tend to adopt a leftist view according 
to which participatory governance can only be successful in improving the livelihoods 
of the poor if it challenges existing institutions and structures and, thus, overcomes 
structural conditions of underdevelopment. Research in this strand of the literature is 
mostly conducted in the form of concept-based2 case studies from, e.g., Peru, India, and 
Bangladesh (Brinkerhoff & Azfar, 2006; Gaventa, 2004; Gibson & Woolcock, 2008; 
Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
Finally, in a fourth body of studies participatory governance is seen as a flexible deci-
sion-making mode for successful self-governance in polycentric systems. According to 
this view, the goal of implementing participatory governance is to allow citizens to in-
fluence the design and implementation of everyday rules on public services (Gibson & 
Lehoucq, 2003; Andersson, Gibson, & Lehoucq, 2006; Andersson, Gordillo, & van 
Laerhoven, 2009). Hence, scholars from this body of literature see participatory govern-
ance as a promising design principle for collective decision-making because it allows 
public service providers and users to develop governance solutions that are tailored to 
local circumstances (Ostrom, 2005). Thus, participatory governance is seen as a way to 
make public service provision resilient to changes in these circumstances. The self-
governance strand of the literature mainly comprises quantitative analyses and case 
studies of participatory governance in Latin America (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 
2007; Andersson, Gibson, & Lehoucq, 2006; García-López & Arizpe, 2010).  
                                                 
2 One of the most popular concepts in research on participatory governance is the concept of “Empowered 
Deliberative Democracy (EDD)” (Fung and Wright 2001). EDD combines elements of the deliberative 
democracy and the empowerment strand and has been widely used as a reference point for evaluating 




Figure 1: Overview of the classification of the literature 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
Besides these four strands of the literature there are two bodies of literature that are 
closely related to the topic of participatory governance: the literature on community-
based development and the literature on decentralization. These two literatures will not 
be reviewed here in depth because they address different aspects of participation and 
public service provision. 
The literature on community-based development analyzes the role of beneficiary partic-
ipation in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of development projects. Its 
main focus is on in-group dynamics at the community level and not on the interaction 
between representatives from several communities and civil society organizations and 
elected representatives that are addressed by the literature on participatory governance 
(Bardhan, 1993; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Brett, 1996; Chambers, 1995; Gerson, 1993; 
Hickey & Mohan, 2004b; Mason & Beard, 2008).   
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Yet, some findings from this literature on issues, such as the role of heterogeneity for 
collective action, elite capture of funds and information distortion are potentially rele-
vant for the interaction between citizen representatives and politicians in participatory 
governance arrangements as well (Conning & Kevane, 2002; Kwaja, 2009; Mansuri & 
Rao, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Platteau, 2009). Hence, though the literature 
review does not cover this wide field of the literature in depth such insights are present-
ed when they complement findings on participatory governance. 
In the literature on the implementation of decentralization in developing countries the 
delegation of political power to lower levels of the state is often discussed together with 
participatory governance arrangements under the conceptual roof of democratic decen-
tralization (Crook & Manor, 1998; Crook, 2003; Manor, 1999). Yet, the normative and 
positive debate about decentralization, service delivery, and poverty focuses on deter-
mining the optimal level of government for efficient and responsive public service pro-
vision (Ahmad & Brosio, 2009; Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000, Bardhan 
& Mookherjee, 2006; Grote & von Braun, 2000; Jütting, Corsi, Kauffmann, McDonnell, 
Osterrieder, Pinaud et al., 2005; Peterson, 1997; Seabright, 1996; Shah, Thompson, & 
Zou, 2004). This debate centers on the question how responsibilities and public re-
sources should be distributed between different levels of government. It does not ad-
dress the question whether citizens should be involved in decision-making by public 
officials between elections. As has been outline above, insights from the democratic 
decentralization scholars that refer to participatory governance are integrated in this 
review, but the optimal level of decentralization, the conditions that make it work and its 
impact on public service delivery and poverty are beyond its scope. 
 The Key Findings of the Literature on Participatory Governance 2.3
The following two sections summarize the main findings of the literature on the impact 
of and the conditions for participatory governance. Section 2.3.1 reviews the results on 
the impact of participatory governance on local government responsiveness, the quality 
of public service provision, and indicators of well-being. Consequently, this section 
draws mainly on studies from what I have classified as the democratic decentralization 




Section 2.3.2 reviews the literature on the conditions for effective participatory govern-
ance. It begins with the research on the factors that influence the capacity and motiva-
tion of civil society actors to participate. Then, it turns to research on the contribution of 
public officials to making participatory governance work. In this section I draw on stud-
ies from all four strands of the literature, because they all examine different aspects of 
the enabling environment for participatory governance. 
The complementary Appendix provides information on the theoretical approach, the 
strand of the literature, the study area, and the key results of the reviewed studies. The 
studies are arranged in the Appendix according to their research design, i.e., they are 
sorted into the categories “case studies”, “comparative studies”, “regression analyses”, 
and “meta-analyses”. 
2.3.1 The Impact of Participatory Governance on Government Responsiveness, Ser-
vice Quality and Well-Being 
The main theoretical argument on the impact of participatory governance in the demo-
cratic decentralization and political economy oriented strand of the literature is derived 
from principal agent theory (Ackerman, 2004; Besley, Pande, & Rao, 2005; Brinker-
hoff, Brinkerhoff, & McNulty, 2007; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Paul, 1992; Schneider, 
1999). Based on this theory scholars argue that participatory governance can help to 
overcome the agency problem between voters (the principals) and their elected repre-
sentative (agent) by contributing to the key elements of a favorable incentive structure 
for the agent: on the one hand, participatory governance forums can improve infor-
mation flows from citizens to governments about citizen preferences and from govern-
ments to citizens about government decisions and actions, as well as about service pro-
vision outcomes. On the other hand, citizens are included into the decision-making 
process in participatory governance forums, which is argued to reduce the discretion of 
the local government in choosing, e.g., the location and quality of a new facility. Finally, 
when citizens are effectively involved in the process of service provision, government 
accountability is expected to be strengthened because citizens can demand corrective 




These theoretical arguments for the positive effects of participatory governance are fre-
quently cited, but so far they have not been translated in established formal agency 
models.3 Such models could account for the specific institutional features of different 
participatory governance reforms, such as the type of information that is exchanged and 
the severity of sanctions that citizens can impose on office-holders. Thus, they would 
refine the theoretical analysis of the micro-level mechanisms through which participa-
tory governance is stated to affect government performance. 
The empirical evidence on the theoretical arguments for a positive impact of participa-
tory governance on government responsiveness is not conclusive (Commins, 2007; 
Robinson, 2003). On the one hand, there are several studies with positive findings. For 
instance, Schneider and Goldfrank (2002) and Boulding and Wampler (2010) show that 
participatory budgeting has increased the share of government spending that is allocated 
to education, health and sanitation in Brazil. Besley et al. (2005) find that holding a 
Gram Sabha meeting in South Indian villages makes it more likely that poverty cards 
are targeted towards the needy. Also, Heller’s (2001) case study demonstrates that par-
ticipatory budgeting in Brazil and village meetings in India have increased government 
spending in line with the needs of the poor. On the other hand, Bräutigam (2004) finds 
in a comparative study of five countries that participatory budgeting is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to make government spending more pro-poor. She concludes that “[o]ften 
citizens are listened to or ‘consulted’ and this is called participation, but in such cases it 
is not uncommon for both the citizens and those who consult them to be aware that deci-
sions are not likely to be changed” (Bräutigam, 2004, p. 654). Similarly, Shatkin (2000), 
who studied participatory planning of urban housing in the Philippines, concludes that it 
has not increased the influence of citizens on government decisions and therefore not 
increased government responsiveness. Lastly, Francis and James (2003) show that deci-
sions on resource allocation to villages in Uganda do not reflect villagers’ needs in spite 
of having been planned with their participation.  
  
                                                 
3 For a first attempt to develop an agency model of participatory planning forums, see Speer (2010). 
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Further down the chain of the purported positive effects of participatory governance, it 
is argued that citizen monitoring of the implementation of projects can increase the effi-
ciency of public service delivery and the quality of services. Moreover, citizen partici-
pation in the decision-making over public resources is claimed to enhance access to 
services for the poor and to improve their income situation and well-being through bet-
ter access to public services (Baiocchi, 2001; Shah, 2007).  
So far however, there is little evidence on a causal link between participatory govern-
ance and such outcomes. Establishing this link is difficult because these outcomes are 
also influenced by a number of other factors, such as the financial resources of a gov-
ernment. The small number of mainly qualitative studies that have looked at this rela-
tionship cannot overcome this identification problem, but they put forward some tenta-
tive evidence for a positive impact of participatory governance. For example, Evans 
(2004) argues that participatory governance has led to an expansion of public infrastruc-
ture and higher efficiency in service production, as well as better human development 
indicators in Porto Alegre (Brazil) and Kerala (India). Fox and Aranda (1996) studied 
participatory decision-making over rural infrastructure projects in twelve municipalities 
in Mexico. They state that projects that were planned with the participation of local 
communities had a higher social impact. Also, Andersson et al. (2009) find in their 
quantitative study of 390 municipalities in Latin America that local governments in mu-
nicipalities with a high degree of participatory decision-making and implementation are 
more likely to provide effective agricultural services. In their case study on bottom-up 
planning in Uganda Porter and Onyach-Olaa (2000) state however that participation in 
the planning process is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for improving the quali-
ty of service delivery. In line with this result, Boulding and Wampler (2010) do not find 
a significant positive effect of participatory governance on indicators of well-being in a 
recent study based on data from 220 Brazilian municipalities. 
2.3.2 The Conditions for Making Participatory Governance Work as an Accountabil-
ity Mechanism 
The conditions for effective participatory governance have been addressed by a much 
larger number of studies than the effects of participatory governance. Several studies, 
among them Bland (2000) (Bolivia), Porter and Onyach-Olaa (2000) (Uganda), and 
Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff and McNulty (2007) (Peru), document a large variance in the 
degree of implementation of participatory governance reforms.   
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Hence, it has been widely acknowledged that “while legal frameworks [for participa-
tory governance] are enabling factors (…), they are insufficient to guarantee that effec-
tive participation will take place” (McGee, Bazaara, Gaventa, Nierras, Rai, Rocamora et 
al., 2003, p. 3) (Barrientos, 2007; Goetz & Gaventa, 2001; Reid, 2005; Russell-Einhorn, 
2007; Smith, 2004). 
Departing from this insight a number of studies have investigated what conditions con-
tribute to an effective implementation and functioning of participatory governance 
mechanisms in practice. Though these studies come from a wide range of disciplinary 
and conceptual backgrounds, most of them agree that effective participatory governance 
requires two main conditions are met: first, civil society actors need to be willing and 
able to contribute to the government task at hand. Numerous studies have unanimously 
pointed to the importance of a well-organized and active civil society for enforcing par-
ticipatory governance arrangements and for filling them with life (Avritzer, 2002; 
Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, & McNulty, 2007; Fox, 2002; Heller, 2001). Second, public 
officials need to be interested in participatory governance and they need to be able to 
fulfill their promises (Evans, 2004; Goldfrank, 2007a). Several studies have shown that 
the willingness of local governments to share their power and their administrative and 
financial capacity to implement the participatory governance arrangement and the pro-
jects that emerge from them are indispensable for successful participatory governance 
(Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007; Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, & McNulty, 2007; 
Wampler, 2008a). Hence, there is a broad consensus in the literature on participatory 
governance that variance in real levels of participation within the same legal framework 
can be explained by differences in these two conditions, which have been referred to as 
the “civil society condition” and the “political economy condition” respectively (Evans, 
2004). 
Besides these two main requirements some cross-national studies point to the institu-
tional set-up of participatory governance, the electoral system, the degree of political 
decentralization, and the size of the jurisdiction as potential causal conditions for differ-
ences in the effectiveness of participatory governance between countries (Brinkerhoff & 
Azfar, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007b). This body of research is however only emerging and 
has not yet generated conclusive findings on whether and how these conditions precise-
ly influence participatory governance (Goldfrank, 2007a; McGee, Bazaara, Gaventa, 
Nierras, Rai, Rocamora et al., 2003).   
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Therefore, the majority of studies on participatory governance focus on explaining dif-
ferences in the civil society and the political economy condition within and across de-
veloping countries.  
The civil society condition is examined in studies that look at the factors that affect ei-
ther the capacity to organize or the motivation of civil society actors to participate: first, 
in the deliberative democracy strand of the literature several scholars argue that the ab-
sence of social capital can explain low levels of citizen participation (Abom, 2004; 
Brinkerhoff & Azfar, 2006; Costa, Kottak, & Prado, 1997; Durston, 1998; Eguren, 
2008; Fox, 2002; Schönleitner, 2004). In these studies social capital refers to structural 
features of civil society, such as the number of civil society organizations and the 
strength of the ties between them and/or to the existence of informal institutions, such as 
norms of trust and reciprocity.4 Such structural conditions are hence argued to play a 
key role in explaining differences in the implementation of participatory governance by 
affecting both the capacity and the motivation of civil society actors to participate. 
Second, in the democratic decentralization strand of the literature it has been pointed out 
that economic inequality and the absence of an encompassing interest can hamper col-
lective action of community representatives and civil society actors in a municipality 
(Faguet, 2009). This argument has not received much attention in the literature on par-
ticipatory governance, but it has been a focus of the community-based development 
literature and the literature on collective common pool resource management (Bardhan, 
1993; Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, & Romani, 2004; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, 
& Weinstein, 2007; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Molinas, 1998; Ostrom, 2007). The large 
amount of evidence from these literatures on the relationship between intra-community 
inequality and collective action suggests that “(…) the propensity of individuals to join 
groups, to participate in social activities, to cooperate in various collective action prob-
lems, or to contribute to public goods and services is negatively related to inequality.” 
(Bardhan, Ghatak, & Karaivanov, 2007, pp. 1843–1844). Whether inequality can also 
explain low levels of collective action of community representatives and NGOs in par-
ticipatory governance mechanisms has to be shown in future research. 
                                                 
4 The concept of social capital, which was made prominent by Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), has 
enjoyed great popularity in the development literature, but it has also been heavily criticized for its analyt-
ical and methodological flaws and its imprecision (Harriss & de Renzio, 1997). I do not address this con-
ceptual debate here because it is not relevant for understanding the findings on the civil society condition. 
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Third, the empowerment strand of the literature emphasizes the role of individual-level 
factors for explaining the variance in citizen representatives’ capacity to participate in 
participatory governance. Several studies in this strand of the literature find that this 
capacity can be constrained by a lack of economic resources and access to information, 
as well as by low levels of education among civil society representatives (Abom, 2004; 
Andersson, 1999; Baiocchi, 2001; Gaventa, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2001; Krishna, 2006; 
Wiebe, 2000). Accordingly, these studies advocate measures for information provision 
and capacity building for improving the civil society condition and thus making partici-
patory governance more effective (Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, & Romani, 2004; Gibson 
& Woolcock, 2008). 
Fourth, studies from the self-governance and the deliberative democracy strands of the 
literature stress that for explaining differences in the civil society condition individual 
representatives’ motivations for participation have to be taken into account. These stud-
ies point out that it cannot be assumed that citizens are motivated to participate in par-
ticipatory governance mechanisms. They argue that citizen representatives’ interest in 
participation depends on the perceived costs and benefits of participatory governance 
arrangements. According to this argument, time and transport cost of participation, as 
well as the risk of being co-opted by the government need to be outweighed by benefits, 
such as the transfer of real decision-making power over public resources to civil society 
and access to preferred public services (Abers, 1998; Costa, Kottak, & Prado, 1997; 
Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). 
Research on the other side of the equation, i.e., research on the political economy condi-
tion, shows that citizens can only obtain such benefits from participatory governance 
when local governments are able and willing to implement participatory governance 
mechanisms. For this governments need to have sufficient administrative, political, and 
financial capacities. These capacities include the bureaucratic competence to organize 
participatory governance processes, the financial resources to fund the prioritized pro-
jects, and the political power to introduce participatory forms of decision-making 




For motivating public officials to implement participatory governance mechanisms two 
types of reasons have been put forward: first, in democratic decentralization and delib-
erative democracy strand of the literature several studies conclude that individual char-
acteristics of a politician account for a government’s willingness to make participatory 
governance arrangements work. 
 In their study on regional coordination councils in Peru Brinkerhoff et al. (2007) con-
clude that the personality, leadership skills and personal ideology of a regional president 
favored the establishment of a regional coordination council. Along the same vein, 
Schönleitner (2004) argues that the attitude of the municipal government towards the 
inclusion of civil society was crucial for making participation effective in municipal 
health councils in Brazil. Such explanations suffer however from being highly idiosyn-
cratic. In addition, they do not tell us whether there are ways to motivate mayors who 
do not have a positive attitude or ideology to implement participatory governance ar-
rangements. 
The second type of explanation for the motivation of public officials is based on rational 
choice institutionalism. Several authors from different strands of the literature point to 
the importance of incentives for explaining differences in the political economy condi-
tion. One type of incentives that can motivate a politician to implement participatory 
governance arrangements are benefits, such as improved relationships with community 
representatives and higher popularity (Bland, 2011). Moreover, supporting participatory 
governance can increase the re-election chances of politicians. As Wampler (2008b) 
points out in his analyses of participatory budgeting in Brazil the latter benefit applies in 
particular to politicians who are affiliated to a party whose electoral base is dominated 
by a strong pro-participation social movement, such as the Brazilian Workers Party. 
A second type of incentives that have been argued to influence the willingness of a local 
government to establish and maintain participatory governance arrangements are institu-
tional incentives5 that arise from the formal and informal enforcement of such arrange-
ments (Blair, 2000; Devas & Grant, 2003; Gibson & Lehoucq, 2003; Kauneckis & An-
dersson, 2009).  
                                                 
5 Institutional incentives have been defined in this line of research as “(…) the expectations of future re-
wards and penalties associated with one’s actions” (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 2007, p. 1092). 
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According to a comparative study of four Latin American countries the most important 
institutional incentives are set by civil society organizations that actively demand to be 
included in decision-making and by central government actors who enforce and support 
participatory governance mechanisms at the local level (Andersson & van Laerhoven, 
2007). The former brings the discussion on the political economy condition back to the 
civil society condition, because civil society enforcement can only be carried out by a 
capable and motivated civil society. 
 Discussion 2.4
The reviewed literature on the impact of participatory governance on government re-
sponsiveness and the quality of public service provision in developing countries is 
scarce and strongly limited in methods and scope.6 It lacks both detailed theoretical 
models of the impact of participatory governance reforms and empirical studies that 
draw on medium or large samples for testing theoretical arguments systematically. The 
second problem is mainly caused by the virtual absence of quantitative data on partici-
patory governance in developing countries.7 
Not surprisingly, the reviewed literature could so far not establish a causal link between 
participatory governance, government responsiveness and improved public service pro-
vision. The lack of quantitative data can partly explain this situation, but there are also 
other problems that affect the quality of quantitative, as well as qualitative empirical 
analyses. Specifically, there are three conceptual issues that have so far not been dealt 
with by most of the literature on the impact of participatory governance: first, as Goetz 
and Gaventa (2001) point out, participatory governance mechanisms can only have a 
positive impact on responsiveness when citizens can hold government officials account-
able, i.e., when they receive information and can effectively demand corrective actions. 
This implies that evaluations of the impact of participatory governance need to measure 
the effectiveness of participatory governance in order to be able to distinguish between 
the finding that participatory governance has not been implemented and the finding that 
it does not have a positive effect. 
                                                 
6 This applies only to studies on the effect of participatory governance on local government responsive-
ness and public service provision. It does not refer to the literature from the deliberative democracy strand 
that examines the impact of participatory governance on the quality of democracy (Avritzer, 2002; Bould-
ing & Wampler, 2010; Eguren, 2008; Schönleitner, 2004). 
7 A notable exception to this pattern is the econometric study by Besley et al. (2005) who have collected 
their own data in South India. 
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Second, the impact of participatory governance is likely to vary with the stage of public 
service provision in which citizens are involved. For instance, citizen involvement in 
the planning of public services, e.g., in participatory budgeting is more likely to have an 
effect on the responsiveness of the allocation of public resources. Citizen involvement 
in the monitoring and evaluation of project implementation, e.g., in social audit com-
missions, is more likely to increase the efficiency of public spending. Hence, studies on 
the effects of participatory governance should state the causal relationship between a 
particular form of participatory governance and the outcome they evaluate explicitly.  
Third, evaluations of the impact of participatory governance should control for the in-
fluence of other accountability mechanisms which can influence government respon-
siveness and the efficiency of public spending. For example, competitive elections and 
local media have been shown to affect these outcomes (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Besley 
& Case, 1995; List & Sturm, 2006). Therefore, they should be taken into account in the 
empirical analysis of the effect of participatory governance. 
The literature on the conditions for effective participatory governance is much more 
comprehensive than the literature on its impact on government responsiveness and pub-
lic service provision. Authors in this literature have arrived at a broad consensus about 
the key conditions that are required for making participatory governance work, i.e., the 
civil society and the political economy condition. Hence, most of the research focuses 
on explaining the civil society condition based on structural and individual level factors.  
Within this literature however, case studies are usually guided by popular concepts, such 
as social capital and human capabilities instead of drawing on theories from economics, 
politics, sociology or psychology for developing explanations for civil society activity. 
Moreover, a number of studies particularly from the deliberative democracy and the 
empowerment strand of literature seem to assume a positive effect of participation on 
the quality of government and, hence, they do not distinguish clearly between positive 
findings on participatory governance and normative recommendations for policy mak-
ers. Besides, much of the empirical work concentrates on a few isolated successful cases 
of participatory governance, such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre or the Peo-
ple’s Campaign in Kerala. This limits the scope of the explanations that these studies 




Last but not least, there is a lack of studies that evaluate both, structural and individual 
level explanations for the collective action of civil society actors and compare their ex-
planatory power. 
In the literature on the political economy condition, the rational choice based approach 
offers a more systematic explanation for differences in public official’s willingness to 
implement participatory governance arrangements than individual characteristics of a 
politician. Yet, for deriving policy recommendations on how to increase the compliance 
of public officials more research on the effectiveness of different types of incentives for 
politicians and interaction effects between these incentives is needed. 
Finally, the research community that examines participatory governance lacks a com-
mon analytic framework to compare the findings on the impact of and the conditions for 
participatory governance from different disciplines. Such a framework would facilitate 
research co-operations and it would foster the accumulation of knowledge on participa-
tory governance. 
 Conclusion 2.5
The state of the literature on participatory governance can be interpreted in different 
ways. In a sceptical interpretation of the findings of this literature one would argue that 
there is no evidence of the purported positive effects of participatory governance. Such 
an interpretation would rely on the fact that the few mainly qualitative studies on this 
topic have not established that there is a positive impact of participatory governance on 
government responsiveness, access to public services, well-being and poverty. Further-
more, one would need to contend that even if participatory governance had such posi-
tive effects, they are cannot be expected to materialize in many places. The reason for 
this is that the two key conditions that have been found to be necessary for the effective 
implementation of participatory governance arrangements-the civil society and the po-





A more optimistic interpretation of the literature on participatory governance would be 
that the scarcity of convincing evidence on its positive effects is mainly a result of the 
lack of quantitative data. In such an interpretation one would stress that sound argu-
ments for a positive impact of participatory governance can be derived from principal 
agent theory and that several case studies support these arguments. Moreover, outstand-
ing examples of successful participatory governance show that the civil society and the 
political economy condition can be met in developing country contexts. From this one 
could conclude that we can expect to confirm the beneficial effects of participatory gov-
ernance once more data become available and that we need to establish the “success 
factors” that have led to effective participatory governance, e.g., in Porto Alegre in other 
places to reap these benefits. 
This last implication is however the most problematic point in the optimistic interpreta-
tion of the literature on participatory governance. As research on the determinants of the 
civil society and the political economy condition shows, it will be a long and protracted 
process to fulfill these two conditions in places where they are not met. This requires 
among other things to increase the density of civil society, to increase the capacity of 
citizens to engage in public discourse, to reduce poverty and to motivate central gov-
ernments to support participatory governance actively. Overall, the literature review 
hence suggests that the positive impact of participatory governance on government ac-
countability and responsiveness remains to be proven and that implementing participa-
tory governance effectively is a challenging enterprise in many places. 
For obtaining more robust evidence on the benefits of participatory governance future 
research needs to focus on conducting systematic studies with medium and large sam-
ples in a broad range of countries and locations. Such studies would also allow re-
searchers to test the explanations for effective participatory governance that have been 
proposed by several case studies. Moreover, as Fox (2002) and Wampler (2004) show, 
participatory governance mechanisms can weaken elected legislative bodies. Hence, 
research on participatory governance should pay more attention to the potential of this 
new accountability mechanism to crowd out existing systems of checks and balances. 
Independent of these questions, all future research efforts would benefit from the estab-
lishment of a common analytic framework for comparing and accumulating findings on 
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Appendix: Overview of the Reviewed Studies on Participatory Governance 
Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Case Studies (up to five cases) 
Abers, R.: From Clientelism 
to Cooperation: Local Gov-
ernment, Participatory Policy, 
and Civic Organizing in Porto 







Case study of Porto 
Alegre on how state 






Brazil (Porto Alegre) 
Participatory budgeting increased the perceived benefits 
and lowered the perceived cost of participation. Hence, 
causation can also run from democratization to social 
capital which contradicts Putnam’s deterministic view 
on social capital. The findings support theories of asso-
ciational democracy and mass mobilization which stress 
the importance of a window of opportunity and an ena-
bling environment for successful collective action. 
Andersson, V.: Popular Partic-
ipation in Bolivia: Does the 
law "Participación Popular" 
secure participation of the 







Case study of the caus-
es for the lack of im-
plementation of the law 






The Popular Participation Law has not been implement-
ed in the case municipality. National party politics dom-
inate local politics and formally established base organ-
izations do not take indigenous traditions of 
organization into account; the local government is found 
to be corrupt and to deliver services of low quality. 
Avritzer, L: Participatory 
Institutions in Democratic 
Brazil. 2009. 
Development 
of a theory of 
participatory 
institutions 
Analysis of the emer-
gence of participatory 
institutions in Brazil 
and their current per-
formance in a com-





ing, health councils, 
city master plans/ 
Brazil 
Stresses the importance of the context, i.e., political 
society and civil society characteristics, for the imple-
mentation of participatory governance. The institutional 
design of participatory institutions should be adapted to 
the context. The interaction between political will and a 
high level of civil society capacity yields successful 
participatory governance.  
Baiocchi, G.: Participation, 
Activism and Politics: The 







Case study of the func-
tioning of participatory 
budgeting in one mu-









Brazil (Porto Alegre) 
The three potential problems with EDD, i.e., inequality 
in meetings, crowding-out of civil society initiatives, 
and opposition from powerful interest groups, have 
been successfully addressed or not arisen in Porto Ale-
gre. The poor participate in meetings, civil society ac-
tivity has even increased and the powerful have not 
managed to stop the initiative. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Barrientos, I.: Participación 
Ciudadana y Construcción de 
Ciudadanía Desde los 
Consejos de Desarrollo. El 








Case study of the func-
tioning of participatory 
planning in one munic-
ipality based on quali-








The Municipal Development Council works reasonably 
well, it has formed commissions and integrates a broad 
range of actors in the case municipality. But there are 
still large obstacles towards the “ideal” implementation 
of participatory governance. 
Bräutigam, D.: The People’s 
Budget? Politics, Participation 



















Brazil, Ireland, Chile, 
Mauritius, Costa Rica 
Participatory budgeting is neither necessary, nor suffi-
cient for making spending more pro-poor. It seems to 
work if a leftist party is in power and if there is a strong 
national auditor, media pressure, and an informed civil 
society. Resource-generating actors (businesses) should 
be included in participatory budgeting to make it more 
sustainable. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W., Brinker-
hoff, J. M. & McNulty, S.: 
Decentralization and Partici-
patory Local Governance: a 
Decision Space Analysis and 







Case study of two 
regions to analyze the 
decision-space of local 











There is a large gap between the law on paper and prac-
tice in Peru. Participatory governance works best when 
there is committed local leadership, well organized civil 
society organizations and central government monitor-
ing. 
Costa, A. C., Kottak, C. P. & 
Prado, R. M.: The Socio-
Political Context of Participa-
tory Development in North-
eastern Brazil. 1997. 
Anthropologi-




Case study of how 
cultural factors affect 









There is some evidence on a positive impact of commu-
nity participation in planning on development project 
outcomes and civicness. The prior cultural setting (pa-
tron-client relationships, elite manipulation) has an 
influence on the level of participation. 
Eguren, I. R.: Moving Up and 
Down the Ladder: Communi-
ty-Based Participation in 
Public Dialogue and Delibera-






study of the factors that 
affect the implementa-






ment councils and 
national consultation 
on health policy/ 
Bolivia, Guatemala 
Committed local leadership and increasing the aware-
ness for participatory governance among the population 
made participatory spaces successful. Participation can 
thrive on existing informal indigenous institutions. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Fox, J.: La Relación 
Recíproca entre la 
Participación Ciudadana y la 
Rendición de Cuentas: la 
Experiencia de los Fondos 
Municipales en el México 
Rural. 2002. 
Social capital Case study of four 
Mexican states to ex-
plore the relation be-
tween accountability, 






ning of social infra-
structure investments/ 
Mexico 
Social capital is a key determinant of successful partici-
patory planning that yields poverty alleviating invest-
ments. Municipal autonomy can be at odds with partici-
patory planning mechanisms when they are 
implemented by the central government. 
Francis, P. & James, R.: Bal-
ancing Rural Poverty Reduc-
tion and Citizen Participation: 







Case study of three 
villages. Analysis of 
the implementation of 










The planning structures in the villages are not participa-
tory, but remain clientelistic. There is a lack of financial 
autonomy at the local level. Decisions in the planning 
process do not reflect local needs and the political sys-
tem does not provide enough information to villagers to 
hold officials accountable. 
Gibson, C. & Woolcock, M.: 
Empowerment, Deliberative 
Development, and Local-
Level Politics in Indonesia: 
Participatory Projects as a 
















volvement in service 
delivery projects/ 
Indonesia 
Interventions and capacity building measures by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) can strengthen the 
capacity of civil society to engage in routines of contes-
tation and to use of deliberative repertoires in participa-
tory organizations. 
Goetz, A.M. & Jenkins, R.: 
Hybrid Forms of Accountabil-
ity-Citizen Engagement in 
Institutions of Public-Sector 






Analysis of new forms 
of accountability with 
two case studies from 





Service delivery audit 
by civil society/ 
India (Maharashtra, 
Rajasthan) 
“Diagonal accountability”, i.e., involving citizens in 
public sector oversight has reduced corruption in ser-
vice delivery in some locations in India. Limitations of 
such mechanisms are problems of legitimacy and con-
trol of power of NGOs, as well as a limited impact on 
policy. 








of three cases to figure 






ning of urban ser-
vices/ 
Uruguay, Brazil and 
Venezuela 
Three factors contribute to successful participatory 
governance: high local government capacity to respond 
to service needs, the non-confrontational party system, 
and interconnected community organizations that are 
independent from parties. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Heller, P.: Moving the State: 
The Politics of Democratic 
Decentralization in Kerala, 








of three cases to find 
out how deep and 
broad participation at 
the local level can be 






ment councils, urban 
forums/ 
India (Kerala), Brazil 
(Porto Alegre), South 
Africa 
In Brazil the priorities of citizens have been taken into 
account; in India spending increased for housing 
schemes, sanitation, and drinking water; in South Africa 
planning processes serve mainly as instruments for 
exerting political and bureaucratic control. Crucial fac-
tors for success shared by all cases were: a well-
developed civil society, a strong programmatic leftist 
party, and a strong, well-organized central state. Social 
movement-party relations and historical back-
ground/political project are the factors that explain why 
South Africa was not as successful as Kerala and Brazil. 
Porter, D. & Onyach-Olaa, 
M.: Inclusive Planning and 





Case study of five 
districts on the impact 
of participatory plan-








Participation is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure 
efficient service delivery. Participation is also needed in 
later stages of public service delivery. Preferably, local 
political representatives should be held accountable for 
bad service provision outcomes. 
Schneider, A. & Goldfrank, 
B.: Budgets and Ballots in 
Brazil: Participatory Democ-








Case study of how 
participatory budgeting 
was scaled up to the 
state level and what its 






Brazil (Rio Grande 
do Sul) 
Participatory budgeting was successfully scaled up to 
the state level and has given marginalized groups access 
to decision-making. It has improved the planning effi-
ciency of the state (overlap of planned and realized 
spending) and increased the share of the budget that is 
allocated to expenditures for health, education, and 
sanitation to the benefit of the poor. 
Schönleitner, G.: Can Public 
Deliberation Democratise 
State Action? Municipal 
Health Councils and Local 






Comparative study in 
four municipalities to 
analyze the implemen-
tation of participatory 
governance and its 
effect on service out-






Local government commitment is the key determinant 
of whether deliberation or power politics take place in 
the councils. When local government commitment is 
combined with strong civic organization a council 
comes closest to the ideal of a deliberative forum. The 






Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Shatkin, G.: Obstacles to 
Empowerment: Local Politics 
and Civil Society in Metro-






Case study on imple-
mentation of participa-







ning of urban hous-
ing/ 
Philippines (Manila) 
Powerful interests mostly prevail over the needs of the 
urban poor in allocation decisions on the construction of 
new housing. Participatory governance reform has not 
increased the influence of civil society on government 
decisions. 
Smith, H.: Costa Rica’s Tri-
angle of Solidarity: Can Gov-
ernment-led Spaces for Nego-
tiation Enhance the 
Involvement of Civil Society 








Case study on the im-
plementation and out-
comes of a central 
government-led initia-
tive on participatory 





ning of urban social 
infrastructure/ 
Costa Rica 
The participatory planning initiative left the roles and 
positions of the central government, local government 
and civil society unchanged and was not successful in 
involving citizens in decision-making. The degree of 
successful project implementation was very low in the 
case study areas. 
Wampler, B.: Expanding 
Accountability Through Par-
ticipatory Institutions: 
Mayors, Citizens, and Budg-







of three cases on the 
motives for mayors to 
implement participa-










Brazil (Sao Paulo, 
Recife, Porto Alegre) 
The political environment (municipal council, electoral 
base, etc.) are important determinants of the mayor’s 
implementation decision. Mixed results on accountabil-
ity: participatory budgeting increases societal and verti-
cal accountability, but it crowds out the municipal coun-
cil as a body of horizontal accountability. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Comparative Studies (between six and fifty cases) 
Bland, G.: The Popular Par-
ticipation Law and the Emer-
gence of Local Accountabil-
ity. 2000. 
Political econ-




Detailed description of 
the law and its imple-
mentation in Bolivia; 










The law is not uniformly implemented across Bolivia 
and does not function well in many cases: participatory 
governance forums are captured by party politics; peo-
ple are not interested in participation in open council 
sessions, participatory budgeting often results in a mere 
list of preferences which do not even reflect the prefer-
ences of the population but rather those of the village 
representatives themselves. Mayors can be removed 
from office but this is used by other political parties to 
get into power, not as an accountability mechanism. 
Bland, G.: Supporting Post-
conflict Democratic Devel-
opment? External Promotion 
of Participatory Budgeting in 






Examination of the 
sustainability of an 
externally promoted 
participatory budgeting 







Externally promoted participatory budgeting works 
under the same conditions as home-grown reforms. The 
sustainability of externally promoted participatory gov-
ernance in El Salvador is limited. The political will of 
the mayor is crucial for the sustained use of participa-
tory budgeting. Mayors can be motivated by better 
relations with communities and higher popularity. Also, 
leftist mayors tend to be more supportive of participa-
tory processes. Participatory budgeting works better in 
small municipalities because their homogeneity fosters 
collective action. Factors that impede independent par-
ticipation are the centralization of the administration, 
strongly institutionalized parties, and reliance on local 
institutions to organize the communities. 
Devas, N. & Grant, U.: Local 
Government Decision-
Making–Citizen Participation 
and Local Accountability: 
Some Evidence from Kenya 


















and interaction with 
CSOs/ 
Kenya, Uganda 
Committed local leadership, central government moni-
toring of performance, capable CSOs and availability of 
information are important determinants of good prac-
tice, i.e., accountable local decision-making. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Fox, J. & Aranda, J.: Decen-
tralization and Rural Devel-
opment in Mexico: Communi-
ty Participation in Oaxaca's 





bining a quantitative 
analysis of fifty munic-
ipalities with a com-






ning of social infra-
structure investments/ 
Mexico 
Most development projects where chosen by the com-
munity assemblies. Projects that were chosen by the 
community assemblies were comparatively more suc-
cessful in terms of social benefit. The most remote 
(poor, indigenous) communities had less successful 
projects. 
Wampler, B.: When Does 
Participatory Democracy 
Deepen the Quality of De-






Comparative study of 
eight municipalities on 











The eight studied municipalities vary with respect to 
transfer of decision-making power to citizens, i.e., with 
respect to the degree to which participatory budgeting 
deepens democracy. The main conditions that explain 
this are: civil society and political society capacity, 
intervening institutions (rules), and interest/strategic 
choices of the involved actors.  
Regression Analyses (more than fifty cases) 
Andersson, K., Gordillo, G. & 
van Laerhoven, F.: Local 
Governments and Rural De-
velopment. Comparing les-
sons from Brazil, Chile, Mex-








based on interviews 
with more than 1200 
mayors, local officials, 












The effectiveness of agricultural service provision de-
pends on whether formal or informal participatory gov-
ernance arrangements are in place in a municipality. 
This link is independent of the degree of decentraliza-
tion in a country. Involving local actors in the design of 
institutional arrangements for participatory planning, 
horizontal learning and co-provision of services makes 
public services more pro-poor. Perverse incentives for 
corruption, clientelistic practices and paternalistic gov-
ernment structures hinder participatory governance. 
Andersson, K. P. & van Laer-
hoven, F.: From Local 
Strongman to Facilitator: 
Institutional Incentives for 
Participatory Municipal Gov-





Quantitative study of a 
sample of 390 munici-
palities on the factors 
that motivate a mayor 






vices, and field pres-




Institutional incentives (demand from CSOs, support 
and supervision of central government) outperform 
political structure (competitiveness of elections, party 
structure) and socioeconomic context variables (literacy, 
level of income) in explaining whether participatory 
local governance takes place. 
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Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Besley, T., Pande, R. & Rao, 
V.: Participatory Democracy 
in Action: Survey Evidence 




Quantitative analysis of 
the determinants of 
holding a Gram Sabha 
meeting and of its 











Kerala, Tamil Nadu) 
In villages that hold a Gram Sabha meeting below pov-
erty line rationing cards are better targeted towards the 
needy. But, higher literacy also improves targeting sig-
nificantly and is correlated with holding Gram Sabha 
meetings. Villages with a higher literacy rate and villag-
es that are more populous are more likely to hold a 
Gram Sabha meeting. Also, disadvantaged groups are 
more likely to participate than the wealthy. 
Boulding, C., & Wampler, B.: 
Voice, Votes, and Resources: 
Evaluating the Effect of Par-





Quantitative analysis of 
the impact of participa-
tory budgeting on well-
being based on panel 










Participatory budgeting adoption has increased munici-
pal spending on health and education significantly, but 
the changes in the allocation of resources did not lead to 
significant changes in indicators of well-being. 
Meta-analyses of Case Studies, Literature Reviews, and Theoretical Contributions 
Ackerman, J.: Co-Governance 
for Accountability: Beyond 








Review of five case 
studies to analyze the 
determinants of effec-
tive participatory gov-
ernance and the impact 
of co-governance on 
accountability of bu-






ing, management of a 




ment, social auditing/ 
Brazil, India, Mexico, 
United States 
Co-governance can foster accountability and strengthen 
the capacity of state and society actors; it can reduce 
possibilities for corruption and the political use of pub-
lic funds (Brazil). Citizens should be involved early on 
and participate also in the design of co-governance 
mechanisms. Participation should be actively encour-
aged by the state and participatory mechanisms should 
be institutionalized. 
Blair, H.: Participation and 
Accountability at the Periph-
ery: Democratic Local Gov-





Review of six case 
studies to analyze the 
relation between partic-
ipation, accountability, 











Both, participation and accountability are important 
elements of effective democratic local governance; 
given central government support local accountability 
mechanisms can prosper. But, participatory budgeting is 




Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. & Azfar, 
O.: Decentralization and 
Community Empowerment: 
Does Community Empower-
ment Deepen Democracy and 











Review of several 
studies on the relation-
ship between commu-







ing, school and health 
committees/ 
Numerous locations 
The more decentralization moves towards devolution 
the greater the space for communities to exercise voice. 
Community empowerment can strengthen accountabil-
ity and responsiveness effects of decentralization. The 
effect of community participation on accountability 
depends on local political support for such involvement 
and discipline imposed by higher levels of government. 
Commins, S.: Community 
Participation in Service De-








Review of several 
studies on the impact 
of participation on 
public sector accounta-
bility and service de-
livery, as well as the 












Participation can increase the allocative and productive 
efficiency of public service provision and accountabil-
ity. Context factors that influence the effectiveness of 
participation are the degree of heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation, the type of service that is provided and the 
spatial context. Legislation alone does not lead to effec-
tive participation. 
Evans, P.: Development as 
Institutional Change: The 
Pitfalls of Monocropping and 







Review of studies on 
two cases of participa-
tory governance to 
analyze the conditions 
for and the effect of 







ing, village planning 
meetings/ 
Brazil, India (Kerala) 
Participatory governance mechanisms must be socially 
self-sustaining and overcome the political economy and 
the growth problem. Participatory budgeting in Brazil 
has increased cost recovery and expanded public infra-
structure. Participation in Kerala goes along with high 
human development indicators and highly efficient 
service delivery. 
Fung, A. & Wright, O.: Deep-
ening Democracy: Innova-
tions in Empowered Participa-





Derivation of a norma-
tive model of participa-
tory governance from 











United States, Brazil, 
India 
The authors develop the concept of “Empowered Delib-
erative Democracy (EDD)”. The main elements of this 
concept are participation, deliberation, and empower-
ment. They identify institutional design principles and 





Author, Title & Year Theory /  Concept Research Design 
Strand of 
Literature 
Subject &  
Study Area Main Results 
Goetz, A.M. & Gaventa, J.: 
Bringing Citizen Voice and 









Review of several  
studies to identify 
successful ways to 
increase the respon-
siveness of service 
providers to the needs 
of the poor 
Empower-
ment 




Only where citizens have real influence do initiatives 
increase accountability and responsiveness. Key condi-
tions for successful initiatives are: formal recognition of 
citizen participation, continuous presence of observers, 
access to official documents, and the right to pass nega-
tive reports to the legislative or seek formal investiga-
tion/legal redress for poor service delivery. 
Goldfrank, B.: Lessons from 
Latin America’s Experience 




Review of the literature 
and comparison of five 










The conditions for successful participatory budgeting 
are: political will of the incumbent, social capital of 
CSOs who want to participate, bureaucratic compe-
tence, small decision-making units, resources to imple-
ment projects, a legal foundation for participation, and 
political decentralization. Based on these factors the 
potential of the five cases for implementing participa-
tory budgeting is assessed. 
McGee, R., et al.: Legal 
Frameworks for Citizen Par-







Review several case 
studies on the imple-
mentation of legal 







Identification of enabling characteristics of legal 
frameworks and enabling contextual factors, such as a 
strong civil society, trustful relationship between the 
state and citizens, progressive political parties, transpar-
ency, and a commitment of the elite to participation. 
Robinson, M.: Participation, 
Local Governance and Decen-







Review of several 
studies on the impact 
of participatory gov-









The evidence so far on the impact of participatory gov-
ernance is not generalizable because it contains mainly 
case studies. Hence, one cannot draw conclusions on its 
impact on the equity of access to public services. 
Wampler, B.: Grafting Partic-
ipatory Governance onto 
Representative Democracy 
and Existing State Institu-
tions: Explaining Outcomes 
via Political Society and Civil 






Development of a 
analytical framework 
for analyzing the con-









Develops a theoretical framework for explaining suc-
cessful participatory institutions. Argues that the varia-
bles that affect functioning of participatory institutions 
are: state and civil society capacity, political and civil 
society regime and individual interests within the two, 
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Abstract: Most studies that apply fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
rely on macro-level data, but an increasing number of studies rely on units of analysis at 
the micro level, i.e., communities, local associations, protected areas or departments. 
For such studies qualitative interview data are often the primary source of information. 
Yet, so far no procedure is available describing how to calibrate interview data to fuzzy-
sets. We propose a technique to do so and illustrate it using examples from the study of 
Guatemalan local governments. By spelling out the details of this important analytic 
step we aim at contributing to the growing literature on best practice in fsQCA. 
Keywords: fsQCA, interview data, fuzzy-sets, intermediate n studies, best practice 
Acknowledgements: We thank Gustavo Garcia-López, Morgan Gopnik, Rebecca Gru-
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of this manuscript. 




 Background and Goals 3.1
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) constitutes one of the most exciting and novel 
analytical tools in social-science in the last thirty years. QCA offers the possibility to 
compare intermediate numbers of cases and to assess the necessity and sufficiency of 
causal conditions. It is based on set theory, Boolean Algebra, and its fuzzy-set version 
(fsQCA) draws on fuzzy logic (Zadeh 1965). The overall aim of any QCA is “(…) to 
allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to with-
in-case complexity” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: xviii).1  
QCA has been welcomed by many social scientists because it promises to maintain a 
constant dialogue between theory and evidence throughout the analytical process. The 
goal of this paper is to advance this dialogue in contexts where scholars are working 
with qualitative data on intermediate numbers of cases. For this purpose, we introduce a 
systematic and transparent procedure that allows scholars to transform qualitative data 
from interviews or secondary sources (e.g., texts from archives, websites, company pro-
files, NGO leaflets) to fuzzy sets. We aim to add to the growing literature on best prac-
tice in applying fsQCA techniques (Ragin 2000, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schnei-
der and Wagemann 2010). 
The number of empirical studies that rely on QCA as an analytical tool to systematically 
compare across intermediate numbers of cases continues to increase and has surpassed 
several hundred in the last years (www.compasss.org). QCA first emerged in compara-
tive sociology, a subdiscipline within sociology that is dominated by qualitative case-
oriented scholars (Yamasaki and Rihoux 2009). Thus, it should not come as a surprise 
that the main applications of QCA have been to macro social phenomena, the traditional 
areas of interest to comparative sociologists or comparative political scientists, e.g., 
peasant revolts or regime change (Grofman and Schneider 2009).  
  
                                                 
1 QCA can be used to compare factors systematically and rigorously across several cases. This increases the external 
validity of the results compared to single case studies without losing information on the complexity and richness of 
cases as it happens in standard quantitative analyses. Unlike in statistic-based methods, causality is conceived in QCA 
as non-linear, non-additive and non-probabilistic. More specifically, QCA allows for multiple conjunctural causation, 




But in the last years QCA applications in other areas, such as natural resources (Heikki-
la 2003; Lam and Ostrom 2010; Rudel 2005; Wade et al. 2003), firms and markets 
(Skoko et al. 2006), and decentralization (Lindner 2010), are increasing. 
A non-exhaustive review of the main repository of QCA literature (www.compasss.org) 
shows that: 1) Most QCA studies use crisp set QCA, which uses only dichotomous data. 
2) Only few studies apply QCA to interview data. There are several reasons for these 
two trends. While fuzzy-set QCA is a more advanced technique which allows for partial 
membership of cases in conditions and outcomes, its adoption lag is to be expected as it 
takes time for scholars to adopt new techniques. The scarcity of studies applying QCA 
to interview data could be due to the fact that most QCA applications are still situated 
within comparative sociology and politics and therefore focus on the study of macro 
social and political phenomena. In these areas the individual is not the typical unit of 
analysis or the source of data.  
The few studies at the micro-level that use interview data for their QCA mostly coded 
their data as crisp sets, without providing much detail on the coding criteria (Haworth-
Hoeppner 2000; Marx 2008; Lam and Ostrom 2010; Lindner 2010; Skoko et al. 2006). 
The predominant use of crisp sets is counterintuitive given that the richness of qualita-
tive data would be better represented by fuzzy rather than crisp sets. Yet, one of the fac-
tors that might be discouraging scholars from pursuing fsQCA to analyze their interview 
data could be the lack of—and the need for—a clear and transparent procedure with 
which to calibrate qualitative interview data to fuzzy sets. Hence, we argue that until 
now the linkage between qualitative interview data and fuzzy sets has not received 
enough attention from fsQCA scholars and that a calibration technique is needed to 
make fsQCA more accessible for scholars who use interview data.  
The procedure presented here is based on the experience of the authors developing 
fieldwork-based projects to study decentralization issues in Central America using 
fsQCA (Basurto 2007, 2009; Speer 2010b). These projects relied mainly on interviews 
as data sources and thus needed to develop a technique for calibrating these data to 
fuzzy sets. The explanation of this technique is illustrated with examples from a study 




The technique we propose consists of six stages, beginning with the preparation of data 
collection and ending when the fuzzy-set values of cases are assigned. Note that this is 
not a paper about how to run a fsQCA. We assume that the reader has some basic under-
standing of fsQCA concepts and general procedures and is looking for guidance on how 
to best approach the preparation of interview data for fsQCA analysis. 
 Background of the Guatemalan Study 3.2
Aim and research question: The aim of the study in Guatemala was to evaluate which 
accountability mechanisms contribute to good governance of public services. Large 
parts of the poor population in rural Guatemala lack access to basic public services. In 
light of the importance of these public services for improving the livelihoods of the rural 
poor and the low budget of the Guatemalan state, it is crucial that the state provides the-
se services efficiently and that public spending responds to the needs of the poor. The 
research question of the study is therefore: under what conditions are local governments 
responsive to their mainly poor electorate? 
The Theory: The provision of public services to rural areas in developing countries has 
been found to be primarily affected by information asymmetries and conflicts of interest 
between the mayor and the population. These two problems were first conceptualized in 
political agency theory in models that show how retrospective voting in elections can 
act as a disciplining device for politicians who shirk by either exercising reduced effort 
in carrying out their task or by diverting resources to private ends (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 
1986). The objective from the point of view of the electorate then is to devise institu-
tions that provide incentives for a self-interested mayor to refrain from opportunistic 
behavior (Moe 1984). 
The baseline political agency model shows how competitive elections can increase local 
government discipline. An extension of the model predicts that good access to infor-
mation for citizens e.g., through active local media can have a positive effect on local 
government performance by making elections more effective as an accountability 
mechanism (Besley 2007: 108-111 and 128-132). Finally, another extension of the mod-
el shows that effective participatory governance can increase local government’s disci-
pline, since participatory governance forums serve both as a source of information, and 
as a sanctioning mechanism (Speer 2010b).  
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These arguments are summarized in the following research hypothesis: the combination 
of competitive elections (CFE) and good access to information through media (GAI) or 
effective participatory governance (EPG) are likely to contribute to a local government 
that acts in the interest of its electorate. In formal QCA notation the hypothesis reads as: 
CFE*GAI + EPG  RLG2 
Empirical Strategy: The study evaluated this hypothesis in a fsQCA of ten rural local 
governments (Speer 2010a). The unit of analysis of this study is the municipality, i.e., a 
local government’s constituency. The qualitative data were mainly collected through 
semi-structured interviews. Overall we completed 88 stakeholder interviews and eleven 
expert interviews. To obtain quantitative data e.g., on the frequency of MDC meetings, 
we collected complementary secondary data, such as minutes of MDC meetings3 and 
municipal budgets, as well as economic, political, and social information. The fuzzy-set 
QCA used in the Guatemala study is based on quantitative and qualitative measures, but 
for purposes of illustrating our technique we will only provide examples of qualitative 
measures. 
 The Procedure: From Interview Data to Fuzzy-Set Values 3.3
In the following sections we outline the procedure that we developed to calibrate inter-
view data to fuzzy sets and obtain fuzzy-set values ready to be loaded into the fsQCA 
software for analysis. We elaborate on the six stages of our procedure, describing them 
in chronological order. In Stage 1 we identified and operationalized the conditions and 
the outcome. In Stage 2 we developed the anchor points and elaborated the interview 
guideline. After coming back from the field, we applied a content analysis to the raw 
interview data (Stage 3) and summarized the code output (Stage 4). Then, we deter-
mined the fuzzy-set scale and defined the fuzzy-set values (Stage 5). Finally, in Stage 6 
we assigned and revised the fuzzy-set values of the causal conditions and the outcome 
for each case. 
                                                 
2 The Boolean algebra notation of the hypothesis in the box uses: “+” to represent logical “OR”, “*” for logical 
“AND”. Lower case letters refer to logical negation/absence of a condition. 
3 The MDCs are participatory governance forums for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of municipal projects 
for building or repairing social infrastructure. In the MDC representatives from the communities and local civil socie-
ty, as well as officials of the municipal and central government meet once a month. 
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3.3.1 Stage 1: Identifying Measures of the Causal conditions and the Outcome 
We start the description of the procedure by identifying the theoretically relevant factors 
and the outcome to observe and then developing appropriate measures to operationalize 
them. In fsQCA terminology, the factors are the “causal conditions”. Then, we derived a 
testable hypothesis and determined appropriate measures for the causal conditions and 
the outcome before collecting interview data in the field (see Stage 2). We recommend 
stating the hypotheses in formal QCA notation preferably identifying which conditions 
are expected to be necessary and which conditions are expected to be sufficient for the 
outcome. Yet, a deductive research design is not required for implementing the proce-
dure we propose. It is also possible to carry out the fsQCA using a more open, inductive 
research strategy. 4  
Next we developed a preliminary list of measures of the conditions and the outcome. 
The operationalization of the theoretical concepts of the causal conditions and the out-
come can be based on standard scientific practice and/or the researcher’s knowledge of 
the empirical context she is going to investigate (Ragin 2000). Measures may be added 
or dropped from the preliminary list during the research process based on the substantial 
information gained while studying your cases. Gathering qualitative data is likely to be 
a source of important case and contextual knowledge that will inform the operationali-
zation of the theoretical concepts for your cases. Box 1 contains an example of the pre-
liminary list of measures that we devised for the Guatemala study and the adjustments 
we made after returning from the field.  
                                                 
4 We recognize that there are many traditions in the social sciences that follow other strategies for designing their 
research. We assure those scholars who use more open research designs that our calibration technique can be equally 
useful to you. For a discussion of several ways on how to select the conditions for a QCA see Berg-Schlosser and De 




Figure 1: Box 1: Developing a preliminary list of measures and conditions 
3.3.2 Stage 2: Developing Anchor Points and the Interview Guideline 
We collected data on each measure of the Guatemala study using mainly semi-
structured interviews.5 In preparing the interview guideline, we first developed a list of 
anchor points of each fuzzy set. Anchor points are the three main thresholds that struc-
ture a fuzzy set: 1 (threshold for full membership), 0.5 (cross-over point), and 0 (thresh-
old for non-membership) (Ragin 2000: 160). Anchor points help the researcher to clari-
fy how to distinguish a case that is more in the set from a case that is less in the set.  
  
                                                 
5 See Bernard (2006) for information on interviewing techniques and data collection in developing countries. 
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We determined the initial anchor points based on our knowledge of the theoretical con-
cepts we were aiming to measure and our knowledge of the context of our cases.6 Back 
from the field we revised the initial anchor points and adapted them when necessary. 
Yet, even though they may change during the research process, developing anchor 
points is essential for judging during an interview whether an interviewee’s answer is 
detailed enough for measuring the fuzzy-set values of the cases and for elaborating the 
specifying questions in the interview guideline. Thinking about the anchor points also 
improved the definitions of the theoretical concepts we used. See Box 2 for an illustra-
tion of the development of anchor points.  
 
Figure 2: Box 2: Developing anchor points 
                                                 
6 The challenge to assign a numerical value such as an anchor point to a verbal label is not unique to fsQCA, but 
frequently encountered e.g., in the design of questionnaires for quantitative research. The assignment of anchor points 
is easier for some measures for which there are already agreed-upon thresholds, such as the cut-off point for poor 
countries in international GDP rankings, and more difficult for others where no consensus has been established so far. 
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Then, we designed the interview guidelines in three steps. First, we devised one section 
per causal condition and the outcome in our interview guideline. For example, since we 
examined three causal conditions and one outcome in the Guatemalan study, the inter-
view guideline had four sections. Second, we defined an introductory eliciting question 
for each section and within the sections we included a sub-question on each measure. 
Starting with an open initial eliciting question leads the interviewee into the topic and 
allows them to talk about the ideas that first came to their minds, and thus inform us 
about their relevance. The sub-questions elicit more targeted information about a select-
ed measure. Including additional sub-questions that explore new dimensions of the theo-
retical concept or additional measures is also recommended. In the third step, we added 
specifying questions for following up on answers to the sub-questions based on the an-
chor points. The purpose of this step is to anticipate situations in which a respondent 
would not answer in enough detail to determine the fuzzy-set value of a measure of a 




Figure 3: Box 3: Elaborating the interview guideline 
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3.3.3 Stage 3: Interview Coding 
After completing data collection we performed a content analysis of the raw interview 
data using qualitative data analysis software. To code our Guatemalan interview data we 
developed an initial list of codes based on the list of measures of the causal conditions 
and the outcome. When interviewees pointed out an additional dimension of one of our 
theoretical concepts that we had not captured in the initial list of measures (and thus for 
which there was no code in the initial list of codes for that dimension) we added it in the 
course of the content analysis using open and in-vivo coding. For instance, the content 
analysis of the interviews from Guatemala revealed that there were large differences in 
access to local media between rural and urban areas. Hence, we added the codes “me-
diause_rural” and “mediause_urban” and subsequently took them into account in meas-
uring access to information through local media. 
3.3.4 Stage 4: Summarizing the Interview Data to Qualitative Classifications 
At this stage we carried out a systematic analysis of the coded interview data (code out-
put) and summarized all quotations within one case for each code. We relied on qualita-
tive data analysis software for this stage, but there are a number of techniques for sum-
marizing interview data that can be done without software (see Bernard and Ryan 
2010). 
We extracted interview quotations for one code for several groupings of interviewees in 
three different ways (see Box 4). First we examined all quotations that had been coded 
with the same code across all cases (i.e., municipalities) and interviewees (Step 1). For 
example, we reviewed all quotations that had been coded with “mediause_rural” (by 
reviewing all data that we collected on each code, we could make sure that there was 
sufficient reliable data for all cases on the respective measure). Furthermore, we as-
sessed whether there was enough variation across cases in each measure and, if so, 
which range of values of the measure we observed. Measures for which we could not 
collect sufficient data in the field or that turned out to display no variation across our 
cases were dropped from the list. The result of this revision process was the final list of 




Second, we extracted data once for each code per type of interviewee (Step 2). For in-
stance, we looked at all answers from village representatives that had been coded as 
“downward information flow from the local government”. This allowed us to detect 
biases in the responses of certain types of interviewees and to take into account the par-
ticular characteristics of different types of interviewees in evaluating their answers. In 
our Guatemala study, village representatives were often economically or politically de-
pendent on the mayor and therefore avoided saying that the mayor did not inform them 
about his spending decisions.  
Being aware of such biases in responses is crucial for the third step of the analysis: the 
summarizing of all interview quotations on one code for each case to formulate a quali-
tative classification7 (Step 3). For instance, we reviewed the interview quotations from 
all ten interviewees of the Guatemalan municipality of San Bueno8 that we had coded 
with “downward information flow from the local government”. Then we summarized all 
these quotations from the mayor, the village representatives, NGO members, etc. to cre-
ate the qualitative classification of San Bueno for the measure “provision of information 
from the Municipal Corporation to the Municipal Development Council”. In our exam-
ple, the qualitative classification was “the local government of San Bueno provides 
yearly information on total revenues and expenses”. In stage six, the qualitative classifi-
cations of each case will be matched to a fuzzy-set value.  
The challenge of the last step is to summarize the information of several interviewees in 
one statement that best reflects the case.9 As in all interview data, it is possible that two 
or more interviewees contradict each other. Based on our knowledge of the cases, the 
context, and the data, we were in a position to solve such contradictions in the replies of 
interviewees and to decide how to weigh the different answers of interviewees for the 
same measure of interest.  
  
                                                 
7 We use the term “qualitative classification“ to refer to the verbal statement that indicates the expression of a qualita-
tive measure for a case. We follow the terminology used by Adcock and Collier (2001). The quantitative equivalent of 
a qualitative classification is the numerical score of a case on a measure or indicator. 
8 We use a fictional name to illustrate this example. 
9Please mind that such a reduction of qualitative data makes it necessary to cut away some of the complexity of the 
data. For example, the qualitative classifications cannot reflect different interpretations of a concept among several 
actors in one case. Such interesting additional findings should be part of the qualitative analysis of the cases that 
should complement any fsQCA.  
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For triangulating interviewees’ answers we drew on information about the Guatemalan 
context, about each case, about potential sources of biases in answers from interview-
ees, and secondary data, such as minutes of the meetings of a council and municipal 
budgets. The decisions on contradictions in the data and the information based on which 
they were made need to be transparent in the presentation of the results of the analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Box 4: Summarizing qualitative data for each case 
3.3.5 Stage 5: Determining the Precision of Fuzzy Sets and Defining their Values 
Before we matched the qualitative classifications to fuzzy-set values we determined the 
degree of precision of the fuzzy-sets we defined each of their values. The degree of pre-
cision of a fuzzy set is determined by the level of detail in the qualitative data we use. 
For the Guatemalan study data the data lent itself to a four value fuzzy set for each 
measure. Such a fuzzy set would have the values: “fully out (0)”, “more out than in 
(0,33)”, “more in than out (0,67)”, and “fully in (1)”.  
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Our qualitative data was not suitable for a more finely scaled fuzzy set 10 as it became 
increasingly difficult to assign different fuzzy-set values to two cases if these values 
were very close to each other.  
The definition of each of the fuzzy-set values is based on the theoretical concept of in-
terest and it draws on the researcher’s in-depth knowledge of cases (Ragin 2000, 2008). 
Discussions in the literature about the definition of the concept allowed us to determine 
the main elements of “effective participatory governance” or “competitive elections.” 
The discourse on the concept of participatory governance reveals, for example, that one 
of its essential elements is “inclusiveness,” i.e., the quality of participatory governance 
depends on who participates. In other words, you must spell out the definition of the 
theoretical concept clearly and ensure to adequately measure the concept. This is crucial 
for being able to derive implications for theory development from the findings of the 
fsQCA. 
Besides closely examining the theoretical concept, we also took into account the socio-
cultural context of our cases for determining the four fuzzy-set values. This is necessary 
since the cases are not compared against an absolute, ideal, context-free case in a quali-
tative comparative analysis. Instead the context-based cases are compared among each 
other. Hence, following Ragin (2008) to define full membership in a fuzzy set (fuzzy-set 
value=1.0), we constructed an imaginary ideal case in the context of the universe of our 
cases, e.g., rural Guatemalan municipalities. This ideal case might not necessarily coin-
cide with an empirical case featuring the highest value on a given measure. Rather it is 
the best imaginable case in the context of the study that is logically and socially possible 
(Ragin 2000: 165-171). For example, for the measure “provision of information from 
Municipal Corporation to MDC about municipal revenues and expenses” the value of 
one was adjusted to the context of the Guatemalan law, which foresees that the munici-
pal government informs the MDC four times a year about its revenues and expenses. 
The provision of information to the MDC three or four times a year is therefore defined 
to correspond to a fuzzy-set value of one even though in other contexts this frequency of 
information provision could be quite low.  
                                                 
10 For an overview of differently scaled fuzzy sets and their advantages and disadvantages see Ragin (2008: 30-33). 
More precise fuzzy-sets can be used when more detailed qualitative data are available or when quantitative data are 
calibrated to fuzzy-set values. 
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We used the same technique to define the lowest value of a fuzzy set, that is, non-
membership in a set. However, for constructing the imaginary case that is fully out of a 
set it is more important to draw on the theoretical concept than on the socio-economic 
context. The definition of the theoretical concept one uses usually contains one or sev-
eral key characteristics. For example, in elections at least two serious candidates need to 
be running if they are to be regarded as competitive. Cases that do not display at least 
one of the defining characteristics of the concept to a low degree need to be assigned a 0 
which stands for non-membership in the set of municipalities with competitive elec-
tions. Again, this value might not necessarily coincide with the lowest measured value 
among the sampled cases. 
Box 5 provides an example of the definitions of the four fuzzy-set values of two 
measures of participatory governance for the Guatemalan study. 
 
Figure 5: Box 5: Defining fuzz-set values 
An alternative to adjusting the definition of the fuzzy-set values to the socio-cultural 
context of the cases is to re-label the concept of the condition or the outcome. For ex-
ample, we could have re-labeled the measure “provision of information from Municipal 
Corporation to MDC about municipal revenues and expenses” to “compliance with 
mandated budget information.” 
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3.3.6 Stage 6: Assigning and Revising Fuzzy-Set Values  
After defining the fuzzy sets we assigned values within the fuzzy set to each case in our 
data set. We did this by matching the qualitative classifications we derived in Stage 4 
with the fuzzy-set values defined in Stage 5. We illustrate how we conducted this 
matching exercise in Box 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Box 6: Assigning fuzzy-set values 
The final step is the revision and adjustment of the assigned fuzzy-set values, i.e., the 
values found in the last column of Box 6, for all cases and all measures. This revision is 
a crucial part of the dialogue between theory and evidence. Going through one measure 
across all cases, the scholar can evaluate whether the fuzzy-set value differences be-
tween cases reflected real differences between the cases according to case knowledge 
and whether the interview data were well captured by the fuzzy-set values. If this is not 
the case the scholar needs to go back to Stage 4 to revise the interview data summary 
for overlooked clues or biases in the data affecting the resulting qualitative classifica-
tions. If not, the scholar returns to Stage 5 to check whether the definitions of the fuzzy-
set values reflect all relevant dimensions of the theoretical concept and have been ad-
justed appropriately to the context.  
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This process of figuring out why a fuzzy-set value of a case does not seem to fit given 
the researcher’s case knowledge can make the researcher aware of important aspects 
that have so far been neglected in her definition of the fuzzy-set values. It is critical to 
ensure that the revision process is not used as a way to adjust the data to display a nice 
pattern of causality. Instead, it is a process in which the researcher verifies that the data 
are well aligned with the theoretical concepts she is interested in, the causal conditions 
and outcome are well represented by their measures, and the case evidence  is adequate-
ly summarized in the fuzzy-set values.  
Hence, it may happen that even after the revision there are measures where all cases are 
concentrated in the lower or upper half of the fuzzy sets. This might then be an example 
of a naturally occurring limited diversity, which may be in itself an issue of interest for 
future inquiry (Ragin 2000: 168-169). For example, in Guatemala no rural municipality 
has local media that critically cover local government decisions and thus provide inde-
pendent information to voters. Local media was intended to be a measure of “good ac-
cess to information through media” but all fuzzy-set values were low for all cases. Why 
there are no rural municipalities with independent local media might be an issue that 
merits future inquiry.  
At this point, the researcher is ready to aggregate the fuzzy-set values of all measures 
into the causal condition to which they belong and create a summary table as show in 
Table 1. This table contains the fuzzy-set values of the causal conditions and the out-
come for all cases in the Guatemalan study. Aggregating measures can be done in many 
different ways depending on the theoretical concept and the particular research question. 
In our example, we have taken e.g., the maximum of the three measures of Good Access 
to Information (see Box 1), since it does not matter through which medium people are 
informed and hence, the three measures are substitutable.11  
  
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the criteria that can be used to decide on whether measures should be aggregated taking the 
average, the maximum or the minimum, see Ragin (2000:321-328). 
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Table 1: Final fuzzy-set values of cases  
Source: author’s elaboration based on the data from Guatemala. 
 Contribution to FsQCA Best Practice 3.4
We agree with seasoned fsQCA users that regardless of whether one uses quantitative 
data, interview data, historical documents or secondary text data, the determination of 
fuzzy-set values should be based on a researcher’s theoretical and substantive 
knowledge and not on internal criteria such as the mean or the mode (Ragin 2008: 30). 
Yet, we argue that this commonly accepted proposition about how fuzzy-set values 
should be determined has not been sufficiently developed for interview data. While 
there are two techniques to calibrate quantitative data (Ragin 2008), to our knowledge 
no equivalent calibrating procedure is available for qualitative interview data12: So far, 
studies that use interview data for a fsQCA do not provide any details on how they have 
transformed their interview data to fuzzy sets (Metelits 2009; Schneider and Sadowski 
2010). Hence, a number of important analytical steps remain opaque to the audience of 
such research.  
  
                                                 
12 Not all studies using qualitative data for fsQCA however, need to be calibrated following the technique described 
in this paper. Sometimes it might be adequate for the researcher to provide the interviewee with a predetermined scale 
of fuzzy-set values. 
Final fuzzy-set values of cases 
Case Conditions Outcome 
Municipali-
ty 
Good Access to 
Information  
(GAI) 










0,33 0,67 0,22 0 
Case B 1 0,33 0,67 0 
Case C 0,67 0 0,33 1 
Case E 0 0,67 0,33 0 
Case F 0 0,67 0,67 0,67 
Case G 0,67 0 1 0,67 
Case H 0,33 1 1 1 
Case I 0 1 1 1 
Case J 0,33 1 1 0,67 
Case K 0,33 0 0,67 0,33 
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The potential of the technique that we propose consists in its ability to maintain a con-
stant dialogue between theory and evidence. As we have illustrated, until the fuzzy-set 
values are defined the researcher must continuously think thoroughly about the defini-
tion of the theoretical concepts she uses and their main elements or subdimensions. 
When applying the technique we propose, these considerations are explicitly stated in 
the analysis and are thus open to criticism from other scientists.  
Our technique is not immune to criticism fsQCA has received from researchers using 
mainly statistical tools. Such researchers have stated that the definition of the fuzzy-set 
values is arbitrary or can be adapted by the researcher to get the desired results (Wade 
and Goldstein 2003). The possibility that this might happen cannot be completely ruled 
out in the procedure we propose since it relies heavily on case and context knowledge of 
a researcher. However, we consider that reliance on such knowledge is not a weakness 
but a tremendous strength in the interpretation of qualitative and quantitative data. In 
addition, fsQCA researchers can show in sensitivity tests whether slight changes in the 
definitions of the fuzzy sets affect their results or not. Another possibility for demon-
strating the robustness of the results of the fsQCA is to use alternative measures for a 
given concept.  
Finally, the availability of a well-developed calibration technique is an essential step 
towards increasing the reliability and repeatability of any study using fsQCA. The pro-
cedure illustrated here constitutes only one example of the different ways calibration 
techniques could be devised. By spelling out one possible way to proceed in the calibra-
tion of interview data to fuzzy sets we welcome discussion among scholars about the 
advantages and disadvantages of this procedure. An open discussion on how to improve 
the integration of qualitative interview data into analyses through fsQCA will increase 
the credibility of the results that are produced using this method and opens the possibil-
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4. Qualitative Comparative Empirical Study (Paper 3):   
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Abstract: This study argues that competitive elections need to be complemented by 
effective information provision to bring about local government responsiveness. It 
points out the synergy effects of participatory governance forums, media coverage, and 
competitive elections in a political agency framework. The theoretical argument is eval-
uated in a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of ten rural Guatemalan 
municipalities. The main finding of the study is that information provision in participa-
tory governance forums and a credible threat of not being re-elected need to be jointly 
present to reduce the agency problem between a local government and its electorate. 
Local media turn out to be ineffective as providers of unbiased information in rural are-
as due to their financial dependence on local governments. Finally, the comparative 
analysis shows that local leadership, the presence of NGOs, and short distances between 
villages and the capital are important context conditions for the emergence of local gov-
ernment responsiveness. 
 
Keywords: Local Government Responsiveness, Participatory Governance, Media, Elec-





The performance of their local government could not be more different for the residents 
of two Guatemalan municipalities: in the first two years in office the government of 
Buenas Hermanas1 has invested almost its whole budget in social services, such as 
schools, health centers, water and sanitation systems, and local roads. In the same peri-
od, the government of La Villa has been spending almost half of its budget on its admin-
istration and personal advisors of the mayor. Therefore, La Villa invested less than half 
of its budget in social services that are preferred by the majority of its poor rural elec-
torate, as research on the ground showed. 
What explains such large differences in local government responsiveness between the 
two Guatemalan municipalities? First, according to the theoretical literature on political 
agency, competitive elections are the principal mechanism for the citizens of the two 
municipalities to hold their politicians to account for unresponsive behavior (Barro, 
1973; Ferejohn, 1986). But differences in electoral accountability alone are unlikely to 
be the whole story because both municipalities have the same electoral system and their 
last elections were equally competitive2. Moreover, studies on the impact of elections in 
developing countries have shown that they often fail as an accountability mechanism 
because their effect is limited by unfavorable context conditions, such as strong ethnic 
cleavages and low literacy rates (Bardhan, 2002; Keefer & Khemani, 2005). 
So what other factors could explain the differences in outcomes in the two municipali-
ties? Recently, two important complementary accountability mechanisms, improved 
access to information through local media and participatory governance arrangements, 
have each been found to increase local government responsiveness when they are com-
bined with competitive elections (Besley & Burgess, 2002; Faguet, 2009). These find-
ings suggest that local government responsiveness results from a context-dependent 
combination of several accountability mechanisms. 
  
                                                 
1 All municipalities have been given fictitious names to protect the privacy of interviewees. 
2 Competitive elections are defined as elections in which at least two candidates have a similar chance of 
winning the election. 
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To test this proposition this study examines how competitive elections, effective partici-
patory governance, and local media coverage interact in affecting local government re-
sponsiveness in Guatemala. Based on political agency theory it develops a theoretical 
argument for the complementarity of the three accountability mechanisms and their con-
text-sensitivity. Thus, it accommodates the three main mechanism that have been found 
to be associated with local government responsiveness and the major context conditions 
that have been pointed out to influence them in one theoretical approach.  
The theoretical argument is tested with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA) of ten municipalities. To interpret the fsQCA solution formula and to shed light 
on the micro-level processes behind it, the study draws on qualitative case-level evi-
dence 
Guatemalan municipalities provide an ideal setting for testing the effect of the three 
accountability mechanisms on local government responsiveness because there are large 
differences in the competitiveness of local elections, the implementation of participatory 
governance forums, and the activity of local media. In addition, the comparison of local 
government performances within a country allows for controlling for differences in 
formal institutions, such as electoral rules, participatory governance legislation, and 
media regulation, as well as for the influence of cultural and historic factors.  
The main finding of the study is that the joint presence of effective participatory gov-
ernance and competitive elections is the most robust sufficient combination of condi-
tions for responsive local governance. Case-level evidence shows that participatory 
governance arrangements play a key role in bridging the information gap between vot-
ers and politicians about the politician’s actions and thus increase the effectiveness of 
elections. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: the next section presents the theoret-
ical argument. Section 4.3 provides background information on the Guatemalan govern-
ance reforms. Section 4.4 describes the method. Section 4.5 presents the results of the 




 A Comprehensive Approach to Local Government Responsiveness 4.2
4.2.1 The Political Agency Problem 
How should an effective system of accountability mechanisms be designed so that local 
governments take policy decisions that reflect the interest of their mainly poor electorate 
and refrain from wasting and diverting public funds? Political agency models provide a 
micro-foundation for analyzing this question and shed light on the incentives that ac-
countability mechanisms create for local governments. The first generation of political 
agency models3 showed that the main obstacles to incumbent (agent) responsiveness to 
the preferences of the electorate (principal) are the conflict of interest between voters 
and a politician and the information asymmetry concerning the politician’s behavior 
(Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).4 
Solving this principal-agent problem requires a governance structure that makes it 
known to voters if the politician has diverted funds or has acted opportunistically and 
allows for punishment of such behavior (Moe, 1984). Some of the key elements of such 
a governance structure are: good information flows, shared decision-making, and the 
possibility to sanction the agent (Holmstrom, 1999). All three accountability mecha-
nisms–local elections, participatory governance and information provision mechanisms–
can contribute to one or two of these elements, but none of them is likely to be a suffi-
cient governance solution on its own. 
4.2.2 Competitive Elections: Uninformed and Untimely Sanctioning 
Elections are the main mechanism through which a population can hold its leaders ac-
countable at the end of their term. They serve as a credible threat to the incumbent that 
behavior which is not in the interest of the population will be punished in the future 
(Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).  Elections can thus motivate a selfish politician to act in 
the interest of voters. 
                                                 
3 There are two generations of political agency models: in the first generation models all politicians are of 
the same type and are only re-elected by voters if they exercise enough effort, i.e., elections function as a 
disciplining device. The second generation political agency models allow for several types of politicians 
who signal their type to voters. In these models, elections serve as a selection mechanism (Besley, 2007). 
4 The conflict of interest arises if selfish politicians do not exercise effort in carrying out their task or 
divert resources to private ends. Both actions are not in the interest of the population because they de-
crease their welfare. There is asymmetric information because voters cannot observe the policy choices 
the politician makes.  
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In line with this theoretical argument, empirical studies from the U.S. show that the pos-
sibility of re-election is associated with US governors being more ready to take the pref-
erences of their electorate into account (Besley & Case, 1995; List & Sturm, 2006). 
The impact of elections on the discipline of an incumbent varies with a number of fac-
tors, such as the frequency of elections, a politician’s base salary, length of tenure, voter 
turnout, and the number of competitors (Besley, 2007). Within one country where e.g., 
the frequency of elections is fixed, the effect of elections mainly depends on their com-
petitiveness: the less certain it is for a politician to be re-elected, e.g., because there are 
many competitors, the more likely is the politician to be responsive to preferences of the 
electorate (Griffin, 2006; Holbrook & van Dunk, 1993). 
In spite of having a positive effect on an incumbent’s discipline, competitive elections 
are not a panacea to the agency problem. The main factor that limits their effectiveness 
is the information asymmetry between voters and the politician. Citizens are unable to 
observe and understand all government actions (Ferejohn, 1999). Hence, as the targeting 
model by Timothy Besley (2007, pp. 144–145) shows, a politician can provide local 
public goods only to the majority and consume the rest of the public resources as a rent. 
If the targeted groups only know about the benefits they receive but do not realize what 
the politician has spent in other locations the politician may still be re-elected. The low-
er the probability that misconduct is discovered by voters, the lower is the cost of shirk-
ing for a politician. 
In developing countries, this problem is particularly relevant since the poor tend to be 
even less informed than richer and better educated citizens (Besley & Burgess, 2002). 
Also, clientelistic practices have been argued to be more pronounced in young democ-
racies where politicians can not make credible promises for programmatic changes and 
therefore refer to vote buying by providing tangible benefits to groups of voters 
(Bardhan, 2002; Jenkins, 2007; Keefer & Khemani, 2005). This argument is supported 
by evidence from Brazil which shows that mayors are not deterred from corrupt behav-
ior by elections when the probability that their misconduct is detected by voters is low 




Finally, long time intervals between elections and the fact that voters can only vote for 
or against a politician, make elections a crude and untimely sanctioning mechanism: A 
politician’s lack of effort cannot be punished immediately and voters have only one vote 
in the next elections. Therefore, politicians may get away with many small bad actions 
if they can convince voters overall at the end of their term (Faguet, 2009).  
4.2.3 Active Local Media: Broad Information Provision at Low Cost 
As the emerging political economy literature on mass media points out active media can 
provide information on government actions to a wide audience at a low cost and thus 
reduce the information asymmetry between politicians and their voters (Bruns & Himm-
ler, 2010; Prat & Strömberg, 2005; Strömberg, 2004). The effect of media can be incor-
porated in the standard political agency model as a change in the probability that the 
population knows about the actions and the type of a politician (Besley, 2007, pp. 128–
132). For example, voters may learn that a politician has not been spending public funds 
well in another village or they may be informed about acts of corruption. Such infor-
mation increases the effectiveness of elections by making punishment for bad behavior 
and reward of good behavior more likely.  
Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2002) support this argument with evidence from 
India. They show that a high turnout in elections combined with a high circulation of 
local newspapers is associated with more responsive state governments. Related studies 
support the general argument that access to information about government actions helps 
to mitigate the principal agent problem in developing countries. For instance, Anne 
Goetz and Rob Jenkins (2001) show how improved access to documents on public 
spending has helped Indian citizens to reduce corruption among public officials by hold-
ing public village audits. There is however little evidence on the capacity of media to 
influence government performance from other developing countries that do not have an 




4.2.4 Effective Participatory Governance: Information Provision and Weak Sanction-
ing 
Participatory governance forums for deliberative planning and evaluation of public poli-
cy can improve information flows and provide a mechanism for a weak form of sanc-
tioning between elections. First, meetings with citizens where officials report on their 
spending decisions and the implementation of projects can increase citizen knowledge 
about an incumbent’s decisions and actions. Just like local media, participatory govern-
ance forums can therefore increase the cost of opportunistic acts and the benefits of re-
sponsive behavior for a politician (Speer, 2010). Moreover, as Matthew Cleary (2007) 
points out, participatory governance forums make it easier for a politician to plan future 
policy decisions because civil society representatives provide nuanced information on 
the preferences and the reactions of the electorate to past policy decisions in meetings 
with the government. 
But participatory governance forums do not only increase upward and downward in-
formation flows, they also serve as a venue where government decisions need to be jus-
tified and policy choices that are not in line with the preferences of the electorate need 
to be corrected. Hence, participatory governance arrangements can reduce incumbent 
utility between elections when shirking is punished right away and thus increase an in-
cumbent’s discipline (Speer, 2010).  
The majority of studies provide support for a positive effect of participatory governance 
forums and participatory budgeting on local government responsiveness (Besley, Pande, 
& Rao, 2005; Faguet, 2009; Schneider & Goldfrank, 2002), but there are also some 
studies that find no such effects (Bräutigam, 2004; Francis & James, 2003). Hence, the 
evidence on the influence of participatory governance on local government responsive-
ness is inconclusive. As this study argues the different findings are likely to stem from 
the fact existing studies do not control systematically for other accountability mecha-
nisms and different context conditions. 
4.2.5 The Role of Remote Conditions: Literacy, Inequality, and Ethnic Heterogeneity 
Three important context conditions are likely to have an indirect effect on local gov-
ernment responsiveness and are therefore included in the empirical analysis. These con-
ditions are of a structural nature and not influenced by actors in the short-run.  
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They create the environment in which the three proximate conditions (competitive elec-
tions, active local media, and effective participatory governance) unfold their effect on 
the outcome. Therefore, they are termed ‘remote’ causal conditions (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2006).  
First, the level of education is likely to affect local government responsiveness. In de-
veloping countries often large parts of the population are illiterate or have not even 
completed primary school. Such low levels of education limit voters’ ability to under-
stand, e.g., information on local government spending and the implementation of pro-
jects that is provided in newspapers or participatory governance forums. Moreover, citi-
zens with higher levels of education are more likely to be able to propose alternative 
policy options and engage in sanctioning in their role as members of a participatory 
governance forum or at the ballots (Faguet, 2009; Krishna, 2006). 
Second, the structure of the local economy can have an impact on local government 
responsiveness. In a municipality where economic resources are concentrated in the 
hands of a few powerful economic actors campaign contributions from these actors can 
reduce the competitiveness of elections. Such contributions can be used to move the 
candidate towards a policy that favors the contributor and to persuade uninformed vot-
ers to vote for a candidate (Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Faguet, 2009). Such persua-
sion efforts are likely to be particularly effective when the share of uninformed and/or 
uneducated voters is high. 
Third, ethnic heterogeneity can reduce the effectiveness of elections and participatory 
governance. The sanctioning effect of elections is limited by ethnic heterogeneity if vot-
ers prefer to vote for a candidate of their own ethnicity in spite of that candidate’s poor 
performance (Keefer & Khemani, 2005). Moreover, ethnic heterogeneity can affect the 
functioning of participatory governance forums, because they require that representa-
tives from different villages and sectors of civil society cooperate in monitoring and 
evaluating local government actions. Ethnic divisions among the population can hinder 
such cooperation as has been shown in an extensive literature on collective action and 




 The Guatemalan Governance Reforms 4.3
In rural Guatemala 71% of the population are poor and 24% live below the extreme 
poverty line (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 2006). Moreover, large parts of the 
population in rural areas lack access to basic public services, such as drinking water, 
sanitation, and roads (World Bank, 2003). Hence, it is crucial that spending on these 
services responds to the needs of the poor.  
In 1996, the government and the guerrilla forces signed a lasting Peace Agreement after 
36 years of civil war in which they agreed to reform public service provision (Gobierno 
de Guatemala & Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, 1996). In the follow-
ing years the Guatemalan government created or reformed all three accountability 
mechanisms: It transferred responsibilities for public service provision to democratical-
ly elected municipal governments, it established a local mechanism for citizen participa-
tion, and it improved access to information for citizens and the media. 
Guatemalan municipalities are governed by a popularly elected mayor and a Municipal 
Council, who are elected every four years with a simple plurality system. The primary 
mechanism to hold municipal governments accountable in the provision of public ser-
vices are local elections. The competitiveness of these elections, measured by the num-
ber of participating candidates, voter turnout, and the share of the winning party, dif-
fered strongly across the 333 Guatemalan municipalities in the last elections (Tribunal 
Supremo Electoral, 2007). This variation will be exploited in the empirical analysis to 
assess the impact of electoral competition on local government responsiveness. 
Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free access to public documents is guaran-
teed by the Constitution, i.e., the legal basis for independent and critical media is for-
mally established in Guatemala (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1985). In addition, 
the Guatemalan Congress passed a new Right to Information Act in September 2008 
(Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2008). This law should facilitate critical re-
porting by local media about local government performance and increase citizens’ ac-




Yet, the existence of a favorable legal framework does not imply that local media with 
independent coverage of local politics are equally active in all Guatemalan municipali-
ties. The circulation of local media is likely to vary because it is more profitable to es-
tablish e.g., a local newspaper in large densely populated municipalities than in a small 
and sparsely populated locations. Also, criminal organizations and repressive local gov-
ernments are known to limit the information that local media dare to publish in many 
municipalities in Guatemala. In those municipalities the coverage of political issues is 
likely to be lower than in less dangerous municipalities.5 
Finally, the 2002 Development Council Law establishes the Municipal Development 
Council (MDC) as a participatory governance forum for the planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of municipal projects for building or repairing social infrastructure. In the 
MDC representatives from Communal Development Councils6 (CDC) and local civil 
society, as well as officials of the municipal and central government meet once a month. 
The decisions of the MDC are not binding for the municipal government, but the De-
velopment Council Law foresees that the mayor reports to the MDC about spending on 
investments in the municipality (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002b). Also, 
members of the MDC can carry out social audits and denounce a local government at 
the general accounting office, which may lead to legal prosecution in cases of corrup-
tion. Last but not least, the Municipal Code demands that the municipal government 
explains the criteria that have led to the inclusion or exclusion of development projects 
in the municipal budget (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002a).  
As with any national law, these provisions are not adhered to equally in all municipali-
ties. In about one third of the municipalities the MDCs are not even convened and in the 
remaining two thirds they differ in their degree of activity, inclusiveness and ability to 
exert pressure on the municipal government (United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), 2005). Hence, there is great variation in the effectiveness of participatory gov-
ernance across Guatemalan municipalities. 
                                                 
5 According to national press reports over 40 journalists employed by different media were intimidated or 
attacked in 2009 alone (Prensa Libre, 2010). 





4.4.1 Case Selection 
The selection of the ten municipalities for the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis (fsQCA) is based on John Stuart Mill’s (1967 [1843]) indirect method of difference, 
or, as denoted by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970), the Most Similar Systems 
Design (MSSD). For the MSSD cases (systems) are selected purposefully so that they 
share several characteristics, but vary in the explanatory conditions under study and in 
outcomes to identify the conditions that cause differences in local government respon-
siveness in Guatemalan municipalities. 
The MSSD was applied in five steps. The starting point of the case selection was the 
universe of all 333 Guatemalan municipalities. This universe was reduced to 155 mu-
nicipalities in which more than 70% of the population lives in rural areas.7 These 155 
rural municipalities constitute the population of cases (Step 1). Then, 45 cases with dif-
ferent outcomes were selected. For this the 155 rural municipalities were divided into 
three strata according to their share of municipal spending on social services; then 15 
cases from each stratum were sampled randomly (Step 2). In the next step, the selection 
was reduced to 35 cases with similar systems, i.e., ten cases were excluded because they 
differed strongly from the others in terms of the financial resources and the size of the 
municipality which could both influence the outcome (Step 3). From those similar 35 
cases with different outcomes, 27 “most likely” and “least likely” cases, i.e., cases that 
are likely and cases that are unlikely to display the outcome according to their configu-
ration of remote causal conditions were selected (Step 4). Finally, to cater to Guatema-
la’s ethnic and socio-economic heterogeneity from these 27 ten cases were chosen from 
all major regions of the country (Step 5).  
The main characteristics of the selected municipalities are summarized in Table 1 below. 
It shows that cases from all three strata of spending on social services are included and 
that the cases vary in the remote causal conditions illiteracy, inequality, and ethnic het-
erogeneity.  
                                                 
7 The study focuses on rural municipalities, because they are most affected by poverty and large gaps in 




It also illustrates that five most likely and five least likely cases have been chosen and 
that the cases are geographically dispersed across all major regions of the country. Giv-
en the purposeful theory-based selection these ten cases are not representative in a sta-
tistical sense, but they are suitable for examining the theoretical argument in a qualita-
tive comparative analysis and they reflect Guatemala’s regional and ethnic composition.  
























Bequita 1st Medium Low Low Least likely No Southeast 
Mayan 1st Low Medium Medium Most likely Yes Central 
La Selva 1st High High High Least likely Yes North 
Buenas 
Hermanas 2nd High High High Least likely Yes Southwest 
Victoria 2nd High Medium Medium Least likely Yes Northwest 
Aurora 2nd Low Medium Medium Most likely Yes Southwest 
Mar Azul 3rd Low Medium Low Most likely No Southwest 
La Villa 3rd Low High Medium Most likely No Central 
Valle de 
Oro 3rd Low Low Low Most likely Yes Southwest 
Villa Beni 3rd Medium Low High Least likely Partly Petén 
Source: author’s elaboration based on data from INE (2002), INE and Secretaría de Planificación y Pro-
gramación de la Presidencia (2006) and United States Agency for International Development and Instituto 
Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (2009).   
The reference for the classifications of the characteristics is the distribution of the 45 rural municipalities 
selected in the first step. “High” is used for municipalities in the highest quartile of the distribution, “low” 
for municipalities in the lowest quartile, and “medium” for all municipalities in the second and third quar-
tile.  
4.4.2 Data Collection 
The fsQCA is based on qualitative and quantitative raw data. Qualitative data were 
mainly collected through semi-structured interviews. In each of the ten municipalities I 
conducted between eight and ten interviews with the mayor, village representatives, 
local civil society actors, key informants, and local journalists. In addition, I carried out 





Overall I completed 88 stakeholder interviews and eleven expert interviews. To obtain 
quantitative data, e.g., on the frequency of MDC meetings and voter turnout, I collected 
complementary secondary data, such as minutes of MDC meetings, municipal budgets, 
local media reports, as well as economic, political, and social information in the munic-
ipalities and at the national statistics institute. 
4.4.3 Measurement and Calibration of Fuzzy Sets 
The outcome local government responsiveness (LGR) is measured as the average share 
of the municipal budget that has been spent on education, health, water and sanitation, 
local roads, and electricity in the first two years of the current administration 
(2008/2009). The share of the budget that a municipality invests in these services in-
stead of in its administration or in pet projects reflects the degree to which it devotes its 
resources to satisfying the needs of the rural poor as the qualitative analysis of the inter-
views with the village representatives showed.  
The measures for the functioning of participatory governance (PG) and the quality of 
access to information through media coverage (AI) are based on qualitative interview 
data. Both concepts consist of several dimensions that are captured by different 
measures. For example, the functioning of participatory governance is measured among 
other things by the “frequency of meetings” and the “scope of participation”, which 
were then aggregated into a composite measure. The measures for the degree of compet-
itiveness of elections (CE), the level of education (EDU), economic equality (EQ), and 
ethnic homogeneity (ETHHOM) are quantitative data from sources, such as the national 
census and the electoral tribunal. Appendix A contains detailed information on all 
measures. 
For the fsQCA the qualitative and quantitative measures need to be converted into fuzzy 
sets. Fuzzy sets are sets in which cases are assigned a value between zero (full exclusion 
from the set) and one (full inclusion of the set) according to a membership function 
(Zadeh, 1965). For the qualitative measures four verbal labels were defined that corre-
spond to the four values of a fuzzy set “fully out” (0), “more out than in” (0.33), “more 
in than out” (0.67), and “fully in” (1). Then, each case was assigned one of these four 
values based on the content analysis of the interview data (for more details of the quali-
tative calibration, see Basurto & Speer, 2012). The quantitative measures were directly 
calibrated following the technique described in Ragin (2008, pp. 85–94).  
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The fuzzy-set anchor points of “fully out” (0), “neither in nor out” (0.5), and “fully in” 
(1) were determined based on case- and social knowledge. Then, the calibration algo-
rithm in the software fsQCA was applied to calibrate the quantitative data (Ragin, 
Drass, & Davey, 2006). All verbal label and anchor point definitions can be looked up in 
Appendix B; the fuzzy-set values of the conditions and the outcome are listed in Appen-
dix C. 
4.4.4 Two-Step FsQCA and Case-Level Analysis 
The first part of the empirical analysis consists in a two-step fsQCA. FsQCA is a case-
oriented method that draws on fuzzy-logic8 to identify the causal conditions that lead to 
an outcome. It is a transparent and replicable method for analyzing qualitative and quan-
titative raw data from an intermediate number of cases. The aim this approach is “(…) to 
allow for systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to 
within-case complexity” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009, p. xviii). As fsQCA does not impose a 
pattern of causality on the data it reveal patterns of multiple conjunctural causation9 
(Ragin, 2000, Ragin, 2008). Therefore, it is perfectly suited to exploring the comple-
mentary effect of the three accountability mechanisms. 
The two-step fsQCA approach was introduced by Carsten Schneider and Claudius 
Wagemann (2006) as a remedy to the too-many-variables/too-few-cases problem in me-
dium N studies and is employed to avoid overloading the fsQCA with too many varia-
bles.10 In the first step, the fsQCA truth table algorithm is applied to an underspecified 
model that contains only the three remote conditions that are likely to support the emer-
gence of local government responsiveness: education, economic equality and ethnic 
homogeneity.  
  
                                                 
8 Fuzzy logic is a superset of traditional Boolean logic, i.e., a form of multi-valued logic that is derived 
from fuzz-set theory. 
9 Multiple conjunctural causation is a conception of causation in which a combination of conditions gen-
erates an outcome or several different combinations of conditions lead to the same outcome or a condition 
can have different effects on the outcome depending on the context in which it is embedded (Berg-
Schlosser, de Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009). 
10 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has been shown to yield reliable results when the proportion 
of variables to cases stays far below one (Marx, 2010). 
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In the second step, the fsQCA is run several times each time with the three proximate 
causal conditions media coverage, competitiveness of elections, and functioning of par-
ticipatory governance and one of the remote conditions that are found to be sufficient 
for the outcome in the first step. This procedure allows for testing the sufficiency of 
conditions, but not their necessity.11 
After concluding the fsQCA, it is essential to interpret, support and discuss the derived 
fsQCA solution formula by drawing on case-level evidence. The relevance of the solu-
tion formula depends on whether it can increase our understanding of the cases and their 
outcomes; its validity depends on whether we can identify the causal mechanisms at the 
case-level that generate it (Ragin, 2000, Ragin, 2008). Therefore, the last part of the 
analysis examines whether the fsQCA solution formula reflects the successful and un-
successful cases of responsive local governance and what mechanisms at the case level 
drive the results. 
 Results 4.5
4.5.1 FsQCA First Step: Analysis of Remote Causal Conditions 
In the first step of the analysis the fsQCA truth table algorithm is applied to test whether 
the following remote causal conditions enhance local government responsiveness (LGR) 
in the ten Guatemalan municipalities: the level of education (EDU1), economic equality 
(EQ), and ethnic homogeneity (ETHHOM1) (see Appendix D for the truth table). I fol-
low Schneider and Wagemann (2006) in applying a low consistency threshold (0.7) and 
in using the parsimonious solution of the logical minimization process. For deriving the 
parsimonious solution the computer program uses any counterfactual (unobserved con-
figuration of conditions) that makes the solution formula simpler.12 Table 2 displays the 
result of the first step of the analysis.13 
  
                                                 
11 If a causal condition is necessary, all cases that display an outcome display the causal condition. If a 
causal condition is sufficient, all cases that display the causal condition also display the outcome (Rihoux 
& Ragin, 2009). 
12 The parsimonious solution accounts for much of the empirical evidence, but it is less precise than the 
complex solution. It is used for the first step of the analysis because this step aims at identifying all rele-
vant remote conditions that foster the emergence of local government responsiveness without yet provid-
ing an exact solution. 
13 For both steps the fsQCA software is used (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006). 
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Table 2: Result of Step 1 of the fsQCA 
Model: LGR = f (EDU1, EQ, ETHHOM1) 
Parsimonious solution Raw coverage14 Unique coverage15 Consistency16 
EDU1 0.76 0.26 0.70 
eq 0.73 0.23 0.66 
Solution coverage: 0.99  
Solution consistency: 0.65 
Source: author’s elaboration using the fsQCA software. 
The parsimonious solution formula 
EDU1 + eq  LGR17 
shows that the presence of education and the absence of economic equality are associat-
ed with local government responsiveness in the ten Guatemalan municipalities. The 
solution coverage is 0.99, which indicates that the solution accounts for 99% of the cas-
es with a positive outcome. The solution consistency is 0.65, i.e., in 65% of the cases 
that share the combination EDU+eq it is sufficient for local government responsiveness. 
The first part of the solution formula (EDU) is in line with the theoretical prediction that 
a high level of education fosters local government responsiveness by supporting the 
functioning of the media and participatory governance arrangements. Its second part 
(eq) implies that high economic inequality, which is measured by the Gini coefficient of 
the distribution of land, is associated with local government responsiveness. This find-
ing does not correspond to the theoretical prediction and therefore needs explanation.  
According to the interview data, responsive local governance emerges in spite of an 
unequal distribution of land not because of it. Land inequality is generally very high in 
Guatemala due to several violent land appropriations in its history.  
                                                 
14 Raw coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are covered by a combina-
tion of conditions. 
15 Unique coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are covered only by the 
same combination of conditions. 
16 “Set-theoretic consistency assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combina-
tion of conditions (…) agree in displaying the outcome in question (…). That is, consistency indicates 
how closely the subset relation is approximated.” (Ragin, 2006, p. 2) 
17 Upper case letters denote the presence and lower case letters the absence of a condition. The plus sign 
indicates a logical “OR”, a star denotes a logical “AND”, and the connecting arrow means that the formu-
la on the left leads to the outcome. 
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Yet, in many municipalities large landowners do not use their economic power to mo-
nopolize local politics, i.e., they do not finance one strong party, but contribute to sever-
al political campaigns. Some landowners refrain completely from interfering in local 
politics, because they are not interested in local public services (Faguet, 2009). For ex-
ample, large-scale sugar cane harvesting at the Pacific Coast in Guatemala does not rely 
on local roads, but national highways. Hence, large finca owners prefer to channel their 
resources into national politics to make sure that they can, e.g., use well-maintained 
highways to extract their goods. 
Ethnic homogeneity is not part of the solution formula of enabling conditions for the 
outcome. This can be explained mainly by the fact that Guatemalan municipalities are 
largely ethnically homogeneous. Most Guatemalan municipalities, including the case 
municipalities, are either almost completely populated by indigenous people or Ladinos 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 2002). Hence, candidates in the case munici-
palities generally belong to the same ethnicity as the majority of voters, which implies 
that ethnicity based voting does not affect the competitiveness of elections. Also, ethnic 
heterogeneity does not have a negative effect on collective action in participatory gov-
ernance arrangements in the case municipalities. In the few municipalities with several 
indigenous groups they understand each other’s language and cooperate with their peers 
from other ethnic backgrounds. 
4.5.2 FsQCA Second Step: Analysis of Proximate Causal Conditions 
The second step of the fsQCA tests what proximate causal conditions are sufficient for 
the outcome in the context of the presence of education or the absence of equality, the 
two conditions that were found to be sufficient for the outcome in the first step of the 
fsQCA. The fsQCA truth table algorithm is applied now to the fully specified model 
where the outcome is again LGR, the proximate causal conditions are access to infor-
mation through media coverage (AI1), competitiveness of elections (CE1), and function-
ing of participatory governance (PG1). As remote causal condition I include first the 
level of education (EDU1) and then the absence of equality (NONEQ) (see Appendices 
E and F for the truth tables). The consistency threshold is now 0.85 to obtain a more 
precise result and I use the complex solution that does not allow the computer program 
to make any assumptions about unobserved combinations of conditions. Table 3 dis-
plays the results of the two rounds of the second step of the analyses. 
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Table 3: Result of Step 2 of the fsQCA 
Model: LGR= f (AI1, CE1, PG1, EDU1 ) 
Complex solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
ai1*CE1*PG1 0.46 0.41 0.89 
AI1*ce1*PG1*EDU1 0.15 0.10 0.87 
Solution coverage: 0.552529  
Solution consistency: 0.879257 
Model: LGR= f (AI1, CE1, PG1, NONEQ) 
Complex solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
ai1*CE1*PG1*NONEQ 0.42 0.42 0.89 
Solution coverage: 0.42 
Solution consistency: 0.89 
Source: author’s elaboration using the fsQCA software. 
The complex solution of the main specification including the level of education is:  
ai1*CE1*PG1 + AI1*ce1*PG1*EDU1  LGR 
According to this formula there are two combinations of conditions or ‘paths’ that are 
sufficient for local government responsiveness in the ten municipalities. The first suffi-
cient combination of conditions is competitive elections and effective participatory gov-
ernance in the absence of access to information through media coverage. The second 
sufficient path to the outcome is access to information through media coverage, effec-
tive participatory governance, and a high level of education in the absence of competi-
tive elections. Both paths are highly consistent, i.e., the subset relation for sufficiency is 
closely approximated by the model. The first path is empirically more relevant than the 
second one as the raw and unique coverage figures show, i.e., the first path accounts for 
more instances of the outcome than the second one. 
When the three proximate causal conditions are analyzed in the context of the absence 
of equality the complex solution of the fsQCA is 
ai1*CE1*PG1*NONEQ  LGR 
Hence, as in the first specification, the combination of competitive elections and effec-
tive participatory governance in the absence of access to information through local me-
dia is found to be a sufficient path to the outcome, this time in the context of an unequal 
land distribution. This path is highly consistent and accounts for a little bit less than half 




In both specifications causality turns out to be conjunctural and equifinal, i.e., local 
government responsiveness is brought about by a combination of conditions and there 
are two paths that lead to the outcome. None of the proximate or remote causal condi-
tions is found to be individually sufficient for the outcome. 
4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results I use alternative measures and alternatively con-
structed composite measures for the causal conditions. For the quantitative measures I 
use two alternative measures for the competitiveness of elections (CE2, CE3) and one 
alternative measure for the level of education (EDU2) and ethnic homogeneity 
(ETHHOM2). For the functioning of participatory governance and for the quality of 
access to information through local media I use a different aggregation function to cal-
culate two alternative composite measures (PG2, AI2).  
The main results of the two specifications are confirmed in the robustness checks. The 
results of the first step of the analysis do not change when using EDU2 and ETHHOM2. 
In the second step, the most robust combination of conditions that is sufficient for the 
outcome across nine of the eleven specifications is ai*CE*PG in the context of high 
education (EDU) or low equality (NONEQ). The second robust combination of condi-
tions, AI*PG in the context of high education (EDU) and high equality (noneq), is part 
of the solution formula in five of the eleven specifications. The results of the second 
step robustness checks are documented in Appendix G. 
4.5.4 Interpretation and Evaluation of the Results: Back to the Cases 
As fsQCA is a qualitative, case-based methodology I will now draw on case-level evi-
dence to interpret and evaluate the solution formula. There are two municipalities, 
Buenas Hermanas and La Selva, that share the configuration of low access to coverage 
in local media, competitive elections, and effective participatory governance, in the con-
text of a low level of equality and education (ai*CE*PG*NONEQ*edu). A third munic-
ipality, Mayan, displays the same configuration of causal conditions except that it is 
characterized by a high level of education. All three municipalities have responsive lo-





All three cases are indigenous municipalities in the Guatemalan highlands that share a 
strong tradition of community organization and a history of brutal state and military 
repression before and during the civil war. Due to this history the indigenous population 
continues to be suspicious of the municipal authorities who are elected according to a 
western system of democracy, even though these municipal authorities belong to their 
ethnic group. In spite of the mistrust towards the municipal authorities, increased self-
esteem among indigenous people implies that a high number of indigenous candidates 
participate in the elections to compete for the position of the mayor. Often these candi-
dates include not only candidates of national political parties but also a number of inde-
pendent candidates that form so-called civic committees. Electoral outcomes are tight 
and mayors are hardly ever re-elected due to the general belief among voters that public 
officials always enrich themselves during their time in office. 
In addition to facing intense competition in the next elections, the municipal govern-
ments of all three cases are under pressure in the years between elections, because there 
are functioning MDCs. The MDCs in the three municipalities do not only meet regular-
ly, but their members also demand to be informed and they discuss the spending deci-
sions of the municipal government. In Mayan the mayor and the municipal staff even 
feel threatened by some of the village representatives who criticize them openly in 
MDC sessions and demand more funds for their villages. As a result, the mayor now 
resorts to dividing the municipal budget in equal amounts that he hands out to the vil-
lage heads for their small projects. In the other two municipalities the relationship be-
tween the mayor and the village representatives is more cooperative and respectful and 
the MDC meetings serve mainly to plan the distribution of projects and to inform the 
village representatives about the decisions of the mayor. 
Local media in all three successful municipalities do not contain much coverage of local 
government actions and more importantly even those that do, do not reach the majority 
of the population in rural areas. Most households are not connected to local TV net-
works and newspaper vendors hardly ever get to the majority of villages. The infor-
mation on recent activities of the local government is passed on by village representa-





The fact that the absence of access to information through the media does not hinder the 
emergence of responsive local governance in these cases suggests that this face-to-face 
communication can substitute local media in rural areas. 
A further unexpected result is that two of the three successful cases, Buenas Hermanas 
and La Selva have very low literacy rates. One explanation for this finding is that the 
low level of education of the population is compensated by the strong presence of 
NGOs in these municipalities who provide capacity building measures on the decentral-
ization laws and citizen’s rights and duties. This capacity building helps even illiterate 
village representatives to understand the information on budget planning and project 
implementation that is provided verbally in the MDC. 
Whereas a high level of education is not a necessary condition for local government 
responsiveness in municipalities with competitive elections, the case of Valle de Oro 
suggests that in combination with an alternative sanctioning mechanism it can compen-
sate for the absence of the threat of not being re-elected. Valle de Oro is characterized 
by the second most robust part of the solution formula: access to information through 
media coverage and effective participatory governance combined with the absence of 
competitive elections in a highly educated and highly equal context 
(AI*ce*PG*EDU*noneq). In Valle de Oro municipal government responsiveness was 
brought about by the leadership of a small group of well-educated citizens who are fa-
miliar with national laws due to their employment in national agencies. This group of 
citizens convicted the former mayor of corruption for which he was sent to jail by the 
national auditor. Subsequently, the group of civic leaders won the election with a large 
majority. Once in office they established the MDC, which did not exist before. In addi-
tion, they communicate the municipal revenues and expenses every three months in a 
public hearing that is also transmitted by the local TV station to all villages. Through 
this TV station, a majority of citizens has access to information on local government 
spending. Yet, this information is only available because the local government provides 
it voluntarily. Hence, no independent investigative media outlet or a citizen driven MDC 





The analysis of the chronological order of events in Valle de Oro illustrates how im-
portant it is to complement the fsQCA solution formula with the case level analysis to 
examine which of the conditions is really driving the result. In this case, the proximate 
causal conditions AI and PG, as well as the outcome, resulted from local leadership and 
a high level of education.  
The remaining six cases lend further support to the validity of the first part of the solu-
tion formula (ai*CE*PG). Four cases suggest that local government responsiveness is 
unlikely to emerge in the absence of all accountability mechanisms or when only com-
petitive elections are present (Bequita: ai*ce*pg*EDU*noneq; Victoria: 
ai*CE*pg*edu*noneq; Villa Beni: ai*CE*pg*EDU*noneq, Aurora: 
ai*CE*pg*EDU*NONEQ). Two cases indicate that even when competitive elections are 
combined with access to media coverage and a high level of education they do not con-
sistently bring about local government responsiveness (Mar Azul and La Villa: 
AI*CE*pg*EDU*NONEQ). 
In the cases with only competitive elections the lack of an effective information provi-
sion mechanism prevents in Victoria and Villa Beni that unresponsive behavior between 
elections is punished by voters. In addition, imperfect information about local govern-
ment actions is aggravated by the following factors: Victoria has the lowest level of ed-
ucation of all cases and the current mayor does not allow NGOs to work in the munici-
pality. Consequently, village representatives hardly understand local government 
decisions. Villa Beni has an extremely low population density and a high share of im-
migrants from other regions. It is the largest municipality of the country and covers a 
huge part of the lowland jungle of the Petén. The lack of common roots hinders the or-
ganization of civil society and the long distances to the capital make it extremely diffi-
cult for village representatives to participate in MDC meetings or for media to reach the 
villages limiting access to information about local government action for the population.  
Even though Aurora does not have an effective MDC or accessible media coverage 
about politics to complement competitive elections, it has a responsive local govern-
ment due to its particular adaptation of the official ‘western’ municipal governance sys-




Traditional indigenous authorities from several villages share the seats in the Municipal 
Council and oversee each other and the mayor in two teams. After two years in office, 
they swap positions. This system of inter-village oversight and rotation of offices after 
two years seems to be an effective substitute for a democratic election with informed 
voters. 
The remaining two remaining municipalities, La Villa and Mar Azul, share the combina-
tion of active local media and competitive elections. But even though a majority of citi-
zens has access to regular news on local government activities this information does not 
reduce the re-election chances of a corrupt or unresponsive incumbent because the cov-
erage is always positive regarding the incumbent. For example, in La Villa the mayor 
hands out numerous small favors to supporters who queue every day in front of his of-
fice and he employs many village representatives in his administration. Both activities 
increase the share of the budget that he spends on administration and reduces the funds 
that are available for social investment. Because local media do not report critically on 
these clientelistic practices, they do not endanger his chances to be re-elected.  
The interviews with local editors revealed that the reason for their uncritical coverage is 
their difficult financial situation and the resulting reliance on local government adver-
tisements. Local media outlets struggle to tap other sources of revenues because of their 
consumer’s low capacity to pay and the low interest of local businesses to use local me-
dia for advertising. Many local newspapers do not even charge for their copies but dis-
tribute them freely. This implies that they cannot afford to offend the local government 
and even if they wanted to cover politics more critically they could not do so because 
they cannot afford to pay journalists for their investigation. 
 Conclusion 4.6
There is widespread consensus that democratic elections alone do not prevent govern-
ments in developing countries from targeting public funds towards favored ethnic 
groups and campaign supporters instead of investing in social services for the poor ma-
jority. Yet, there is little evidence on how to increase vertical accountability and thus 
government responsiveness in developing country political markets that are severely 




Drawing on political agency theory this study argues that elections need to be comple-
mented by an information provision mechanism, such as participatory governance or 
local media, to bring about local government responsiveness. The fsQCA of ten Guate-
malan municipalities supports the conjunctural causation of competitive local elections 
and effective participatory governance. Widespread access to news on local politics in 
local media does not complement competitive elections in bringing about local govern-
ment responsiveness in the case municipalities. Even when local media have high circu-
lation figures and report regularly on politics they do not earn enough revenues from 
sources outside the local government to be able to publish critical reports on local gov-
ernment actions. This finding suggests that liberalizing state regulation of the media and 
guaranteeing freedom of the press is not sufficient for creating a landscape of free and 
independent media in developing countries; demand side constraints to media growth 
need to be addressed as well.  
The effect of the context conditions literacy and economic inequality on local govern-
ment responsiveness differed substantially across the cases. The micro-mechanisms that 
cause this variation in the overall effect would be a fruitful area of further case study or 
experimental research. Finally, the case-level analysis shows that local leadership, the 
presence of NGOs and the density of the population can play an important role in the 
emergence of local government responsiveness. Further research is needed to corrobo-
rate the empirical relevance of these context conditions in other settings. 
Even though the case selection contains a variety of configurations of conditions it was 
not possible to evaluate the impact of participatory governance in the absence of com-
petitive elections due to the limited diversity of cases. Moreover, to explore the link 
between low demand and bias in media coverage more systematically we would require 
a measure of the objectivity of local media coverage across all municipalities. Such a 
measure was not available due to a shortage of archived local media reports and finan-




Taken together, the results of this study underline the importance of looking at the inter-
play of all accountability mechanisms that influence a local government and of control-
ling for important context conditions to assess what governance structure fosters local 
government responsiveness. By evaluating governance reforms, such as participatory 
budgeting or citizen report cards without taking into account existing accountability 
mechanisms, such as elections or media, we are unlikely to obtain a comprehensive pic-
ture of the incentives that politicians face to behave in line with the preferences of the 
majority of voters.  
Contributing to a comprehensive theory of local government accountability that ac-
commodates recently established forms of participatory governance in developing coun-
tries this study has applied the political agency model to outline the basic effects of par-
ticipatory governance forums on local government responsiveness. Further research is 
needed to develop more extensive models that can make nuanced predictions on the 
impact of information provision, joint decision-making, and soft sanctioning in partici-
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Appendix A: Measurement of Conditions and Outcome 
Qualitative Measures 
Causal  




Frequency of MDC meetings (fqmdc) Fqmdc and partmdc measure whether the MDC physically functions as foreseen, i.e. 
whether all relevant actor groups in the 
municipality meet regularly with the mayor. 
PG1: the average of the values 
for all three information pro-
vision measures is calculated 
(downward information); the 
average of frequency and 
participation is calculated 
(physical establishment); then 
the minimum of these two 2nd 
level measures and disapprov-
al is taken. 
 
PG2: the average of the values 
for all three information pro-
vision measures is calculated 
(downward information); then 
the average of this 2nd level 
measure and all other 
measures is taken. 
Interviews with 
members of the MDC 
and the municipal 
government; focus 
group interviews in 
the villages; minutes 
of MDC meetings; 
local media coverage. 
Scope of participation (partmdc) 
Provision of information from Municipal Corpo-
ration to MDC about municipal budget revenues 
and expenses (dwinfo1) 
Dwinfo1-dwinfo3 measure the actual 
downward information flow within the 
MDC and thus its most important function. 
Provision of information from Municipal Corpo-
ration to MDC about realization of development 
council and municipal projects (dwinfo2) 
Provision of information from Municipal Corpo-
ration to MDC about justification for allocation of 
development council and municipal projects 
(dwinfo3) 
Disapproval and demand for corrective actions is 
voiced within the MDC in case that development 
plans and projects are not implemented properly 
by the Municipal Corporation (dca) 
Dca measures whether the MDC can sanc-
tion the behavior of the Municipal Corpora-
tion by publicly criticizing it and by de-





Availability of news on local politics for majority 
of population on TV (tv) 
The more locally accessible media 
(TV/radio/newspapers) report on municipal 
local politics, the more likely are voters to 
pick up this information. 
AI1: the maximum of TV, 
radio and np. 
 





views with local civil 
society representa-
tives, donors and 
journalists. 
Availability of news on local politics for majority 
of population on the radio (radio) 
Availability of news on local politics for majority 




Causal Condition / 
Outcome Main and Alternative Measures Justification for the Measures Data Sources 
Competitive Elections 
(CE) 
Number of candidates for mayor (ce1) 
(main) 
The more candidates have competed for the mayor position, the more 
difficult it was for each one of them to win enough votes in the last elec-
tion. 
TSE 2007: the data for the 
measures ce1-ce3 are avail-
able for the municipal elec-
tions 2007 from the elec-
toral archive. Winning party share (ce2) (alternative) The higher the share of votes for the winning party, the easier it was for the 1st placed party to win more votes than the 2nd placed one. 
Voter turnout (ce3) (alternative) 
High participation in the last election means that they have been competi-
tive because politicians needed to convince more voters to get a majority 
of the votes 
Level of Education 
(EDU) 
Literacy rate (edu1) (main) Literacy reflects the ability to understand printed information on govern-ment performance. 
INE 2002: data at the mu-
nicipal level from the Cen-
sus. Share of population with at least prima-
ry education (edu2) (alternative) 
A higher level of education raises the ability to understand any infor-
mation on government performance. 
Economic Equality 
(EQ) 
Inverse of the Gini coefficient of land 
distribution (eq) (main) 
The Gini coefficient of land is the area under the Lorenz curve of land 
distribution. Because fertile land is the main source of wealth in rural 
municipalities the land distribution is likely to be a good measure of the 
concentration of economic power. 





Inverse of Ethnic Fractionalization 
Index (ethhom 1) (main) 
The Ethnic Fractionalization Index of a municipality specifies the proba-
bility that two people that are randomly drawn from the municipality’s 
population are from different ethnicities 
INE 2002: data at the mu-
nicipal level from the Cen-
sus. 
Inverse of Language Fractionalization 
Index (ethhom 2) (alternative) 
The Language Fractionalization Index of a municipality specifies the 
probability that two people that are randomly drawn from the municipali-




Average share of the municipal budget 
spent on health, education, water and 
sanitation, roads, and electricity in 2008 
and 2009 (lgr) 
The more a municipal government invests in social services, the more it 
takes the preferences of its electorate into account. 
Gobierno de Guatemala 
2010: municipal budgets 





Appendix B: Calibration of Fuzzy-Set Values 
Qualitative Measures 
Causal  




Frequency of officially docu-
mented MDC meetings 
(fqmdc) 
0: MDC has not met in the last 12 months 
0,5: MDC has met four times in the last 12 months 
1: MDC has met 12 times or more often in the last 12 months 
Scope of participation (part-
mdc) 
0: None of the  interested organizations in the municipality participates 
0,33: Less than half of the  interested organizations participates 
0,67: Half or more of the interested organizations participate 
1: All of the interested organizations participate 
Provision of information from 
Municipal Corporation to 
MDC about municipal budget 
revenues and expenses (dwin-
fo1) 
0: No revenues and expenses are communicated 
0,33: All revenues and expenses are communicated once a year / only totals are communicated twice or once a year 
0,67: All revenues and expenses are communicated 3 times or twice a year/ only totals are communicated 3 or 4 times a 
year 
1: All revenues and expenses are communicated 3 or 4 times a year 
Provision of information from 
Municipal Corporation to 
MDC about realization of 
development council and 
municipal projects (dwinfo2) 
0: No information is given 
0,33: Information only on development council or municipal projects without cost once a year 
0,67: Information without cost is given on development council and municipal projects at least once a year / information 
with cost on either development council or municipal projects is given at least once a year 
1: Information with cost of projects is given on development council and municipal projects at least once a year 
Provision of information from 
Municipal Corporation to 
MDC about justification for 
allocation of development 
council and municipal projects 
(dwinfo3) 
0: No information is given 
0,33: Information about list of development council or municipal projects without reasons once a year 
0,67: Information about list and reasons for including development council or municipal projects at least once a year 
1: Information about list and reasons for including development council and municipal projects at least once a year 
Disapproval and demand for 
corrective actions is officially 
voiced by the MDC (dca) 
0: MDC members do not evaluate any topic 
0,33: MDC evaluate at least one crucial topic 
0,67: MDC members voice disapproval for at least one crucial topic 










Availability of news on local 
politics for majority of popula-
tion on TV (tv) 
0: No news on local politics are available on TV for the majority of the population 
0,33: News on local politics are available on TV for the majority of the population every few months 
0,67: News on local politics are available on TV for the majority of the population every month 
1: News on local politics are available on TV for the majority of the population every week 
Availability of news on local 
politics for majority of popula-
tion on the radio (radio) 
0: No news on local politics are available on the radio for the majority of the population 
0,33: News on local politics are available on the radio for the majority of the population every few months 
0,67: News on local politics are available on the radio for the majority of the population every month 
1: News on local politics are available on the radio for the majority of the population every week 
Availability of news on local 
politics for majority of popula-
tion in newspapers (np) 
0: No news on local politics are available in newspapers for the majority of the population 
0,33: News on local politics are available in newspapers for the majority of the population every few months 
0,67: News on local politics are available in newspapers for the majority of the population every month 









Number of candidates for 
mayor (ce1) 
0: Only one candidate ran for the position of the mayor  
0,5: Five candidates ran for the position of the mayor  
1: Ten or more candidates ran for the position of the mayor  
Winning party share (ce2) 
0: The share of the 1st placed party was at least 50% of the votes 
0,5: The share of the 1st placed party was 35% of the votes 
1: The share of the 1st placed party was at most 20% of the votes 
Voter turnout (ce3) 
0: Voter turnout was at most 50% 
0,5:  Voter turnout was 60% 




Causal Condition / 
Outcome Measure(s) Anchor Points for Direct Calibration of Fuzzy-Sets 
Level of Education 
(EDU) 
Literacy rate (edu1) 
0: Less than 50% of the population can read and write 
0,5: 65% of the population can read and write 
1: More than 80% of the population can read and write 
Share of population 
with at least primary 
education (edu2) 
0: No one has completed primary education 
0,5: 25% of the population have completed primary education 
1: More than 50% of the population have completed primary education 
Economic Equality 
(EQ) 
Inverse of the Gini 
coefficient of land 
distribution (eq) (main) 
0: Inverse of Gini coefficient of land distribution of at least 0,6 
0,5: Inverse of Gini coefficient of land distribution of 0,4 
1: Inverse of Gini coefficient of land distribution of at most 0,2 
Ethnic homogeneity 
(ETHHOM) 
Inverse of Ethnic Frac-
tionalization Index 
(ethhom 1) (main) 
0: Probability of 1 that two randomly selected people from the municipality are from different ethnic background 
0,5: Probability of 0.5 that two randomly selected people from the municipality are from different ethnic background 
1: Probability of 0 that two randomly selected people from the municipality are from different ethnic background 




0: Probability of 1 that two randomly selected people from the municipality speak two different languages 
0,5: Probability of 0.5 that two randomly selected people from the municipality speak two different languages 
1: Probability of 0 that two randomly selected people from the municipality speak two different languages 
Local Government  
Responsiveness 
(LGR) 
Average share of 
budget spent on social 
services 
0: Less than 60% of the budget is spent on social services 
0,5: 70% of the budget is spent on social services 




Appendix C: Fuzzy-Set Values of Conditions and Outcome 
Municipality 
Remote Causal Conditions Proximate Causal Conditions Outcome 
EDU1 EDU2 EQ ETHHOM1 
ETHHO
M2 AI1 AI2 CE1 CE2 CE3 PG1 PG2 LGR 
Victoria 0,03 0,33 0,57 0,93 0,93 0,33 0,11 0,77 0,86 0,77 0,33 0,36 0,05 
La Villa 0,77 0,87 0,01 0,92 0,93 1 0,78 0,77 0,69 0,95 0,11 0,62 0 
Mar Azul 0,75 0,76 0,35 0,95 0,95 0,67 0,22 0,86 0,12 0,51 0 0,42 0,77 
Villa Beni 0,54 0,64 0,9 0,84 0,87 0 0 0,95 0,86 0,42 0 0,27 0,01 
Aurora 0,8 0,78 0,46 0,94 0,67 0 0 0,77 0,83 0,04 0,33 0,62 0,82 
La Selva 0,24 0,68 0,01 0,73 0,63 0 0 0,97 0,97 0,99 0,56 0,86 0,86 
Valle de Oro 0,88 0,83 1 0,95 0,85 0,67 0,44 0,18 0,02 0,2 0,67 0,82 0,82 
Buenas Hermanas 0,18 0,45 0,04 0,83 0,59 0,33 0,11 0,95 0,96 0,31 0,89 0,94 0,89 
Mayan 0,81 0,82 0,43 0,89 0,67 0,33 0,11 1 0,95 0,94 0,56 0,84 0,57 
Bequita 0,69 0,79 0,65 0,95 0,95 0,33 0,11 0,18 0,17 0,97 0 0,55 0,35 
Source: author’s elaboration based on interview data and quantitative data from Gobierno de Guatemala (2010), INE (2002), TSE (2007), and UNDP (2005). 
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Appendix D: Truth Table for the Analysis of Remote Causal Conditions 
Row EDU1 EQ ETHHOM1 Number LGR Consistency Cases 
1 1 0 1 4 1 0.749271 La Villa, Mar Azul, Aurora, Mayan 
2 1 1 1 3 1 0.735294 Villa Beni, Valle de Oro, Bequita 
3 0 0 1 2 1 0.785276 La Selva, Buenas Hermanas 
4 0 1 1 1 0 0.546296 Victoria 
5 0 0 0 0 1 0.802083 - 
6 1 1 0 0 1 0.719298 - 
7 0 1 0 0 1 0.704918 - 
8 1 0 0 0 1 0.808989 - 
Source: author’s elaboration using the fsQCA software. 
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Appendix E: Truth Table for Analysis of Proximate Causal Conditions with Education 
Row AI1 CE1 PG1 EDU1 Number LGR Consistency Cases 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.000.000 Mayan 
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.872093 Valle de Oro 
3 0 1 1 0 2 1 0.864734 La Selva, Buenas Hermanas 
4 0 1 0 1 2 0 0.805147 Villa Beni, Aurora 
5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.764706 Bequita 
6 1 1 0 1 2 0 0.660793 La Villa, Mar Azul 
7 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.591603 Victoria 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.805310 - 
9 0 0 1 1 0 1 1.000.000 - 
10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.714286 - 
11 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.792793 - 
12 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.638889 - 
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.638298 - 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.620370 - 
15 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.867470 - 
16 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.431373 - 




Appendix F: Truth Table for Analysis of Proximate Causal Conditions with Absence of Equality 
Source: author’s elaboration using the fsQCA software.  
Row AI1 CE1 PG1 NONEQ Number LGR Consistency Cases 
1 0 1 1 1 3 1 0.885714 La Selva, Buenas Hermanas, Mayan 
2 1 1 0 1 2 0 0.556962 La Villa, Mar Azul 
3 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.545161 Victoria, Villa Beni 
4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.800000 Valle de Oro 
5 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.817121 Aurora 
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.690476 Bequita 
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.824074 - 
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.785714 - 
9 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.787879 - 
10 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.674157 - 
11 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.666667 - 
12 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.645455 - 
13 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.581633 - 
14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.795775 - 
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.796296 - 
16 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.256410 - 
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Appendix G: Results of the Robustness Checks of the Analysis of Proximate Causal Conditions 
Change in specification Complex solution  with education 
Complex solution  
with absence of equality 
Winning party share (CE2) instead of number of 
candidates (CE1) ai1*CE2*PG1 + AI1*ce2*PG1*EDU1  LGR ai1*CE2*PG1*NONEQ + AI1*ce2*PG1*noneq  LGR 
Voter turnout (CE3) instead of number of candidates 
(CE1) 
ai1*CE3*PG1*EDU1 + AI1*ce4*PG1*EDU1 + 
ai1*ce3*PG1*edu1  LGR ai1*ce3*PG1*NONEQ  LGR 
Share of population with primary education (EDU2) 
instead of literacy rate (EDU1) ai1*CE1*PG1*EDU2  LGR n/a 
Use a softer aggregation function (average instead of 
minimum) for PG (PG2)  ai1*CE1*PG2*EDU1  LGR ai1*CE1*PG2*NONEQ + AI1*ce1*PG2*noneq  LGR 
Use a stricter aggregation function (average instead 
of maximum) for AI (AI2) ai2*PG1*EDU1  LGR ai2*CE1*PG1*NONEQ  LGR 
Source: author’s elaboration using the fsQCA software.  
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Abstract: Participatory governance arrangements in developing countries have been 
shown to work when local governments are willing to allow participation and civil soci-
ety actors have the capabilities to participate effectively. But in many instances these 
two conditions are hardly met. So, how can they be brought about? This study puts for-
ward two institutional rational choice based research hypotheses, one on the compliance 
incentives for government officials and one on social and structural conditions for effec-
tive civil society participation. It tests them in a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA) of ten rural municipalities. The key findings of the analysis are that 
social enforcement by civil society actors, a mayor’s internal enforcement with feelings 
of guilt and a mayor’s interest in participatory governance are jointly sufficient for gov-
ernment compliance. Moreover, the analysis shows that a the combination of a high 
capacity to engage in public discourse, short distances to meetings, and the presence of 
a large number of civil society organizations is sufficient for effective civil society en-
forcement in the examined municipalities. 
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In the last twenty years, many developing countries have formally introduced new 
forms of participatory governance1. Participatory governance is promoted as a means to 
improve public service delivery and a strategy to deepen democracy (Avritzer 2009; 
Evans 2004; Prichett and Woolcock 2004). Effective participatory governance mecha-
nisms have been found e.g., to increase government accountability and responsiveness 
in public service delivery and to enhance access to services for the poor (Besley et al. 
2005; Boulding and Wampler 2010; Lemos et al. 2010; Shah 2007).  
Yet, making participatory governance mechanisms work effectively turns out to be a 
great challenge for many developing countries. Several case studies e.g., from Bolivia, 
Peru and Uganda, observe a deep gap between formally adopted laws on participatory 
governance and their functioning on the ground (Andersson 1999; Brinkerhoff et al. 
2007; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 2000). Difficulties in implementing participatory gov-
ernance effectively have been explained by the fact that either the “political economy 
condition” and/or the “civil society condition” are not met (Evans 2004). On the one 
hand, participatory governance mechanisms have been found to fail because govern-
ment officials are unwilling to involve citizens in decision-making and when they are 
able to implement the planned projects (Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007; Blair 
2000; Brinkerhoff et al. 2007; Eguren 2008; Schönleitner 2004). On the other hand, 
effective participatory governance has been shown to hindered by the fact that civil so-
ciety actors lack the technical and organizational capacity to discuss and contest gov-
ernment decisions (Avritzer 2009; Devas and Grant 2003; Wampler 2008a). 
So should we conclude from these findings that participatory governance is doomed to 
fail in places where these two conditions are not met or are there ways to foster the civil 
society and the political economy condition? To answer this question the remainder of 
this study examines the determinants of the civil society and the political economy con-
dition in rural Guatemala. 
  
                                                 




For guiding the empirical investigation, the study proposes two research hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis covers the conditions that influence a municipal government’s deci-
sion to establish and run a participatory governance forum. This decision is conceptual-
ized as the decision to comply with an institution, in this case the Guatemalan participa-
tory governance law. The second research hypothesis refers to the conditions that 
contribute to civil society actors’ ability to exert public pressure and to participate ac-
tively, which is framed as the collective social enforcement of the participatory govern-
ance law. Both hypotheses are derived from theories that belong to the field of rational 
choice institutionalism. Hence, the theoretical approach of this study is based on the 
assumptions that actors are boundedly rational and that institutions are the main struc-
tural element of decision situations (Shepsle 1989; Weingast 2002). 
The two research hypotheses are tested in two fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Anal-
yses (fsQCA) of ten Guatemalan municipalities. These municipalities provide an ideal 
testing ground for the research hypotheses. First, Guatemalan national law mandates the 
establishment of Municipal Development Councils (MDCs) since 2002. Municipal gov-
ernments are able to implement these forums2 and village representatives are motivated 
to participate in them3 But the willingness of municipal governments to share their 
power and the ability of civil society actors to contest government decisions are likely to 
vary greatly between Guatemalan municipalities due to Guatemala’s ethnic, social, and 
economic heterogeneity (Durston 1998). In fact, even though all forms of civic organi-
zation and community orientation have been severely affected by the long internal con-
flict, civil society participation in Guatemala has been found to vary strongly before, 
during and after the civil war (Booth 2000; Goldfrank 2007; Miños Chavez 2001). The 
study exploits these differences to analyze the determinants of the political economy 
and the civil society condition in ten municipalities from different regions of the coun-
try. 
  
                                                 
2 All municipalities obtain substantial funds that can be prioritized in the participatory planning process in 
the Municipal Development Councils (MDCs). Moreover, even though bureaucratic competence and 
financial resources of Guatemalan municipal administrations are low (Miños Chavez 2001), they are able 
to carry out the basic organizational tasks of coordinating a MDC. 
3 The village representatives are motivated by the projects that can be distributed according to the partici-
patory prioritization. Representatives of civil society organizations benefit from participating in the 
MDCs because it offers them a forum for promoting their cause. 
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The remainder of the study is structured as follows: the next section provides infor-
mation on the Guatemalan context for participatory governance. Section 5.3 presents the 
two research hypotheses and the theoretical arguments from which they have been de-
rived. Section 5.4 describes the data and the methods. Section 5.5 presents the results of 
the empirical analysis and interprets them. Section 5.6 concludes. 
 Participatory Governance in Guatemala 5.2
Guatemala is among the poorest countries in Latin America. In 2006 more than half of 
Guatemala’s population lived below the national poverty line and more than 15% of the 
population were estimated to be extremely poor (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
2006). The country continues to suffer from the socio-economic consequences of a 36-
year-long civil war in which more than 200,000 people died and 250,000 are still miss-
ing (Jonas 2000).  
To comply with the provisions of the 1996 Peace Agreement the Guatemalan Congress 
passed the Urban and Rural Development Council Law in 2002 (Congreso de la 
República de Guatemala 2002). This law established Communal, Municipal, Depart-
mental, Regional and National Development Councils as the principal means of partici-
pation of the Guatemalan population in the public policy process. 
The principal level of this system for bottom-up planning and monitoring of elected 
local governments is the municipal level where civil society actors participate in the 
Municipal Development Council (MDC). The Development Council Law establishes 
the MDC as a consultative forum for the planning and evaluation of municipal devel-
opment projects. It foresees that representatives from the Communal Development 
Councils4 (CDC) and local civil society groups meet with municipal and central gov-
ernment officials once a month to discuss development projects and to evaluate munici-
pal spending (Congreso de la República de Guatemala 2002). 
Guatemalan municipalities are governed by mayors and Municipal Councils who are 
elected every four years. The mayors are the executive agents of the municipal govern-
ment and the heads of the municipal administration.  
                                                 
4 At the village level a community assembly, the so-called Communal Development Council, takes place 
every month in which the needs of the community for public services are discussed and prioritized. 
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In addition, they usually have a majority in the Municipal Council due to the simple 
plurality electoral system (Puente Alcaraz and Linares López 2004). According to the 
law, they call the MDC meeting, coordinate the MDC and set the agenda for the debate. 
Hence, their compliance with the law is decisive for the effectiveness of participatory 
governance at the municipal level (López 2002). For this reason, the analysis focuses on 
a mayor’s decision and leaves aside power struggles between different branches of the 
municipal government. 
As there is no central government enforcement of the Development Council Law at the 
municipal level, the actual functioning of a MDC depends on the willingness of a mayor 
to coordinate and run it (the political economy condition) and the ability of civil society 
actors to participate effectively (the civil society condition) (López 2002; Centro de 
Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales 2003).  
Both conditions are affected by Guatemala’s historical and cultural legacy. On the one 
hand, many mayors reproduce the authoritarianism and arbitrariness of the central gov-
ernment and continue to perceive the MDC as competing with them for power and un-
duly restricting their autonomy. They are also afraid to open up a space where members 
of the opposition can voice their criticism and interfere with the implementation of pro-
jects (Barrientos 2007; López 2002). On the other hand, in many municipalities active 
demand for political participation is impeded by fear, a so called ‘culture of dependen-
cy’, and resignation due to the recent brutal civil war and decades of authoritarian re-
gimes, as well as repeated experiences with corrupt politicians (Borrell 2002; Kaur 
2003).  
Yet, in spite of this legacy, Guatemala remains a multi-ethnic country with an immense 
variety of indigenous cultures, languages, climate zones, customs and traditions, which 
naturally translates into a variation in civil society activity5 (Durston 1998; Grant 2001) 
and differences in the degree of implementation of the MDCs.  
                                                 
5 For example, “[T]here is a widespread perception in Guatemala that the Mayan corporate communities 
in the western highlands are more ‘civic’, more organized and more oriented toward collective decision-
making and action, while the eastern lowlands are described as being ‘individualistic’ with little partici-




For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) finds that 200 munici-
palities had established a MDC in 2005, whereas 131 did not do so (UNDP 2005: 213). 
What explains this diversity within one country? The following section puts forward 
two research hypotheses for explaining differences in the compliance of a Guatemalan 
mayor with the Development Council Law and the ability of civil society actors to de-
mand and exercise their right to be included in decision-making. 
 An Institutional Rational Choice Approach to Explaining Participa-5.3
tory Governance 
The research hypotheses on the political economy condition (Section 5.3.1) and the civil 
society condition (Section 5.3.2) are developed from theories that adopt a rational 
choice institutionalist perspective. Hence, the theories share the view that institutions 
constrain and enable interactions of boundedly rational human actors by conveying in-
formation about the likely future actions of other actors and the nature of sanctions for 
noncompliance (North 1990; Weingast 2002).6 
5.3.1 Incentives for Municipal Government Compliance 
The first research hypothesis addresses the motivations that can induce a municipal 
government to establish and run a MDC. It is derived from imperative and behavioral 
theories of law which provide arguments on why citizens comply with laws. According 
to these theories three types of reasons could motivate municipal governments to com-
ply with the Guatemalan participatory governance law. They are summarized in the first 
research hypothesis (H1). 
H1: The following three conditions contribute to municipal government compliance 
(COMPLIANCE) with the mandate to establish a functioning Municipal Development 
Council (MDC)...  
1) …a mayor’s interest in establishing a functioning MDC (INTEREST) 
2) …civil society enforcement with expressions of (dis)approval (SOCIETYENF) 
3) …mayoral self-enforcement with feelings, such as guilt and pride (SELFENF) 
                                                 
6 In this view institutions are seen as sources of observed regularities in human behavior. Following 
Ostrom they are defined in this study as “(…) prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of re-
petitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom 2005: 3). 
 
141 
The theoretical arguments from which H1 is derived are the following: imperative and 
behavioral theories of law show that besides formal state enforcement7 there are three 
main incentives for actors to adhere to an institution: 1) it is in the interest of an actor to 
comply with the institution (strategy), 2) the institution is enforced by societal disap-
proval (social norm), 3) the institution is enforced by personal feelings (personal norm) 
(Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Parisi and von Wagenheim 2006). The impact of an institu-
tion on human behavior can thus originate from three different sources: first, it can af-
fect behavior by transmitting information on how other actors are going to behave. 
Strategies are repeated patterns of behavior to which actors adhere because deviation 
entails a lower payoff for them (Bromley 1989; Posner and Rasmusen 1999). According 
to this imperative theory of law argument, municipal government compliance will take 
place when the personal or political benefits outweigh the cost of calling MDC meetings 
(condition 1). 
Second, behavioral theories of law stress that compliance with an institution can be 
achieved through informal monitoring and sanctioning with public disapproval by other 
members of a society or by feelings of guilt (Cooter 1998; Elster 1989; Hodgson 2006; 
Posner and Rasmusen 1999). Social monitoring and sanctioning could be exercised in 
Guatemala by local civil society members and thus motivate the municipal government 
to set up a MDC (condition 2). Finally, Guatemalan mayors could be induced to coordi-
nate a functioning MDC by self-monitoring and self-sanctioning, e.g., with feelings of 
guilt when breaking a law or the feeling of a warm glow when complying with it (condi-
tion 3). 
5.3.2 Socio-Economic Conditions for Civil Society Enforcement 
The second outcome that is examined is the ability of civil society actors to exert public 
pressure on the mayor and to participate actively in MDC meetings, which is conceptu-
alized as the collective social enforcement of the participatory governance law. The se-
cond research hypothesis (H2) summarizes what conditions explain the differences in 
civil society enforcement in Guatemalan municipalities according to distributive bar-
gaining theory (Knight 1992) and collective action theory (Ostrom 2007).  
                                                 
7 This type of enforcement does not take place in Guatemala and is hence not included in the hypothesis. 
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H2: The following four conditions contribute to civil society enforcement 
(SOCIETYENF) … 
1) …high discourse capability of civil society actors (DISCOURSECAP) 
2) …low poverty of civil society actors (LOWPOV) 
3) …large number of civil society organizations (LARGEGROUP) 
4) …high frequency of personal communication between civil society actors 
(COMMUNICATE) 
The first two conditions of the hypothesis are derived from the distributive bargaining 
theory argument that the resources that actors command influence their ability to en-
force institutions against other actors (Knight 1992). According to this argument, the 
resources that enable civil society actors to carry out public lobbying activities and to 
engage in meaningful debates about public policy decisions affect the strength of civil 
society enforcement. The following two resources have been found to be particularly 
relevant for civil society to be able to fulfill these functions: first, civil society actors 
need to have sufficient discourse capability (Besley et al. 2005; Gibson and Woolcock 
2008; Wampler 2008b) (condition 1). Discourse capability is defined in this study as an 
actor’s ability to understand the law and to use effective social and linguistic practices 
to criticize municipal government behavior in public and to discuss and contest munici-
pal government decisions in participatory governance meetings (Holzscheiter 2005). 
Second, civil society actors need to have the financial resources to be able to afford the 
cost of participation and to be independent from government welfare programs and ben-
efits (Wampler 2008b; Wiebe 2000) (condition 2). 
Besides intellectual and financial resources civil society enforcement needs to involve a 
number of actors to be effective. Hence, it can be framed as the provision of a public 
good, which needs to be organized collectively. Collective action theory establishes 
eight structural factors that influence the success of collective action to provide a public 
good (Ostrom 2007).8 Only two of these eight factors are relevant for explaining the 
ability of civil society to push collectively for the enforcement of the law because the 
other six factors do not vary across Guatemalan municipalities. 
                                                 
8 The eight factors are: 1) the size of the group, 2) whether benefits are subtractive or fully shared, 3) the 
heterogeneity of participants, 4) face-to-face communication, 5) the shape of the production function, 6) 
information about past actions, 7) how individuals are linked, and 8) whether individuals can enter and 
exit freely (Ostrom 2007: 188). 
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The first of the two factors that are hypothesized to affect collective action in Guatema-
lan municipalities is group size. A larger group of civil society organizations makes it 
more likely that there will be a critical number of interested and resourceful actors for 
civil society enforcement; also a larger group of civil society actors makes it more diffi-
cult for the municipal government to co-opt all interest groups (Oliver and Marwell 
1988; Wampler 2008a) (condition 3). The second factor that could theoretically influ-
ence civil society enforcement is how often citizens have the opportunity for face-to-
face communication. The reason for this is that this type of communication can be used 
for persuading other actors to act in the interest of the group and for discussing devia-
tions from cooperation (Ostrom et al. 1994; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998) (condition 
4). 
To sum up the theoretical arguments on municipal government compliance and civil 
society enforcement in this and the previous section, Figure 1 illustrates both research 
hypotheses and their relationship. 
 





The empirical analysis consists in a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA)9 of ten municipalities that is based on qualitative and quantitative raw data. By 
comparing the experiences of ten cases from different regions the study accounts for 
Guatemala’s cultural and socio-economic diversity; at the same time the collection of 
detailed qualitative data allows for the measurement of complex concepts, such as in-
formal enforcement mechanisms, which are difficult to capture in large n surveys. 
FsQCA offers a systematic and transparent technique for comparing these data. Another 
advantage of fsQCA is that it can detect patterns of multiple conjunctural causation 
where different combinations of causal conditions lead to an outcome (Berg-Schlosser 
et al. 2009). 
5.4.1 Case Selection 
The selection of the ten municipalities for the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analy-
sis (fsQCA) is carried out according to the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). The MSSD is chosen to identify conditions that explain 
the differences in outcomes across the cases in spite of their similarity. For this case 
selection design, cases that share several characteristics but vary in the explanatory con-
ditions under study and in outcomes are selected purposefully. 
The population of cases comprises the 155 Guatemalan municipalities in which more 
than 70% of the population lives in rural areas. The study focuses on rural municipali-
ties because they are most affected by poverty and a lack of basic social services and 
therefore in dire need of a governance mechanism that fosters social inclusion (INE 
2006; World Bank 2003). From the 155 rural municipalities, ten cases with positive and 
negative outcomes measured by their share of municipal spending on social services 
were selected10.   
                                                 
9 FsQCA is a case-oriented method that uses fuzzy-logic to identify the necessary and sufficient combina-
tions of conditions that lead to an outcome. Fuzzy logic is a superset of traditional Boolean logic, i.e., a 
form of multi-valued logic that is derived from fuzz-set theory. For a detailed treatment of fsQCA see 
Ragin (2000, 2008). 
10 The share of social spending is the most accurate and timely measure of a municipality with municipal 
government compliance and civil society enforcement that is available for all 155 rural municipalities.  
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The data collected in the course of the study confirm that the ten selected cases differ in 
the degree to which the civil society condition and the political economy condition are 
met and in the functioning of their MDCs.11 Hence, the cases vary in the outcome. They 
also vary in the conditions that are hypothesized to contribute to civil society enforce-
ment. They differ in the level of education and poverty, the number of civil society or-
ganizations and population density. At the same time the cases are similar in the follow-
ing characteristics: financial capacity (budgets per head and funds to implement 
development council projects), population size, number of villages, and ethnic and lan-
guage heterogeneity. Finally, the case selection accounts for the ethnic, geographic and 
economic diversity between different regions in Guatemala as it includes indigenous 
and non-indigenous municipalities from all major regions of the country. 
5.4.2 Data Collection 
The fsQCA draws on both qualitative and quantitative raw data. We conducted eight to 
ten semi-structured interviews with the mayor, village representatives, local civil society 
actors, key informants, and local journalists in each of the ten municipalities, which 
resulted in 88 stakeholder interviews in total. Moreover, we carried out 22 open-ended 
interviews with experts on participation, capacity building, and development planning in 
Guatemala City.12 In addition, complementary secondary data, e.g., minutes of MDC 
meetings, capacity building schedules, as well as economic and social quantitative data 
were collected for all ten municipalities. 
5.4.3 Measurement and Calibration of Fuzzy Sets 
Several measures, such as the literacy rate which is one measure for discourse capabil-
ity, are quantitative data from the national census and the national planning office. Oth-
ers, such as the measures of municipal government compliance (COMPLIANCE) and 
civil society enforcement (SOCIETYENF), are qualitative interview data. Moreover, the 
concepts of COMPLIANCE, SOCIETYENF, and mayoral self-enforcement (SELFENF) 
consist of several dimensions and are therefore captured by composite measures. 
                                                 
11 The ten studied participatory governance forums displayed large differences in the frequency of meet-
ings, the topics that were addressed in the MDC, and the influence that citizens had over planning deci-
sions. Whether this variation is representative for the variation across all Guatemalan municipalities can-
not be evaluated, because there are no data on the functioning of participatory governance in Guatemala. 
12 The professional support of my two Guatemalan fieldwork assistants is gratefully acknowledged. 
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The measures of COMPLIANCE, SOCIETYENF, SELFENF and mayoral interest 
(INTEREST) merit further explanation. COMPLIANCE is captured by a composite 
measure that combines measures of a MDCs physical establishment with measures of its 
functioning as a forum where the mayor cedes decision-making power in the planning 
of resources and the evaluation of past policies to citizens. The composite measure of 
SOCIETYENF reflects the content and scope of the pressure that is exercised by civil 
society actors. SELFENF is measured as the combination of a mayor’s perception of the 
strength of the obligation to run the MDC and the legitimacy of the central government 
as a lawmaker. The rationale for the first measure is that a mayor who does not interpret 
the law as mandating him to establish the MDC is unlikely to feel guilty for not estab-
lishing it (Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). The second measure is used because it is more 
likely that a mayor who acknowledges the authority of the central government will feel 
guilty or ashamed for breaking a central government law (DeBell 2006). Finally, 
INTEREST is measured as the balance of cost and benefits13 of coordinating a function-
ing MDC as perceived by the mayor. The details of all measures that are used in the 
study are contained in Appendix A. 
For the fsQCA all raw data have to be calibrated as fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets can take on 
values between zero (full exclusion from the set) and one (full inclusion in the set). For 
the qualitative measures four verbal classifications corresponding to the fuzzy-set values 
“fully out” (0), “more out than in” (0.33), “more in than out” (0.67), and “fully in” (1) 
were defined. Following Ragin (2000; 2008) the definitions of these fuzzy-set values 
are based on theoretical considerations and the case and context knowledge of the ana-
lyst. To assign each case one of these four values the interview data were coded with 
Atlas.ti and the quotations on each measure were then summarized. Finally, each case 
was assigned one of the four fuzzy-set values. For this assignment the summary of the 
quotations of each case was compared to the verbal definitions of the fuzzy-set values to 
choose the most appropriate value for each case and each measure.14  
                                                 
13 Potential costs of participatory governance for the municipal government include, loss of decision-
making power, distributional conflicts, and more room for criticism from the opposition; benefits include 
claiming credit for popular outcomes, promoting party interests and getting information on the prefer-
ences of the electorate (Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007; Wampler 2008a). 
14 The details of the calibration procedure that was applied to the qualitative data are described in Basurto 
and Speer (2011). 
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The quantitative measures were calibrated following the direct calibration technique 
described in Ragin (2008: 85-94). As for the qualitative fuzzy-set value definitions, the 
anchor points for the direct calibration are determined based on the theoretical concept 
that a measure captures and case and context knowledge. Based on these anchor points 
the fsQCA software transforms the original quantitative data through a log of odds met-
ric into fuzzy-set values between 0 and 1. All fuzzy-set value definitions and anchor 
points are listed in Appendix B; the fuzzy-set values of the conditions and the outcome 
are shown in Appendix C. 
 Results 5.5
The following sections presents the results of the fsQCA on municipal government 
compliance and civil society enforcement. The results are interpreted in light of the 
case-level evidence and compared with the research hypotheses in Section 5.5.2. 
5.5.1 FsQCA Results 
Results on Municipal Government Compliance 
The first round of the fsQCA examines the conditions for municipal government com-
pliance (COMPLIANCE1). It analyzes the necessity and the sufficiency of the following 
three conditions: civil society enforcement (SOCIETYENF1), mayoral self-enforcement 
(SELFENF1), and mayoral interest (INTEREST). 
The analysis of necessity is performed first. For this analysis, for each condition the 
fsQCA software is used to calculate whether instances of the outcome are a subset of 
instances of the condition. The threshold for the consistency with which this subset rela-
tion needs to hold is set at 0.9. In this analysis none of the hypothesized conditions is 
found to be individually necessary for municipal government compliance. The con-
sistency values for all subset relations can be looked up in Appendix F. 
The next step in the analysis is the evaluation of the sufficiency of the three conditions 
using the fsQCA truth table algorithm. The starting point of this analysis is the truth 
table which is displayed in Appendix D. For the analysis of sufficiency a consistency 
threshold of 0.99 is chosen based on the distribution of the consistency values in the 
truth table. Then, the truth table is reduced with the truth table algorithm of the fsQCA 
software and the intermediate solution is derived.  
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The intermediate solution strikes a balance between parsimony and complexity because 
the truth table algorithm is allowed to use unobserved counterfactual cases that can be 
expected to display the outcome based on theoretical considerations and substantive 
knowledge of the analyst. Table 1 shows the result of the analysis of sufficiency. 
Table 1: Result of the analysis of sufficiency for COMPLIANCE1 
Model:  COMPLIANCE1 = f (SOCIETYENF1, SELFENF1, INTEREST) 
Intermediate solution Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
SOCIETYENF1*SELFENF1*INTEREST 0.47 0.47 1.00 
Solution coverage: 0.47 
Solution consistency: 1.00 
Cases that are covered by the solution formula: Buenas Hermanas, La Selva 
Source: author’s calculation using the fsQCA software (Ragin et al. 2006).  
Note: Raw coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are covered by a com-
bination of conditions. Unique coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are 
covered only by the same combination of conditions. Consistency refers to the degree to which the cases 
that share a combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome (Ragin 2006). 
The intermediate solution formula is hence:  
SOCIETYENF1*SELFENF1*INTEREST  COMPLIANCE115. 
It implies that the combined presence of all three enforcement mechanisms is sufficient 
for municipal government compliance. The solution coverage is 0.47, which indicates 
that it accounts for 47 % of the explained positive outcomes. The solution consistency is 
1.00, i.e., the consistency of the subset relation between the configuration of conditions 
and the outcome is 1. Hence, the solution is highly precise, but it covers only two cases, 
La Selva16 and Buenas Hermanas, which display this favorable configuration of condi-
tions. 
Results on Civil Society Enforcement 
To examine what conditions contribute to civil society enforcement (SOCIETYENF1) in 
the ten cases the second fsQCA evaluates the necessity and sufficiency of the following 
four conditions: large number of civil society organizations (LARGEGROUP), oppor-
tunity for frequent communication (COMMUNICATE), high discourse capability 
(DISCOURSECAP1), and low level of poverty (LOWPOV1).   
                                                 
15 Upper case letters denote the presence and lower case letters the absence of a condition. The plus sign 
indicates a logical “OR”, a star denotes a logical “AND”, and the connecting arrow means that the formu-
la on the left leads to the outcome on the right. 
16  The municipalities are assigned fictitious names to protect the privacy of interviewees. 
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The consistency threshold for the analysis of necessity is again set at 0.9. The analysis 
shows that the discourse capability of civil society actors is a necessary condition for 
civil society enforcement when it is measured by the intensity of capacity building by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (DISCOURSECAP1). The consistency of this 
subset relation is 0.92. None of the remaining conditions is found to be necessary as can 
be seen by inspecting the consistency values in the lower part of the table in Appendix 
F. 
Subsequently the sufficiency of the four conditions for civil society enforcement is as-
sessed. 17 The truth table for this analysis is displayed in Appendix E. As in the first 
fsQCA the consistency threshold for the analysis of sufficiency is determined by look-
ing for a break in the consistency values in the truth table. In this case it is set at 0.80. 
The presented solution is again the intermediate solution. The result of the fsQCA truth 
table algorithm is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Result of the analysis of sufficiency for SOCIETYENF1 
Model:  SOCIETYENF1 = f (LARGEGROUP, COMMUNICATE, DISCOURSECAP1,   
  LOWPOV1) 
Intermediate solution Raw  coverage 
Unique  
coverage Consistency 
COMMUNICATE*DISCOURSECAP1*lowpov1 0.59 0.59 0.89 
Solution coverage: 0.59 
Solution consistency: 0.89 
Cases that are covered by the solution formula: Buenas Hermanas, La Selva, Mayan 
Source: author’s calculation using the fsQCA software (Ragin et al. 2006).  
Note: Raw coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are covered by a com-
bination of conditions. Unique coverage refers to the proportion of cases with a positive outcome that are 
covered only by the same combination of conditions. Consistency refers to the degree to which the cases 
that share a combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome (Ragin 2006). 
The intermediate solution formula is:  
COMMUNICATE*DISCOURSECAP1*lowpov1  SOCIETYENF1. 
  
                                                 
17 To check whether including four conditions in the fsQCA leads to random results the necessary condi-
tion DISCOURSECAP1 was excluded and the truth table algorithm was applied to the model with the 
remaining three conditions. This alternative specification yielded the same result for the three included 
conditions as the base model with all four conditions. 
 
150 
Frequent opportunities for face-to-face communication (COMMUNICATE), a high dis-
course capability due to capacity building (DISCOURSECAP1), and high poverty (low-
pov1) are thus found to be jointly sufficient conditions for civil society enforcement 
(SOCIETYENF1). The solution coverage is 0.59, which indicates that the solution ac-
counts for 59 % of the explained variation in outcome. The solution consistency, i.e., the 
consistency of the combination of conditions being a subset of the outcome is 0.89. 
Overall, the main result is thus very precise and it covers three of the ten cases. 
Robustness Checks 
The robustness of the fsQCA results is assessed in two ways. First, the analysis of ne-
cessity and the analysis of sufficiency for both outcomes are repeated with alternative 
measures of several conditions and an alternative measure of the outcome. The results 
of this exercise can be looked up in Appendix F and G. Overall, the analyses with alter-
native measures confirm the main results that have been described in the previous two 
sections. Divergences from the main results which are of conceptual interest are com-
mented upon in the interpretation of the results in section 5.2. 
Second, both the analysis of necessity and sufficiency are repeated for all measures for 
the absence of the outcome. This needs to be done because fsQCA does not rely on the 
assumption of causal symmetry. Hence, the absence of an outcome cannot be assumed 
to be caused by the absence of the combination of conditions that have been found to 
cause the presence of the outcome. The results of the analyses for the absence of the two 
outcomes are displayed in the right column in Appendix F and G respectively. They 
show that the absence of the conditions which are found to contribute to the presence of 
the outcomes leads to the absence of the outcomes, i.e., the analysis does not yield a 
pattern of asymmetric causation. 
5.5.2 Interpretation of the FsQCA Results 
What do the fsQCA results tell us about the cases and how do they compare to the re-
search hypotheses? Table 3 provides an overview of the research hypotheses and the 





Table 3: Research hypotheses and main fsQCA results  
Overview of the Research Hypothesis and the Main Result of the FsQCAs 


























Incentives for Municipal Government Compliance 
The main finding of the fsQCA on municipal government compliance is that the three 
conditions that have been hypothesized to contribute to this outcome need to be com-
bined to bring about the outcome. None of these conditions is found to be necessary or 
sufficient for this outcome, but all conditions are found to be necessary parts of a com-
bination of conditions that is then sufficient for the outcome. These findings lend sup-
port to arguments of both imperative and behavioral theories of law and thus support 
research hypothesis 1. Moreover, they indicate that the three examined enforcement 
mechanisms complement each other in achieving municipal government compliance. 
But why is none of the conditions found to be individually sufficient and how do the 
conditions interact? To answer these questions, we now take a closer look at the case 
level evidence.  
Mayoral interest (INTEREST): first, according to imperative theories of law, a munic-
ipal government complies with the mandate to establish a participatory governance fo-
rum when it is in its interest. Yet, in the ten Guatemalan municipalities INTEREST is not 
found to be sufficient for municipal government compliance. This finding can be ex-
plained by examining the evidence from two municipalities where only mayoral interest 
is present (row 7 in Appendix D). In Aurora and La Villa the MDCs meet and everyone 
who is interested in participating is invited, but the mayors in these two municipalities 
only use the MDC meetings to increase the visibility of their achievements or to justify 
delays in works or spending cuts. Moreover, the mayor of La Villa uses the MDC to 
direct projects to large villages to gain political support for the next elections.  
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For both mayors the benefits of holding such superficial MDC meetings, such as claim-
ing credit for popular outcomes and strengthening their electoral base outweigh the 
costs they carry, such as the opportunity cost of meeting times and writing the minutes. 
These benefits are however not large enough for motivating them to run functioning 
MDCs that go beyond providing selected pieces of information to citizens. The higher 
cost for a mayor of involving citizens in decision-making and allowing them to critical-
ly evaluate municipal government performance in the MDC would need to be out-
weighed by much higher political benefits.  
As studies from Brazil show, increased re-election chances for politicians whose party 
represents an inclusive, pro-participation ideology, such as the Workers Party, constitute 
such a high benefit (Goldfrank 2007, Wampler 2008b). Yet, the personality-based elec-
toral system, frequent party switching by candidates and a short lifecycle of political 
parties imply that this benefit does not incentivize mayors in the case municipalities to 
run functioning MDCs (Miños Chavez 2001; Prensa Libre 2011). 
Mayoral self-enforcement (SELFENF): turning to the internalization argument of 
behavioral theories of law (Cooter 1998), the fsQCA also shows that self-enforcement 
of the law is not sufficient to convince a mayor to involve citizens in decision-making. 
Even if a mayor feels obliged to call the MDC and perceives the law as legitimate, 
compliance beyond the physical establishment of a MDC does not take place. This is 
illustrated by the cases of Bequita and Valle de Oro (row 4 and 6 in Appendix D). The 
mayors of these municipalities also call MDC meetings, but in the meetings they pro-
ceed as the mayors of Aurora and La Villa, i.e., they do not go beyond information and 
consultation.  
In these municipalities the absence of a well-organized demand from civil society actors 
for being included in decision-making prevents the emergence of a functioning MDC. 
The law does not indicate in detail how civil society actors should be involved and, 
hence, when there is no demand for participatory planning and evaluation of the projects 
from civil society, it does not take place. This result is in line with previous research on 
participatory governance bodies that were not established as a consequence of pressure 
from citizens, but initiated and implemented top-down by government officials (García-
López and Arizpe 2010; Schönleitner 2004). 
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Civil society enforcement (SOCIETYENF): finally, the fsQCA shows that social en-
forcement by civil society actors is necessary but not sufficient for municipal govern-
ment compliance. This finding can be explained by examining the three cases with high 
values of municipal government compliance Buenas Hermanas, La Selva, and Mayan 
which all have civil society enforcement (see rows 1 and 5 in Appendix D). The differ-
ence between these cases is that Buenas Hermanas and La Selva also have a mayor who 
has an interest in the MDC and who feels obliged to run it. Hence, the MDC meetings in 
these two municipalities are more cooperative and productive than the meetings in Ma-
yan where several projects were stuck in the planning process due to conflicts between 
the mayor and village representatives; also, the mayor and the MDC members spent 
long hours in angry disputes in MDC meetings. Due to these conflicts, the mayor ex-
cluded several groups from the meetings whom he accused of using the MDC for pro-
moting opposition party interests. This shows that the most successful cases of munici-
pal government compliance are municipalities with both, motivated authorities and well 
organized and active civil society actors. 
Conditions for Civil Society Enforcement 
The results of the fsQCA show that it is the combination of a high discourse capacity, 
the opportunity to communicate and the presence of poverty that brings about civil soci-
ety enforcement. In addition, the robustness checks show that when discourse capability 
is measured by the level of literacy and the level of primary education it is not part of 
the solution formula but in these specifications the presence of a large number of civil 
society organizations is found to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the out-
come. These results broadly support research hypotheses 2 and they suggest that it is the 
combination of several individual level and structural factors that brings about a vocal 
and active civil society. But the results also indicate that some qualifications to the theo-
retical predictions need to be made. These are discussed for each condition in turn. 
High discourse capability (DISCOURSECAP): a high discourse capability is found to 
be necessary for civil society enforcement of the law because village representatives 
who do not know what documents, e.g., the treasurer is supposed to present in the MDC 
are unable to ask for these documents. Hence, the distributive bargaining argument by 
Knight (1992) is strongly supported by the data. A high discourse capability is however 
not found to be sufficient for civil society enforcement of a functioning MDC.  
 
154 
This can be explained by cases, such as La Villa and Bequita where citizens have a high 
discourse capability but no civil society enforcement takes place (rows 11 and 14 in 
Appendix E). In both places the distances from the villages to the capital are large. 
Therefore, village representatives rarely interact and they are played off against each 
other by the mayor. Also, both municipalities lack civil society organizations that repre-
sent broader interests and ask for accounts in the MDC. 
A second finding is that high discourse capability is found to be necessary for civil soci-
ety enforcement in the case municipalities when it is measured by the intensity of capac-
ity building, but not when it is measured with the level of education or literacy. The rea-
son for this could be that the capacity building workshops that take place in the case 
municipalities inform citizens about their rights and duties and offer them practical tools 
for participation, such as manuals on how to evaluate a municipal budget and how to 
solicit a project for their community. A higher level of education and literacy facilitate 
the acquisition and application of this practical knowledge, but by themselves they do 
not seem to enable people to participate in the MDC. Last but not least, higher levels of 
education do not lead to higher civil society enforcement because young, better educat-
ed village members participate less in the MDC; in most of the case municipalities the 
community representatives are retired men who have already secured their income or 
are supported by their families. 
Large number of civil society organizations (LARGEGROUP): the presence of a 
large number of civil society organizations is found to be necessary, but not sufficient 
for civil society enforcement in two of the alternative fsQCA specifications. Case-level 
evidence suggests that one mechanism behind this finding is that in municipalities, such 
as Buenas Hermanas and Mayan where numerous organizations are active, the mayors 
are unable to co-opt all organizations because they do not have enough funds to finance 
projects for all of them. This supports the theoretical arguments on the advantages of 
large groups for achieving collective action by Oliver and Marwell (1988). In addition, 
the case level evidence points to another beneficial effect of a dense civil society: civil 
society organizations attract capacity building measures because international donors 




Finally, the case of Villa Beni shows why the presence of a large number of civil society 
organizations alone is not sufficient for bringing about civil society enforcement (row 
12 in Appendix E). In this large municipality, civil society is mainly organized around 
economic interests, but their representatives know very little about their rights to partic-
ipate in the MDC and hence do not exert pressure on the mayor to establish it. 
Low level of poverty (LOWPOV) and high frequency of communication 
(COMMUNICATE): the fsQCA result that the presence of poverty is found to be neces-
sary, but not sufficient for civil society enforcement seems to contradict the distributive 
bargaining theory argument that actors need resources to enforce an institution. Yet, case 
level evidence from Buenas Hermanas, Mayan and La Selva shows that civil society 
enforcement can take place in spite of high poverty in municipalities that also have a 
high population density, which was used as a measure for the frequency of communica-
tion (see rows 2 and 9 in Appendix E). In these municipalities even the poorest can af-
ford the cost of travelling to the capital for meetings because they can walk or take a 
bicycle. Moreover, the citizens of these two municipalities alleviate the cost of transport 
and foregone employment for their village representatives, e.g., by collecting money for 
travel expenses.  
In municipalities with low population density, high poverty rates indeed hinder civil 
society enforcement due to the high cost of travelling to the capital, as the interviews 
with community representatives in Villa Beni and Bequita reveal (rows 12 and 14 in 
Appendix E). Hence, the case level analysis shows a lack of economic resources can be 
overcome under certain circumstances and thus does not necessarily constrain civil so-
ciety enforcement.  
Finally, the case level evidence brings to light another benefit of a high population den-
sity for collective action. Short distances between actors do not only foster collective 
action by facilitating frequent personal communication between village representatives 






The first key result of the study is that civil society enforcement, mayoral self-
enforcement and mayoral interest are jointly sufficient for municipal government com-
pliance in the examined cases. This finding supports both, behavioral and imperative 
theories of law. Behavioral theories of law are supported by the finding that social en-
forcement and self-enforcement are necessary parts of the combination that brings about 
compliance with the law. From this we cannot conclude however that these informal 
enforcement mechanisms are more effective than official state sanctioning because such 
enforcement does not take place in Guatemala. Moreover, the finding that mayoral in-
terest is part of the recipe for compliance in the case municipalities also lends support to 
imperative theories of law. Most importantly however, the empirical analysis suggests 
that it may be the combination of several incentives that leads to the best compliance 
results. 
The second key result of the study is a high discourse capability of citizens can bring 
about strong civil society enforcement in municipalities with a large number of civil 
society organizations and a high population density in spite of high poverty. This result 
lends support to the distributive bargaining theory argument that the implementation of 
formal institutions in practice depends on the power of the involved actors to impose 
their will on others. They also support the predictions by collective action theory that 
the size of a group and the opportunity to communicate personally affect the success of 
collective action. At the same time, the study shows that successful collective social 
enforcement can only be achieved in the examined municipalities with a favorable com-
bination of resource endowments and group characteristics. 
These results are not only relevant for the case municipalities, but also for similar mu-
nicipalities in other countries where participatory governance laws are neither enforced 
by a national government, nor the result of a strong bottom-up social movement (e.g., 
Uganda, Bolivia). They suggests that strengthening social and internal enforcement 
mechanisms as well as pointing out the benefits of participatory governance for politi-
cians through awareness raising campaigns and capacity building measures for civil 
society actors, could be promising strategies to foster compliance with participatory 
governance legislation.  
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Moreover, the results on civil society participation imply that even illiterate citizens can 
participate actively when they are informed about their rights in capacity building work-
shops. The findings also indicate that compensating participants for travel costs could 
contribute to increasing participation in similar contexts. Finally, fostering the formation 
of civil society organizations could be a fruitful measure for supporting the implementa-
tion of participatory governance because places with a larger number of civil society 
organizations are more likely to have more capable and active civil society actors to 
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Appendix A: Measurement of Conditions and Outcome 
Qualitative Measures 




Content of civil society public en-
forcement (cscont) 
The more comprehensive the demand for the im-
plementation of the Development Council Law, the 
more difficult it is for the mayor to reject it.  
SOCIETYENF1: Aver-
age of cscont and 
csscope 
SOCIETYENF2: Min-
imum cscont and 
csscope 
Semi-structured interviews 
with village representatives, 
local civil society organiza-
tions, the mayor, key inform-
ants, focus group interviews. Scope of civil society public en-
forcement (csscope) 
The more actors participate in the public enforce-
ment of the Development Council Law, the higher 




Mayor’s interpretation of how 
strongly the law mandates him to 
hold MDC meetings (mim) 
The stronger the mayor perceives the law’s man-
date, the more likely he is to feel guilty for not 
holding MDC meetings. 
SELFENF 1: Mini-
mum of mim and mpl 
 
SELFENF2: Average 
of mim and mpl 
Semi-structured interview 
with the mayor. 
Mayor’s opinion about the legiti-
macy of the central government as 
the lawmaking authority (mpl) 
The more favorable the opinion of the mayor about 
the central government and its legitimacy to make 
laws on municipal governance is, the worse will he 
feel when he is breaking a national law. 
Mayoral Interest 
(INTEREST) 
Perceived costs (loss of decision-
making power, distributional con-
flicts, staff time) and benefits 
(claim credit for popular outcomes, 
serve constituency better, promote 
party interests) of holding the MDC 
for the mayor (interest). 
The balance of costs and benefits of running the 
MDC that each mayor perceives depending on 
his/her personal party background, electoral base 
and characteristics of the municipality results in a 
political incentive or disincentive for the mayor to 
run the MDC. 
Not aggregated. Semi-structured interview 
with the mayor; party affilia-
tion of the mayor; other inter-
views, e.g. with key inform-





Presence of an international or 
national NGO that provides capaci-
ty building measures to the village 
representatives and local civil so-
ciety organizations (discoursecap1). 
Capacity building measures that inform about the 
law and its regulation and train village representa-
tives and civil society organization representatives 
in planning and evaluation of municipal govern-
ment spending enable these actors to demand MDC 
meetings and that existing MDCs function properly. 
Not aggregated. Semi-structured interviews 
with village representatives, 
local civil society organiza-
tions, the mayor, key inform-









Frequency of MDC meetings 
(fqmdc) 
Fqmdc and partmdc measure whether the mayor 
coordinates the MDC as foreseen, i.e. whether all 
interested actor groups in the municipality are invit-
ed and whether regular meetings are held. 
COMPLIANCE1: the 
minimum of the physi-
cal establishment 
(phmdc) and the func-
tioning (functmdc); 
phmdc is the average 
of fqmdc and partmdc, 
functmdc is the aver-




average of phmdc and 
functmdc. 
Interviews with members of 
the MDC and the municipal 
government; focus group 
interviews in the villages; 
minutes of MDC meetings; 
local media coverage. 
Scope of participation (partmdc) 
Concession of power to MDC 
members in the planning of the list 
of development council projects 
and in the municipal budget 
(planmdc) 
Planmdc measures how much power the mayor 
concedes to MDC members in setting spending 
priorities for the municipal and development coun-
cil projects. 
Concession of power to MDC 
members in the monitoring and 
evaluation of the list of develop-
ment council projects and in the 
municipal budget (evalmdc) 
Evalmdc measures the effectiveness of the MDC as 
an accountability mechanism, i.e., it measures how 
much information the mayor provides in the MDC 
about the implementation of municipal and devel-
opment council projects and whether the municipal 
government justifies its actions and correct its be-






Condition /  
Outcome 
Main and Alternative  
Measures Justification for the Measures Data Sources 
Large Civil Society 
(LARGEGROUP) 
Number of civil society organiza-
tions (largegroup) 
The larger the number of civil society organizations in a municipality, the 
larger is the number of potential actors for civil society enforcement. 
Data collection sheet, interviews 
with civil society representatives 
and homepages of the municipal 
administrations. 
High Frequency of 
Communication 
(COMMUNICATE) 
Population density of the munici-
pality in inhabitants per square km 
(communicate) 
The more densely populated a municipality is, the lower the cost of meeting 
and communicating personally for village representatives and civil society 
organization members. 
INE 2002 and 2002: data on the 
area from the Census and pro-




Literacy rate (discoursecap2) 
Literacy reflects the ability to understand printed information on govern-
ment performance. 
INE 2002: data at the municipal 
level from the Census. 
Share of population with at least 
primary education (discoursecap3) 
A higher level of education raises the ability to understand any information 
on government performance. 
Completing six years of schooling or more provides people with an ad-
vantage in publicly communicating their arguments 
Low Poverty 
(LOWPOV) 
Share of the population above the 
poverty line in the municipality 
(lowpov1) 
The higher the proportion of the population that has the means to satisfy 
basic food and non-food needs, the higher is the proportion of people who 
are able to afford transport cost and devote time to political participation. 
INE and Secretaría de 
Planificación y Programación de 
la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN) 
2006. Poverty maps.  Share of the population above the 
extreme poverty line in the munici-
pality (lowpov2) 
The higher the proportion of the population that has the means to satisfy 
basic food needs, the higher is the proportion of people who are able to 




Appendix B: Calibration of Fuzzy-Set Values 
Qualitative Measures 




Content of civil society public enforcement (cscont) 
0: Civil society actors do not demand anything or do not even know the rules  
0,33: Civil society actors (would) only demand MDC meetings 
0,67: Civil society actors (would)  demand MDC meetings and participation in plan-
ning or accounts 
1: Civil society actors (would)  demand MDC meetings and participation in planning 
and accounts  
Scope of civil society public enforcement (csscope) 
0: No civil society actor would join a public demand 
0,33: A minority of civil society actors would join a public demand 
0,67: A majority of civil society actors would join a public demand  




Mayor’s interpretation of how strongly the law mandates him to 
hold MDC meetings (mim) 
0: The law does not contain binding provisions on how to run the MDC 
0,33: The law recommends that MDC meetings are held regularly 
0,67: The law states that mayors should hold MDC meetings regularly 
1:  The law states that mayors must hold MDC 
Mayor’s opinion about the legitimacy of the central government 
as the lawmaking authority (mpl) 
1: Mayor has a positive attitude towards the central government and considers it as 
the legitimate law-making authority 
0,67: Mayor has a positive attitude towards the central government but does not 
consider it as the legitimate law-making authority 
0,33: Mayor has a negative attitude towards the central government but considers it 
as the legitimate law-making authority 
0: Mayor has a negative attitude towards the central government and does not con-
sider it as the legitimate law-making authority 
Mayoral Interest 
(INTEREST) 
Perceived costs (e.g., loss of decision-making power, distribu-
tional conflicts, staff time) and benefits (e.g., claim credit for 
popular outcomes, serve constituency better, promote party 
interests) of holding the MDC for the mayor (cbmdc). 
0: The perceived cost of holding the MDC outweigh the benefits by far 
0,33: The perceived cost holding the MDC outweigh the benefits somewhat 
0,67: The perceived benefits holding the MDC outweigh the cost somewhat 








Presence of an international or national NGO that provides 
capacity building measures to the village representatives and 
local civil society organizations (discourscap1). 
0: No NGO offers workshops to CDCs and/or CSOs 
0,33: NGO(s) rarely offer workshops to CDCs and/or CSOs 
0,67: NGO(s) offer occasional workshops to CDCs and/or CSOs 
1:  NGO(s) offer frequent workshops to CDCs and/or CSOs 




Frequency of MDC meetings (fqmdc) 0: MDC has not met in the last 12 months 0,5: MDC has met four times in the last 12 months 
1: MDC has met 12 times or more often in the last 12 months 
Scope of participation (partmdc) 
0: More than five of all interested organizations in the municipality are not invited to 
participate in the MDC 
0,33: Three to five of all interested organizations in the municipality are not invited 
to participate in the MDC  
0,67: One or two of all interested organizations in the municipality are not invited to 
participate in the MDC 
1: All interested organizations in the municipality are invited to participate in the 
MDC 
Concession of power to MDC members in the planning of the 
list of development council projects and in the municipal budg-
et (planmdc) 
0: Authorities at most inform MDC about planned policy, MDC receives information 
0,33: Authorities inform MDC about planned policy and listen to MDC opinions 
(consultation) 
0,67: Authorities inform MDC, MDC proposes changes, authorities justify but de-
cide on the final policy 
1: Authorities inform, MDC judges the proposal, can make change, and decide on 
the final policy 
Concession of power to MDC members in the monitoring and 
evaluation of the list of development council projects and in the 
municipal budget (evalmdc) 
0: Authorities at most inform MDC about past actions, MDC receives information 
0,33: Authorities inform MDC about past actions and listen to MDC opinions (con-
sultation) 
0,67: Authorities inform MDC, MDC demands sanctions for corruption or remedies 
for poorly implemented projects, authorities justify their decisions 
1: Authorities inform, MDC judges past actions, demands sanctions for corruption or 






Condition /   
Outcome Measure(s) Anchor Points for Direct Calibration of Fuzzy-Sets 
Large Civil Society 
(LARGEGROUP) 
Number of civil society organizations 
(largegroup) 
0: 0 civil society organizations are active in the municipality 
0,5: 5 civil society organizations are active in the municipality 




Literacy rate (discoursecap2) 
0: Less than 50% of the population can read and write 
0,5: 65% of the population can read and write 
1: More than 80% of the population can read and write 
Share of population with at least prima-
ry education (discoursecap3) 
0: No one has completed primary education 
0,5: 25% of the population have completed primary education 
1: More than 50% of the population have completed primary education 
High Frequency of 
Communication 
(COMMUNICATE) 
Population density of the municipality in 
inhabitants per square km (communi-
cate) 
0: 50 inhabitants/square km 
0,5: 100 inhabitants/square km 
1: 300 inhabitants/square km 
Low Poverty  
(LOWPOV) 
Share of the population above the pov-
erty line in the municipality (lowpov1) 
0: 0% of the population are above the poverty line 
0,5: 33% of the population are above the poverty line 
1: 67% of the population are above the poverty line 
Share of the population above the ex-
treme poverty line in the municipality 
(lowpov2) 
0: 67% of the population are above the extreme poverty line 
0,5: 83% of the population are above the extreme poverty line 












































Victoria 0,17 0,28 0,17 0 0 0 0 0,08 0,88 0 0,03 0,33 0,12 0,03 
La Villa 0,33 0,6 0,17 0 1 0,33 0,33 0,35 0,14 0,67 0,77 0,87 0,67 0,8 
Mar Azul 0,33 0,35 0 0 0,33 0 0 0,08 0,93 0 0,75 0,76 0,84 0,87 
Villa Beni 0 0,03 0,34 0 0 0,33 0,33 0,92 0,02 0,33 0,54 0,64 0,24 0,26 
Aurora 0,33 0,64 0,17 0 1 0,33 0,33 0,05 0,96 0 0,8 0,78 0,28 0,15 
La Selva 0,83 0,9 0,67 0,33 1 0,67 0,67 0,23 1 0,67 0,24 0,68 0,29 0,05 
Valle de 
Oro 0,33 0,59 0,67 0,33 0,67 0 0,165 0,35 1 1 0,88 0,83 0,71 0,81 
Buenas 
Hermanas 0,98 0,99 0,67 0,33 0,67 1 1 0,99 0,65 1 0,18 0,45 0,19 0,11 
Mayan 0,67 0,83 0,33 0,33 0 1 1 0,77 0,99 1 0,81 0,82 0,43 0,43 
Bequita 0,33 0,63 0,84 0,67 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,08 0,3 0,67 0,69 0,79 0,23 0,06 




Appendix D: Truth Table for the Analysis of Sufficiency for Municipal Government Compliance 
Row SOCIETYENF1 SELFENF1 INTEREST Number COMPLIANCE1 Consistency Cases 
1 1 1 1 2 1 1.00 Buenas Hermanas, La Selva 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0.75 - 
3 1 0 1 0 1 1.00 - 
4 0 1 1 1 0 0.80 Valle de Oro 
5 1 0 0 1 0 0.78 Mayan 
6 0 1 0 1 0 0.55 Bequita 
7 0 0 1 2 0 0.73 Aurora, La Villa 
8 0 0 0 3 0 0.37 Victoria, Mar Azul, Villa Beni 





Appendix E: Truth Table for Analysis of Sufficiency for Civil Society Enforcement 
Row LARGEGROUP COMMUNICATE DISCOURSECAP1 LOWPOV1 Number SOCIETYENF1 Consistency Cases 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.76 - 
2 1 1 1 0 2 1 0.85 Buenas Hermanas, Mayan 
3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.76 - 
4 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.98 - 
5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.59 Valle de Oro 
6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.76 - 
7 1 0 1 0 0 1 1.00 - 
8 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.82 - 
9 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.83 La Selva 
10 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.50 Mar Azul 
11 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.67 La Villa 
12 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.61 Villa Beni 
13 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.44 Victoria, Aurora 
14 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.69 Bequita 
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.78 - 
16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.80 - 





Appendix F: Base Results and Robustness Checks for the Analysis of Necessity 
Type of Specification 
Consistency Values for the Ne-
cessity of a Condition for the 
Presence of the Outcome 
Consistency Values for the 
Necessity of a Condition for 
the Absence of the Outcome 
1st Round of fsQCA: Determinants of COMPLIANCE  Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 















Softer aggregation function (average instead of minimum) for the measures of SOCIETYENF 
(SOCIETYENF2 instead of SOCIETYENF1) (Outcome: COMPLIANCE1) SOCIETYENF2: 0,81 SOCIETYENF2: 0,35 
Stricter aggregation function (minimum instead of average) for the measures of SELFENF 
(SELFENF2 instead of SELFENF1) (Outcome: COMPLIANCE1) SELFENF2: 0,38 SELFENF2: 0,27 
2nd Round of fsQCA: Determinants of SOCIETYENF Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 



















Literacy rate (DISCOURSECAP2) instead of NGO capacity building for civil society actors 
(DISCOURSECAP1) (Outcome: SOCIETYENF1 DISCOURSECAP2: 0.64 DISCOURSECAP2: 0.74 
Share of population with primary education (DISCOURSECAP3) instead of NGO capacity building 
for civil society actors (DISCOURSECAP1) (Outcome: SOCIETYENF1) DISCOURSECAP3: 0.82 DISCOURSECAP3: 0.82 
Share of the population above the extreme poverty line (LOWPOV2) instead of share of the popula-
tion above the poverty line (LOWPOV1) (Outcome: SOCIETYENF1) LOWPOV2: 0.35 LOWPOV2: 0.48 




Appendix G: Base Results and Robustness Checks for the Analysis of Sufficiency 
Type of Specification Solutions for the  Presence of the Outcome 
Solutions for the  
Absence of the Outcome 
1st Round of fsQCA: Determinants of COMPLIANCE  Consistency Cut-Off 0.99 Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 
Base specification (Outcome: COMPLIANCE1) INTEREST * SOCIETYENF1 * SELFENF1  COMPLIANCE1 
societyenf1  compliance1 
Softer aggregation function (average instead of minimum) for the measures of 
COMLIANCE (Outcome: COMPLIANCE2) 
INTEREST * SOCIETYENF1 * 
SELFENF1  COMPLIANCE2 
interest * societyenf1 * selfenf1  compliance2 
Softer aggregation function (average instead of minimum) for the measures of 
SOCIETYENF (SOCIETYENF2 instead of SOCIETYENF1) (Outcome: 
COMPLIANCE1) 
INTEREST * SOCIETYENF2 * 
SELFENF1  COMPLIANCE1 
societyenf2  compliance1 
Stricter aggregation function (minimum instead of average) for the measures of 
SELFENF (SELFENF2 instead of SELFENF1) (Outcome: COMPLIANCE1) 
INTEREST * SOCIETYENF1  
COMPLIANCE1 
societyenf1 * (interest + selfenf2)  compli-
ance1 
2nd Round of fsQCA: Determinants of SOCIETYENF Consistency Cut-Off 0.80 Consistency Cut-Off 0.90 
Base specification (Outcome: SOCIETYENF1) 
COMMUNICATE * 
DISCOURSECAP1 * lowpov1  
SOCIETYENF1 
communicate * (discoursecap1 * lowpov1 + 
largegroup) + discousecap1 * largegroup  soci-
etyenf1 
Softer aggregation function (average instead of minimum) for the measures of 
SOCIETYENF (Outcome SOCIETYENF2) 
COMMUNICATE * 
DISCOURSECAP1 * lowpov1  
SOCIETYENF2 
communicate * (discoursecap1 * lowpov1 + 
largegroup) + discousecap1 * largegroup  soci-
etyenf1 
Literacy rate (DISCOURSECAP2) instead of NGO capacity building for civil 
society actors (DISCOURSECAP1) (Outcome: SOCIETYENF1 
COMMUNICATE * LARGEGROUP * 
discoursecap2  SOCIETYENF1 
largegroup * (communicate + LOWPOV1)  
societyenf1 
Share of population with primary education (DISCOURSECAP3) instead of 
NGO capacity building for civil society actors (DISCOURSECAP1) (Outcome: 
SOCIETYENF1) (In this specification the consistency cut-off had to be lowered 
from 0.80 to 0.75 to obtain a result of the truth table algorithm) 
COMMUNICATE * LARGEGROUP 
 SOCIETYENF1 
largegroup * (communicate + discoursecap3 + 
LOWPOV1)  societyenf1 
Share of the population above the extreme poverty line (LOWPOV2) instead of 
share of the population above the poverty line (LOWPOV1) (Outcome: 
SOCIETYENF1) 
COMMUNICATE * 
DISCOURSECAP1 * lowpov2  
SOCIETYENF1 
communicate * (discoursecap1 * lowpov2 + 
largegroup) + discousecap1 * largegroup  soci-
etyenf1 




6. Case study (Paper 5):   
“The Role of Participatory Governance for Overcoming Infor-
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Abstract: Increasing voter knowledge about government performance has been shown 
in previous research to be a key condition for making elections work as an effective 
accountability mechanism in developing countries. Yet, how this can be achieved best 
remains unclear. In a case study of two Guatemalan Municipal Development Councils 
we examine the potential of participatory governance forums to transmit information 
about government decisions to poor voters in rural areas. The case study results show 
that participatory governance forums can provide information effectively and thus con-
tribute to local government responsiveness. They do not function in this way however 
when village representatives are unfamiliar with the procedural rules of participatory 
governance, when they are not supported by civil society organizations and when the 
cost of attending meetings is high for them. 







“The profound role that political market imperfections play in development is just beginning to 
be understood. More research and practical experiments are needed to discover how best to 
alleviate these imperfections.” (Keefer & Khemani, 2005, p. 23) 
Previous research on the implementation of decentralization in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America provides ample evidence on the persistence of elite capture, clientelistic prac-
tices and corruption in spite of the introduction of free local elections (Crook & Manor, 
1998; Crook, 2003; Shah, Thompson, & Zou, 2004). This suggests that competitive 
elections alone often fail to provide sufficient incentives for local politicians to respond 
to the preferences of their mainly poor electorate. At first sight, this finding seems to be 
at odds with the finding from the US that re-election incentives are a powerful way to 
induce politicians to respond to the preferences of the electorate (Besley & Case, 1995; 
Griffin, 2006; List & Sturm, 2006). The two findings can be reconciled however by the 
insight that re-election incentives are impaired by the presence of political market im-
perfections, such as ethnicity based voting, lack of credibility of political promises, and 
imperfect information in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002; Keefer & Khemani, 
2005). Remedying these imperfections is therefore a promising strategy for improving 
government performance in developing countries. 
In this study we address the question how information asymmetries can be overcome in 
rural political markets. An emerging body of literature shows that increasing voter in-
formation leads to better government performance and less corruption in developing 
countries (Ferraz & Finan, 2009; Pereira, Melo, & Figueiredo, 2009). Also, there are 
some insights from India about possible mechanisms for achieving this task. For in-
stance, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that Indian states with a higher circulation of 
local newspapers and more competitive elections have more responsive governments. 
Moreover, information campaigns and public hearings in villages in which citizens learn 
about the quality of services and project implementation details have been shown to 
reduce the diversion of public funds and improve local public services in Indian villages 
(Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Khemani, 2006). But what mechanisms could work in coun-
tries in which local media are hardly developed and public hearings in villages are not 





The case study we conduct provides an answer to this question by assessing the poten-
tial of participatory governance forums to contribute to better government performance 
by improving access to information for voters.1 The suitability of participatory govern-
ance as an information provision mechanism has not been examined so far. Hence, we 
complement previous research on the interaction between elections and other infor-
mation provision mechanisms, such as the media, central government audit reports and 
information campaigns. At the same time, we add to the literature on the effects of par-
ticipatory governance reforms by exploring a new mechanism through which these re-
forms can improve local government performance. 
The empirical analysis of the study consists of a comparative case study of two Guate-
malan participatory governance forums, the so-called Municipal Development Councils 
(MDCs). These two cases were selected from a pool of cases we have studied because 
they represent the two extremes of a highly effective and an ineffective participatory 
governance forum. We contrast the experience of the effective MDC with the experi-
ence of the ineffective MDC. In both cases we study what type of information these 
forums provide, how they convey this information and what audience they reach. Then, 
we examine the performance of the local governments in these two municipalities to 
find out whether the municipality with the more effective information provision mecha-
nism benefits from a more responsive local government. Finally, we analyze what con-
ditions explain the difference in the effectiveness of the two MDCs in providing infor-
mation about policy decisions to rural voters. 
The case study shows that a participatory governance forum can indeed overcome in-
formation asymmetries and reach illiterate and immobile citizens in remote areas of a 
municipality and thus contribute to local government responsiveness. It also indicates, 
however, that this does not happen when village representatives do not have sufficient 
knowledge of their rights and duties to enforce the functioning of the participatory gov-
ernance forum and when they are not supported by civil society organizations.  
                                                 
1 The study focuses on information provision in rural areas because these areas are usually affected most 
by poverty, illiteracy, and low media coverage (World Bank, 2003a). Hence, the problem of information 




Moreover, the case study shows that village representatives need to be able to afford 
traveling to the venue of participation, which is more likely when distances in a munici-
pality are small.  
By examining information provision through participatory governance we do not intend 
to discard alternatives, such as mass media or information campaigns, as less effective. 
Instead, we aim to point out the advantages and disadvantages of drawing on participa-
tory governance forums for increasing voter information and the conditions that need to 
be in place to make them work.  
In the following we first describe the theoretical arguments that guide our study and the 
criteria we use to evaluate them (Section 6.2). Then, we briefly describe the study 
methods (Section 6.3). Subsequently, we present the results of the analysis (Section 6.4) 
and discuss their policy implications (Section 6.5). In the final section we summarize 
our results and conclude (Section 6.6). 
 Research Proposition and Evaluation Criteria 6.2
Competitive elections have been shown to be a powerful incentive for politicians to 
respond to the preferences of the electorate (Besley & Case, 1995; Griffin, 2006). Polit-
ical economy models of electoral competition predict that elections are most effective in 
this task when voters are informed about the effort that a politician has made to satisfy 
their preferences and make their choice based on this information (Barro, 1973; Fere-
john, 1986). In developing countries however supply-side constraints, such as govern-
ment reluctance to disclose official documents and weak media, as well as demand-side 
constraints, such as illiteracy and low levels of education often imply that citizens have 
little or no information about government performance. 
So what happens in such cases? Models of electoral competition with informed and un-
informed voters predict that opportunistic politicians can play off voters against each 
other by treating informed voters better and by using their campaign contributions to 






They also suggest that incumbents can provide targeted public goods to part of the elec-
torate and divert the remaining resources to their own pockets when information about 
policy decisions is not available to voters (Besley, 2007, pp. 144–146}). Such clientelis-
tic practices tend to be more pronounced in young democracies where politicians strug-
gle to make credible policy promises on programmatic change because parties are not 
yet institutionalized (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Jenkins, 2007). 
Overall, political economy models thus suggest that a municipality with more informed 
voters will have a more responsive government than a municipality with less informed 
voters even if the two municipalities have equally competitive elections. 
But what does it take to inform voters in rural areas in developing countries? Previous 
research and theoretical insights from communication psychology suggest that an in-
formation provision mechanism must meet at least three requirements to be effective in 
increasing voter knowledge about government performance. First, the most basic re-
quirement is that an information provision mechanism needs to convey relevant and 
interesting information on key policy outcomes to voters (Keefer & Khemani, 2005). 
Previous research has shown that for making electoral accountability work voters do not 
need to and cannot be informed about the details of all policy decisions (Ferejohn & 
Kuklinski, 1990). Nevertheless, voters need to know whether the incumbent has broadly 
acted in their interest.  
The second requirement is that information needs to be presented to citizens in an ac-
cessible way that captures their attention and facilitates remembering it. As Lupia 
(2003) points out, increasing civic competence to judge government performance re-
quires capturing citizens’ attention and achieving that they retain the provided infor-
mation in their long-term memory. Otherwise the provided information is unlikely to 
affect voting decisions (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, & Khemani, 2006).  
The third requirement is that the information about the performance of the local gov-
ernment needs to reach a large number of voters and overthrow previously held beliefs 
about the local government if it is to translate into a threat for its re-election (Lupia, 
2003). The provided information will only elicit a coordinated response in the next elec-
tions if it reaches more than half of the voters and if this majority interprets it in a simi-




In our case study we examine the proposition that a participatory governance arrange-
ment which fulfills the three requirements can contribute to local government respon-
siveness. For evaluating this proposition, we need to assess two aspects in the case mu-
nicipalities: on the one hand we need to judge whether the participatory governance 
forums, i.e., the Municipal Development Councils (MDCs), fulfill the three require-
ments for effective information provision. On the other hand, we need to be able to 
judge whether the municipal governments in the two cases are responsive to voters’ 
preferences. Hence, we need to operationalize these concepts for the empirical analysis. 
We evaluate the first requirement for effective information provision by assessing 
whether the local government provides information on last year’s public spending, on 
its spending plans, as well as on the criteria it has applied for allocating public funds. 
We also take into account whether the MDC has received information on the state of 
implementation and the quality of publicly funded projects. This information allows the 
MDC members to judge broadly whether the local government responds to their vil-
lage’s needs and whether it distributes public funds efficiently and equitably.  
For evaluating the second criterion we assess whether the information is provided in the 
MDC verbally or graphically and whether it is translated in local languages. These as-
pects are important for making the information accessible to the population because 
almost 40% of the rural population is illiterate and more than 30% of the population was 
raised in an indigenous language (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 2002). Also, 
we check whether information is provided in regular intervals because this increases the 
probability that people will retain it and it enables them to reach a judgment about the 
overall performance of local government in the four years it is in office.  
Finally, the third criterion is evaluated based on whether information that is provided in 
the MDC is passed on in most of the villages in village assemblies by the village repre-
sentatives. Previously held beliefs about the local government are more likely to be re-
vised in Guatemala if the new information is transmitted by a familiar person because 






According to a recent survey, only 7% of the Guatemalan population use the internet to 
obtain information about politics, whereas 29% ask their friends and 42% consult their 
families (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010). Therefore, we also examine the relation-
ship between village representatives and their communities. 
After evaluating whether a participatory governance forum is an effective information 
provision mechanism, we turn to assessing the responsiveness of the two local govern-
ments. This assessment is made based on the notion that a responsive government is one 
that achieves congruence between the preferences of the majority of voters and public 
policies, such that it is valued by the public (Crook, 2003; Fried & Rabinovitz, 1980). 
We try to capture this by a mixture of objective and subjective performance criteria that 
are adapted to the context of a rural Guatemalan municipality in which more than half 
of the population lives below the poverty line.  
The first criterion we use is the share of the budget that a local government has spent on 
its staff and buildings in the first two years of being in office. The higher this share, the 
lower the share of the budget that can be spent on much needed public services. The 
second criterion we use to evaluate local government performance is the rationale based 
on which the local government distributes the remaining public funds between different 
villages. We assess based on interview data and the budget allocation of the first two 
years of the current administration whether social infrastructure projects are distributed 
according to the stated preferences of the village representatives and equity and effi-
ciency concerns or whether they are used to reward campaign supporters and win over 
villages that carry many votes. Finally, we take into account the subjective perception of 
our interview partners about the corruption of their local government for assessing local 
government responsiveness. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the proposition that guides our comparative case study 





Table 1: Overview of the proposition and evaluation criteria for the case study  
Proposition and Evaluation Criteria for the Case Study 
Proposition: A participatory governance forum which functions as an effective infor-
mation provision mechanism can contribute to local government responsiveness. 
Evaluation criteria for  
effective information provision: 
Content relevance:  
Relevant information on key govern-
ment decisions is conveyed  
Form and frequency of presentation: 
Information presented in an accessible 
way and provided regularly 
Outreach and trustworthiness: 
Information reaches a majority of the 
population and is transmitted by a 
trusted person 
Evaluation criteria for  
local government responsiveness 
Administrative efficiency: 
The government spends a low share on its 
administrative functioning 
Responsiveness in allocation of funds: 
Public funds are distributed between villag-
es based on the preferences of village repre-
sentatives, equity, and efficiency criteria 
Perceived level of corruption:  
The population perceives the level of local 
government corruption to be low. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 Methods 6.3
We examine our proposition by drawing on qualitative evidence from two extreme cases 
of participatory governance in Guatemala. The municipalities of Buenas Hermanas2 and 
La Villa are part of a pool of ten cases that we studied in a broader research project on 
public service provision in rural areas. The ten municipalities were chosen to reflect 
Guatemala’s geographic, ethnic and socio-economic composition. For the comparative 
case study we selected two cases from the ten studied municipalities, one with a highly 
effective and one with an ineffective participatory governance forum. At the same time 
the cases are similar in other characteristics that have been shown to lead to differences 
in local government responsiveness. Hence, they constitute an ideal pair of cases to ex-
amine whether the difference in the functioning of the participatory governance forum 
leads to differences in local government performance. 
  
                                                 




We carried out five months of fieldwork for studying the ten cases in Guatemala. In the 
two case study municipalities, we conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with the 
mayor, village representatives, civil society organizations, key informants, and local 
journalists. These interviews were implemented in the municipal capital and in several 
rural communities. The interviewed stakeholders were selected from all actor groups 
that are involved in the participatory governance forum to obtain a complete picture of 
the situation in a municipality and to capture different opinions. Moreover, we conduct-
ed 11 expert interviews in Guatemala City to increase our understanding of the socio-
political context for implementing participatory governance in Guatemala. To comple-
ment and triangulate the interview data we also analyzed the minutes of the Municipal 
Development Council meetings of the last twelve months, the municipal budgets of the 
first two years of the current administration (2008 and 2009), as well as demographic 
and socio-economic secondary data from the National Statistics Institute. 
 Case Study Results 6.4
In the following sections we first introduce the reader to the context of the case study 
(Section 1.4.1). Then, we compare the effectiveness of the two participatory governance 
forums as information provision mechanisms (Section 1.4.2). Next, we describe the 
local government performance in the two municipalities (Section 1.4.3). Finally, we 
evaluate our research proposition and suggest potential explanations for the different 
outcomes of the two municipalities (Section 1.4.4). 
6.4.1 The Context of the Case Study 
In rural areas of Guatemala almost three quarters of the population live below the na-
tional poverty line and one quarter of the population is estimated to be extremely poor 
(INE, 2006a). Some progress has been made in recent years to improve access to infra-
structure, education, health and other services for the poor, but there are still substantial 
gaps in public service coverage and quality (World Bank, 2003b). Given this situation, it 





According to a recent survey, more than half of the Guatemalan population (53%) be-
lieves that government decisions favor a few influential actors and only little more than 
a quarter of the population (27%) thinks that the country is governed to the benefit of 
the whole population. The same survey suggests however that many Guatemalans do 
not have access to comprehensible information that allows them to judge the perfor-
mance of their politicians: 55% of the surveyed respondents indicate that they do not 
understand political decisions because they are too complicated (Corporación Latino-
barómetro, 2010).  
One mechanism that could improve access to information about government perfor-
mance and the quality of public services in Guatemala are the Development Councils. 
These participatory governance forums were reformed substantially in 2002. They aim 
at involving citizens in the planning and evaluation of public policy. Our case study 
focuses on the local level where the representatives of Communal Development Coun-
cils3 (CDC) and civil society groups meet with representatives of the municipal and the 
central government once a month in the Municipal Development Council (MDC).4 
The MDC is a consultative forum for decision-making over municipal development 
projects. Its decisions are not binding for the municipal government (Art. 44, Presiden-
cia de la República de Guatemala, 2002). Yet, according to the law the local government 
should provide information on various aspects of its performance in these meetings. For 
example, public officials should announce the amount of and the distribution of invest-
ment spending, they should outline the revenues and expenditures of the municipal gov-
ernment and they should inform citizens about the state of implementation of social 
infrastructure projects (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002a-b). 
  
                                                 
3 The Communal Development Council consists of a board of twelve community representatives. This 
board should hold monthly community assemblies in which the needs of the community for public ser-
vices are discussed and prioritized. 
4 We focus on the local level in our analysis because municipal governments are elected by popular vote, 
whereas departmental and regional officials are determined by the central government. Therefore, the 
municipal level is most suitable for investigating whether participatory governance forums can overcome 




6.4.2 The Effectiveness of the two MDCs as Information Providers 
So how are the MDCs in the two case municipalities implemented? Do they function as 
a mechanism for information provision to voters as foreseen by the law? To answer the-
se questions we go through the three evaluation criteria step by step: 
Content Relevance 
The MDC in Buenas Hermanas discusses current problems in the municipality and 
searches for ways to solve them. Topics in the MDC include for example the organiza-
tion of health services, how to deal with environmental damages and how to tax local 
transport companies. Moreover, once a year the MDC approves last year’s municipal 
budget and plans how to spend the municipal resources next year. At this opportunity 
the treasurer reports on the annual municipal revenues and expenses and the CDC presi-
dents and NGOs present projects that they would like to implement with municipal 
funds in the next year. In addition, the mayor reports every three months about the de-
gree of implementation of projects that are financed by central government transfers for 
infrastructure projects.  
Besides these regular exchanges of information the MDC in Buenas Hermanas has aso-
cial audit commission. The three retired CDC presidents who form this commission 
have been trained by a non-governmental organization (NGO) in monitoring and evalu-
ating the physical and financial implementation of social infrastructure projects. They 
cannot cover all ongoing projects but they select around ten projects a year and report in 
the MDC about the results of their audits.  
In MDC meetings in La Villa the mayor does not involve the civil society actors in the 
planning and evaluation of public services. The village representatives inform him once 
a year on the projects they would like to have implemented in their villages. These pro-
jects are then discussed and agreed upon in the Municipal Council (the municipal legis-





Hence, he informs the village representatives about the projects he plans to realize with 
some of the municipal and central government funds, but he does not share information 
on the revenues and expenses of the municipality or the overall cost of all development 
investments. Though he reports biannually on the degree of implementation of munici-
pal and central government financed projects, the MDC members do not obtain any in-
formation on how the budget of the municipality is spent, how much of it is invested, 
how much is financed by new debt and whether the projects have been implemented 
well.  
Moreover, as many of the CDC presidents are employed by the mayor and they do not 
dare to provide negative information about him to their fellow villagers. Hence, voters 
can neither obtain a comprehensive picture of an incumbent’s overall allocation of 
funds, nor do they learn anything about the efficiency of spending on the project in their 
village and elsewhere. 
Form and Frequency of Presentation 
The MDC in Buenas Hermanas meets every month and the information that is present-
ed in the meetings is accessible for all members of the municipal society as all infor-
mation is given in both the indigenous language Mam and Spanish. The CDC presidents 
and NGO representatives pass the information that is relevant for their villages on in 
monthly village assemblies. These assemblies are accessible for people who lack funds 
to travel to the municipal capital and who only speak Mam. Moreover, they do not re-
quire literacy as the information is passed on verbally. 
The MDC in La Villa has met only seven times in the last twelve months. The CDC 
presidents should hold a village assembly once a month by law to channel the infor-
mation they obtain in the MDC meetings to their village and to discuss current needs of 
the village that they can communicate in the next MDC meetings. In La Villa however 
such assemblies are called less than bimonthly. Both the MDC meetings and the village 
assemblies are held in Spanish. This does however not reduce the accessibility of the 
information because the share of indigenous people is below 10 % in La Villa and most 





Outreach and Trustworthiness 
In Buenas Hermanas the village assemblies are well attended and most CDC presi-
dents enjoy a good reputation in their villages. Hence, it can be expected that the ma-
jority of the rural population has access to the information that is provided in the MDC 
and trusts the providers of this information. Moreover, the CDC presidents coordinate 
their evaluation of the incumbent in regular meetings and inform their villages subse-
quently about the perception of other villages on whether the mayor should be re-
elected. The good information flow from CDC presidents to their villages ensures that 
the mayor is constantly monitored in his decisions and not likely to be re-elected if he 
fails to invest municipal funds in an equitable and efficient way. 
In La Villa information on the municipal government’s budget, its decisions on invest-
ment spending and the share of the budget that it allocates to its administration does not 
reach any significant number of citizens because the few village assemblies that are held 
are not well attended. As many CDC presidents are co-opted by the mayor they are not 
considered trustworthy sources of information. Therefore, voters can be influenced by 
electoral campaigns and the targeted gifts that the mayor hands out to some villages. 
The village representatives do not meet outside of the MDC and they do not obtain in-
formation on uniting issues, such as spending efficiency and the level of diversion of 
funds. Hence, they are unlikely to be able to coordinate to prevent the re-election of the 
mayor. 
Table 2 sums up how the MDCs in the two municipalities compare to the requirements 
for an effective information provision mechanism. It illustrates that the two MDCs dif-
fer strongly with the MDC in Buenas Hermanas functioning as a much more effective 





Table 2: Summary of the differences in the effectiveness of the two MDCs 
Case 
Criterion 
Buenas Hermanas La Villa 
Content 
relevance  
Local government provides information 
on allocation of all funds and spending 
efficiency to village representatives. 
Local government uses MDC mainly to 
claim credit for popular outcomes; the only 
relevant information that CDCs obtain is 






In the MDC: monthly meetings; verbally 
and in written form; translated in local 
language 
In village assemblies: monthly village 
assemblies; verbally in local language 
In the MDC: bimonthly meetings, verbally 
in Spanish which is spoken by all members 
In village assemblies: trimestral or less 





High attendance at village meetings and 
quality of government performance at 
municipal level known; village repre-
sentatives are legitimized by village 
elections. 
Low attendance at village meetings and 
quality of government performance at 
municipal level unknown; most village 
representatives captured by incumbent. 
Sources: interview data and minutes of the MDC meetings from 12/08-11/09. 
6.4.3 The Performance of the Two Local Governments 
To explore whether the differences in access to information through the MDC are asso-
ciated with different local government performances we now analyze how the local 
governments in the two case municipalities spend their municipal budgets, how they 
allocate development projects and how interviewees perceive the level of corruption in 
the two cases. 
Administrative Efficiency 
According to the analysis of the 2008 and 2009 budgets and the interviewee opinions 
the government of Buenas Hermanas runs an efficient and effective administration. It 
spent on average less than 20% of its budget on administrative expenses and it has kept 
its electoral promises with respect to supporting women’s participation and improving 
municipal health and education services (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2010). Moreover, the 





In La Villa the office of the mayor is cramped every day with people soliciting help in 
personal affairs, such as a funeral or a business start-up credit. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the municipal government spent on average more than 45% of its budget in 2008 
and 2009 on its administration (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2010). This is way above the 
central government guideline for spending on municipal administration of 30% and a 
clear sign of administrative inefficiency and wasteful spending. According to several 
interviewees the administrative expenses in La Villa were inflated by the high salaries of 
personal advisers who have supported the campaign of the mayor financially and the 
numerous small favors that the mayor hands out every day to citizens. 
Responsiveness in Allocation of Funds 
The allocation of the municipal budget of Buenas Hermanas is discussed in the MDC 
and takes into account the recommendations of sectoral commissions, e.g., on health 
and education for prioritizing municipal investments. At the same time the mayor tries 
to serve all communities during his term but does not give projects to villages who do 
not participate in the MDC. For large projects he is said though to favor communities 
who contribute financially to the projects they solicit. This discriminates against the 
poorest communities, but at the same time it supports projects with higher village own-
ership and it allows him to attract funds to the municipality that require co-financing. 
In the distribution of municipal funds for infrastructure projects in La Villa political 
criteria prevail in the allocation of public resources over equity and efficiency concerns. 
Public resources are given to the villages of Municipal Council members and to popu-
lous villages that are led by CDC presidents who support the mayor’s party. 
Perceived Level of Corruption 
The social audit commission in Buenas Hermanas regularly evaluates the implementa-
tion of municipal investment projects. During the current mayor’s term it has not found 
any major irregularity in spending. Also, interview partners did not report on political 
connections between the mayor and the CDC presidents. Finally, the municipal gov-
ernment was ranked first among the 23 municipalities in the department and among the 
top fifteen among the 333 municipalities in the country in a transparency ranking by the 





In La Villa, actual spending on investment is not monitored. This implies that inflated 
project budgets and badly implemented projects are a potential source of rents for the 
local government and construction companies, as several interviewees have pointed out. 
In addition, interviewees claimed that the local government of La Villa pursues a spend-
ing pattern that maximizes votes by targeting municipal funds to populous villages and 
diverts the rest of the funds for buying political support. 
Table 3 summarizes the differences in local government performance between the two 
municipalities. It shows that the government of Buenas Hermanas outperforms the gov-
ernment of La Villa in all three criteria. 
Table 3: Summary of differences in local government performance 
Case 
Criterion 
Buenas Hermanas La Villa 
Administrative 
efficiency 
Average share of spending on administra-
tion in 2008/2009: 18 % 
Average share of spending on admin-
istration in 2008/2009: 48 % 
Responsiveness 
in allocation of 
public funds 
Allocation of a large part of the budget 
based on participatory budgeting with 
CDC presidents 
 
Criteria for deciding which village re-
ceives a project 
 Equity: satisfy some of the needs of 
all communities during one term 
 Reward for participation: only vil-
lages who participate in the MDC 
can obtain projects 
 Co-financing: villages who contrib-
ute financially to their project are 
more likely to obtain one 
Decision on allocation of municipal 
budget is taken without CDC president 
involvement in the Municipal Council 
 
Criteria for deciding which village 
receives a project 
 Favoritism: villages of Municipal 
Council members and co-opted 
CDC presidents are more likely to 
obtain projects 
 Vote-buying: more populous vil-
lages who carry more votes are 
more likely to obtain projects 
Perceived level 
of corruption 
Social audit commission reviews munici-
pal expenses and project implementation 
regularly and has not found major irregu-
larity 
 
Ranked high on national transparency 
ranking 
 
Interview partners perceive the level of 
corruption as very low 
No review of municipal expenses and 
project implementation 
 
CDC presidents must support electoral 
campaign of the mayor otherwise they 
loose their jobs in the municipal ad-
ministration 
 
Interview partners indicate that cam-
paign contributions are repaid by put-
ting advisors and CDC presidents on 
the municipal payroll or by handing out 
personal favors 
Sources: interview data, municipal budgets (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2010) and reports of the social audit 





6.4.4 Explaining the Differences in Outcomes 
The case study evidence presented so far shows that there are differences in the effec-
tiveness of the participatory governance forums and the performance of the local gov-
ernments in the two municipalities. To evaluate our proposition we still need to examine 
however whether the more effective MDC in Buenas Hermanas contributes to the good 
performance of its local government. A number factors support this argument: first, dif-
ferences in the competitiveness of the elections in the two municipalities can be ruled 
out as explanations for the different local government performances in the two munici-
palities. Both municipalities had similar voter turnouts in the last municipal elections, 
the winning party won with almost the same margin and a similar number of candidates 
competed for the position of the mayor. Second, other information provision mecha-
nisms are also unlikely to cause the differences in local government responsiveness. 
Neither do large parts of its population have access to critical and independent media 
coverage in any of the two municipalities, nor did any local or international NGO im-
plement an information campaign in the last two years. Third, La Villa is actually more 
likely to have a government that satisfies the needs of its population than Buenas Her-
manas according to the socio-economic situation of the population and its government: 
the government of La Villa can spend twice as much per head as the government of 
Buenas Hermanas, its administration has more staff and its less poor population has 
fewer unsatisfied needs (Gobierno de Guatemala 2010; INE & Secretaría de Planifi-
cación y Programación de la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN), 2006; INE 2006b) 
Overall, the case study evidence thus supports the proposition that a participatory gov-
ernance forum that functions as an effective information provision mechanism can con-
tribute to local government responsiveness. This finding implies that supporting effec-
tive participatory governance is a fruitful strategy for promoting good local governance. 
But what does this strategy entail exactly? For answering this question we need to turn 
to the two cases once more to explore which factors explain why the MDC in Buenas 





We begin this exploration with a comparison of the basic socio-economic conditions in 
the two municipalities. Buenas Hermanas is an extremely poor, densely populated mu-
nicipality in the western highlands. Its mainly indigenous population of around 25 000 
people earn their income from a combination of subsistence farming, trade, and seasonal 
migration to the fertile lowlands for the sugar cane harvest (INE, 2004). Less than 60% 
of its inhabitants are literate and 82% of them live below the poverty line. The large and 
relatively prosperous municipality of La Villa on the other hand is located at the humid 
and fertile South Pacific coast. Its predominantly non-indigenous (Ladino) population of 
around 40 000 people is scattered across villages that were set up far away from each 
other on or between large agricultural landholdings (INE, 2002, 2004). The main source 
of income of the rural population of which 59% live below the national poverty line is 
labor in sugar cane farming and processing (INE & SEGEPLAN, 2006)). Almost three 
quarters of the population of La Villa is literate (71%) (INE, 2002).  
Hence, at first sight, the MDC seems to be implemented in a less favorable socio-
economic context in Buenas Hermanas than in La Villa as the population in this munici-
pality is less educated, less literate, and much poorer. So why does Buenas Hermanas 
have a highly effective Municipal Development Council and a responsive government? 
The case study evidence suggests that the explanation for this outcome lies in the bene-
ficial interplay of frequent capacity building, the presence of many civil society organi-
zations, and short distances to meetings. 
Being one of the poorest municipalities in the country and pertaining to the area that 
was most affected by the civil war, Buenas Hermanas received a large amount of ca-
pacity building by donor agencies and national NGOs. Due to this support it has more 
than ten municipal level civil society organizations and countless village groups that are 
organized to solicit donor projects or to preserve indigenous customs and traditions. The 
large amount of capacity building workshops that national and international NGOs have 
provided in Buenas Hermanas has strengthened the demand for participation and the 
familiarity of CDC presidents with their right to information. These interventions have 
also fostered the formation of local civil society organizations who in turn support the 
functioning of the social audit commission and provide technical assistance to CDC 
presidents in the MDC sector commissions e.g., by supporting the elaboration of a pro-




The capacity building for CDCs and the presence of knowledgeable local NGOs who 
are in frequent contact with the CDCs also imply that villagers do not accept interfer-
ence of the municipal government in the election of their CDC presidents and their 
board. Therefore, they are legitimized within their villages and largely seen as repre-
senting the interest of their communities. As the CDC presidents have access to relevant 
and interesting information in the MDC meetings the assemblies they convene are well 
attended and as a result a large share of the population in the municipality has access the 
information that is conveyed in the MDC. 
Finally, the awareness of CDC presidents about their rights and their close horizontal 
ties have led to the selection of a mayor who is willing to provide relevant and sensitive 
information in the MDC that allows the CDC presidents to judge his performance. The 
CDC presidents promoted the selection of this mayor by coordinating the voting of their 
villages for a promising candidate. Before the elections many CDC presidents and some 
NGOs asked candidates to sign an agenda that reflected the demands of their village or 
group of villages to be able to hold him to account on his promises afterwards. Candi-
dates who did not sign these “contracts” were unlikely to get the votes of these villages 
or the members of an organization. 
Besides the intense capacity building and the presence of a large number of local civil 
society organizations, the short distances to meetings in Buenas Hermanas support the 
functioning of the MDC. Though poverty is much more pronounced in Buenas Her-
manas than in La Villa, CDC presidents manage to attend the MDC meetings. Their 
travel expenses are mitigated by the fact that many of them can walk from the villages 
nearby the capital. In addition, some communities support their CDC presidents with 
small contributions to their expenses and CDC presidents usually stay in office only two 
years. 
La Villa is hardly ever targeted by donors and national capacity building projects, be-
cause it is less poverty-stricken than the municipalities in the highlands and its non-
indigenous population is not as badly discriminated against at the national level in eco-
nomic and social terms. Its population is only weakly organized. Besides some village 
based school committees and a group of ex-combatants there are no organizations that 




The absence of capacity building implies that the failure of the mayor to provide infor-
mation in the MDC is not criticized. Even though most of the village representatives are 
literate they generally do not know the provisions of the Development Council Law and 
the obligations of the mayor very well and they do not organize to pressure him to com-
ply with the law. Also, the few civil society organizations in La Villa do not provide 
organizational or technical support to the CDC presidents and they do not exert any 
pressure on the mayor to provide information in the MDC. 
A further consequence of the low level of capacity building and the weak civil society in 
La Villa is that a mayor was selected who is not willing to give account in the MDC and 
that the information from the MDC meetings reaches only a small part of the popula-
tion. As the CDC presidents and the majority of the population are not aware of their 
rights to demand information the mayor was re-elected though he did not give account 
about his performance during the last term. Another reason why the CDC representa-
tives do not exert pressure on the mayor for providing information is that most of them 
depend financially on him. He employs a large number of the village representatives as 
administrative staff or as janitors of municipal buildings in the villages. He also attends 
the elections for the CDC boards and makes clear which candidates would have his sup-
port and would thus have access to projects for the village. Again the lack of capacity 
building and the absence of local NGOs that criticize this interference imply that the 
villagers accept the political capture of their CDCs. Consequently, the CDC presidents 
are often not respected and unpopular within their communities and therefore they avoid 
calling village assemblies. The fact that most of the CDC presidents are not legitimized 
by a free election at the village level but party members of the mayor also implies that 
they are perceived as useless in providing unbiased information on the incumbent. In 
some cases they are also purported to demand projects for their villages that have not 
been legitimized by a village assembly.  
Last but not least, the large distances between the villages and from the villages to the 
capital imply that the CDC presidents have high travel costs for attending MDC meet-
ings. This hinders the functioning of the MDC and the coordination of actions among 
the CDC presidents to demand more transparency or to remove the current mayor from 
office. As a result of these unfavorable conditions, the MDC in La Villa does not convey 




 Discussion of Policy Implications 6.5
The results of our case study suggest that there are several ways to make participatory 
governance mechanisms more effective in providing information to voters. The design 
of our study limits the scope of the policy recommendations that we can derive from our 
results. But they provide new insights for policymakers on what measures for promoting 
effective participatory governance work where and why. Moreover, the case study find-
ings generate hypotheses for future research. 
To begin with, our study suggests that effective information provision through participa-
tory governance can be supported by measures that lead to a higher awareness of village 
representatives and civil society actors about their rights and duties in the participatory 
governance arrangement. Furthermore, our results indicate that higher levels of formal 
education or providing access to the law through the internet or one-off distributions by 
NGOs do not necessarily bring about these capacities.5 At least in the short to medium 
run, regular workshops that deal specifically with the legal framework and practical 
tools for analyzing a government budget and formulating projects seem to be more ef-
fective in bringing about active participation. These results are consistent with pervious 
research from El Salvador which found that donor-assisted communication and educa-
tion of citizens about the rules and procedures of participatory budgeting was crucial for 
the sustained adoption of this form of participatory governance (Bland, 2011). Hence, 
the first policy implication of our findings is: 
Policy implication 1: village representatives and civil society actors’ knowledge of their 
rights and their technical and organizational capacities to claim them can be increased 
effectively in the short- to medium-run by capacity building in spite of low levels of edu-
cation. 
The case study indicates that to be effective capacity building workshops need to be 
repeated on a regular basis, because the voluntary village representatives that are target-
ed by these measures rotate frequently.  
  
                                                 
5 The Development Council Law and its regulation can be downloaded from several websites and paper 
versions of them were distributed by Plan International in La Villa a few years ago. This was not suffi-




In reality however, intense and regular capacity building measures by donors cannot be 
financed for long periods of time for all municipalities in a country. A more cost-
effective and sustainable alternative would be to incorporate lessons on the rights and 
duties of citizens in local participatory governance in the formal primary and secondary 
education system and extend access education. Another alternative to extending capaci-
ty building initiatives to all municipalities would be the establishment of regional cen-
ters for capacity building on participatory governance, which could upscale successful 
experiences in capacity building from individual municipalities. 
The second key finding of our case study is that local civil society organizations can 
play an important role in making the MDCs work as effective information provision 
mechanisms. Our results also suggest that the number of civil society organizations can 
be increased by external interventions. This result is in line with findings from case 
studies in Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru which show that a high density of civil society or-
ganizations fosters the effective implementation of participatory governance mecha-
nisms (Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, & McNulty, 2007; Eguren, 2008; Schönleitner, 2004). 
The second policy implication of our study is therefore: 
Policy implication 2: the formation and the functioning of civil society organizations 
can be promoted through capacity building and group-based fund allocation. 
The case of Buenas Hermanas shows that this can be realized in practice, e.g., by raising 
awareness among citizens about the benefits of association for pursuing their interests 
and by providing central government or donor funds for projects to groups of citizens or 
to entitle them to solicit projects from the local government budget in the MDC. Once 
such groups are formed, they can be targeted by workshops on participatory governance 
which increases their capacity to participate and to pass on their knowledge to village 
representatives. 
The third main finding of our case study is that the influence of poverty on the level and 
the quality of participation can be offset by differences in the cost of participation. 
Poorer citizens can actually participate more than less poor citizens when the main costs 





Moreover, high cost of participation can lead to corruption among village representa-
tives and to an absence of working age individuals in participatory forums. These results 
do not contradict previous research that shows that high levels of poverty can impede 
participation, but they show that this is not necessarily the case (Abom, 2004; Wiebe, 
2000). Therefore, the third policy implication of our results is: 
Policy implication 3: mitigating the cost of participation for village representatives and 
civil society actors can enable participation in places with high poverty. 
There are several ways to achieve this: first, adapting the schedule of meetings to make 
them compatible with the usual working hours reduces the opportunity cost of attending 
the meetings employed participants. Second, refunding travel expenses cuts direct costs 
of participation which are particularly high in municipalities with large distances be-
tween villages and the capital. Third, frequent rotation of village representatives reduces 
the overall cost of participation for them and thus reduces the risk of cooptation by the 
local government. This is because the incentive for village representatives to accept 
bribes from the local government increases with the number of years and thus the 
amount of private resources they spend for travel to the capital, meeting times and ad-
ministrative work for the community. 
 Conclusion 6.6
The results of the study of two Guatemalan municipalities show that a local participa-
tory governance forum that functions as effective information provision mechanisms 
can reduce the information asymmetry between a local government and its electorate 
and thus contribute to better local government performance. They also indicate that a 
high familiarity of citizens with the rules and the technical and organizational support of 
civil society organizations are crucial for making a participatory governance forum an 
effective information provision mechanism. Finally, the results of our study suggest that 
a higher level of formal education does not automatically result in a higher capacity to 
participate, that the formation of civil society groups can be supported by external inter-






Overall, our study thus lends support to the argument that differences in the level of 
information of voters about an incumbent lead to differences in government perfor-
mance (Bardhan, 2002; Besley, 2007; Keefer & Khemani, 2005). It also provides evi-
dence for the claim that the way in which information is presented matters for its impact 
on local government performance (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, & Khemani, 
2006; Lupia, 2003). Finally, our study contributes to the literature on participatory gov-
ernance by pointing out what combinations of socio-economic factors can contribute to 
the effective implementation of such mechanisms. 
The limited data availability in Guatemala implies that the generalizability of our re-
search proposition can only be tested with data from other countries. Also, we could not 
compare the effect of participatory governance to the effect of other information mech-
anisms, such as information campaigns by NGOs and central government agencies that 
provide information, e.g., on service quality or levels of corruption in different jurisdic-
tions. Hence, further research is needed to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different 
information provision mechanisms and the conditions under which they work.  
What we can conclude from our case study findings though is that participatory govern-
ance forums are one effective option for increasing voter knowledge given certain con-
ditions are fulfilled. This suggests that strengthening electoral accountability through 
information provision in participatory governance forums may be a more promising 
strategy to improve local government responsiveness than turning participatory govern-
ance mechanisms into vertical accountability mechanisms themselves. This may be par-
ticularly fruitful in countries in which existing participatory governance mechanisms 
have so far failed in holding politicians to account between elections due to a lack of 
power and legitimacy of these bodies (Bland, 2000; Devas & Grant, 2003; Francis & 






Abom, B. (2004). Social Capital, NGOs, and Development: A Guatemalan Case Study. 
Development in Practice, 14 (3), 342–353. 
Banerjee, A., Banerji, R., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Khemani, S. (2006). Can Infor-
mation Campaigns Spark Local Participation and Improve Outcomes? World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3967. Washington, D.C. 
Bardhan, P. (2002). Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 16 (4), 185–205. 
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2006). Decentralisation and Accountability in Infra-
structure Delivery in Developing Countries. The Economic Journal, 116, 101–
127. 
Baron, D. P. (1994). Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters. 
American Political Science Review, 88 (1), 33–47. 
Barro, R. J. (1973). The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice, 14 
(1), 19–42. 
Besley, T. (2007). Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Besley, T., & Case, A. (1995). Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy 
Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 110 (3), 769–798. 
Besley, T., & Burgess, R. (2002). The Political Economy of Government Responsive-
ness: Theory and Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4), 
1415–1451. 
Bland, G. (2000). The Popular Participation Law and the Emergence of Local Account-
ability. In World Bank (Ed.). Bolivia: From Patronage to a Professional State. 




Bland, G. (2011). Supporting Post-Conflict Democratic Development? External Promo-
tion of Participatory Budgeting in El Salvador. World Development, 39 (5), 863–
873. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W., Brinkerhoff, J. M., & McNulty, S. (2007). Decentralization and Par-
ticipatory Local Governance: a Decision Space Analysis and Application to Pe-
ru. In G. S. Cheema & D. A. Rondinelli (Eds.). Decentralizing Governance. 
Emerging Concepts and Practices (pp. 189–211). Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Congreso de la República de Guatemala (2002a). Código Municipal [Municipal Code]. 
Decreto N°12 de 2002. Guatemala. 
Congreso de la República de Guatemala (2002b). Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo 
Urbano y Rural [Law of the Urban and Rural Development Councils]. Decreto 
N°11 de 2002. Guatemala. 
Corporación Latinobarómetro (2010). Informe 2010 [2010 Report]. Santiago de Chile. 
Retrieved August 31st, 2010 from http://www.latinobarometro.org. 
Crook, R. C. (2003). Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: the Politics of 
Local-Central Relations. Public Administration and Development 23 (1), 77–88. 
Crook, R. C., & Manor, J. (1998). Democracy and Decentralization in South East Asia 
and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Devas, N., & Grant, U. (2003). Local Government Decision-Making, Citizen Participa-
tion and Local accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and Uganda. Public 
Administration and Development, 23, 307–316. 
Eguren, I. R. (2008). Moving Up and Down the Ladder: Community-Based Participa-
tion in Public Dialogue and Deliberation in Bolivia and Guatemala. Community 





Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control. Public Choice, 50 
(1-3), 5–25. 
Ferejohn, J., & Kuklinski, J. (1990). Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana and 
Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2009). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from 
the Audits of Local Governments. NBER Working Paper No. 14937. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Francis, P., & James, R. (2003). Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Partici-
pation: The Contradictions of Uganda's Decentralization Programm. World De-
velopment, 31 (2), 325–337. 
Fried, R. C., & Rabinovitz, F. F. (1980). Comparative Urban Politics, a Performance 
Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Gobierno de Guatemala (2010). Portal SIAF Muni: Promoviendo la Transparencia 
[SIAF-Muni Portal: Promoting Transparency]. Retrieved August 31, 2010, from 
http://siafmuni.minfin.gob.gt/siafmuni/. 
Griffin, J. D. (2006). Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense 
of the Marginality Hypothesis. Journal of Politics, 68 (4), 911–921. 
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1996). Electoral Competition and Special Interest 
Politics. The Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), 265–286. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2002). XI Censo Nacional de Población y VI de 
Habitación [XI National Census of Population and VI Census of Housing]. 
Guatemala. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2004). Proyecciones de Población [Population 
Projections]. Guatemala. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2006a). Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de 




Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2006b). Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas al 
2002 [Unsatisfied Needs in 2002]. Guatemala. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), & Secretaría de Planificación y Programación 
de la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN) (2006). Mapas de Pobreza en Guatemala al 
2002 [Poverty Maps in Guatemala in 2002]. Guatemala. 
Jenkins, R. (2007). The Role of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability. In A. 
Shah (Ed.), Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series. Performance 
Accountability and Combating Corruption (pp. 135–182). Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank. 
Jenkins, R., & Goetz, A. M. (1999). Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implica-
tions of the Right-to-Information Movement in India. Third World Quarterly, 20 
(3), 603–622. 
Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2005). Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor: Un-
derstanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. The World Bank 
Research Observer, 20 (1), 1–27. 
Khemani, S. (2006). Can Information Campaigns Overcome Political Obstacles to Serv-
ing the Poor? Paper prepared for the Expert Group on Development Issues 
(EGDI) Secretariat Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden. Washington, D.C. 
List, J. A., & Sturm, D. M. (2006). How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from 
Environmental Policy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (4), 1249–1281. 
Lupia, A. (2003). Necessary conditions for improving civic competence. Mimeo. Uni-
versity of Michigan, retrieved 31st of August, 2010, from http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lupia/necessary.pdf. 
Pereira, C., Melo, M. A., & Figueiredo, C. M. (2009). The Corruption-Enhancing Role 
of Re-Election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil’s Audit Re-





Presidencia de la República de Guatemala (2002). Reglamento de la Ley de los Con-
sejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural [By-Law of the Urban and Ru-
ral Development Council Law]. Acuerdo Gubernativo N°461 de 2002. Guatema-
la. 
Schönleitner, G. (2004). Can Public Deliberation Democratise State Action?: Municipal 
Health Councils and Local Democracy in Brazil. In J. Harriss, K. Stokke, & O. 
Törnquist (Eds.). Politicising Democracy. The New Local Politics of Democrati-
sation (pp. 75–106). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Shah, A., Thompson, T., & Zou, H.-F. (2004). The Impact of Decentralisation on Ser-
vice Delivery, Corruption, Fiscal Management and Growth in Developing and 
Emerging Market Economies: A Synthesis of Empirical Evidence. CESifo DICE 
Report (1), 10–14. 
Strömberg, D. (2001). Mass Media and Public Policy. European Economic Review, 45 
(4-6), 652–663. 
Wiebe, A. (2000). Who Participates? Determinants of Participation in a Community 
Development Project in Guatemala. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 
21 (Special Issue), 579–604. 
World Bank (2003a). Making Services Work for Poor People. World Development Re-
port 2004. Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2003b). Poverty in Guatemala. Country Report No. 24221-GU. Washing-




7. Conclusions and Research Outlook 
“When looking cross-sectionally at the quality of government with relatively similar electoral 
institutions, the provision of information could be an important source of heterogeneity in gov-
ernment performance.” (Besley, 2007, pp. 135–136) 
The findings of the papers in this thesis support this prediction. They show that differ-
ences in information provision through participatory governance can explain differences 
in government responsiveness in municipalities with the same electoral institutions. 
Moreover, they indicate that effective participatory governance only leads to govern-
ment responsiveness when it is combined with competitive elections. These findings 
suggest that promoting participatory governance would be a promising strategy to im-
prove local government performance in Guatemala. Yet, the findings of the thesis also 
show that the implementation of participatory governance in the study area faces great 
challenges. The low density of civil society organizations, the low level of education, 
and the high level of poverty of the population are the greatest obstacles to such an en-
deavor. In sum, the results of the thesis show that the combination of effective participa-
tory governance and competitive elections is sufficient for increasing local government 
responsiveness, but that implementing participatory governance effectively is probably 
not feasible in the short- to medium run in the study area. 
In the following sections, I recapitulate these and other key results in more detail. I also 
highlight the contribution of each paper and of the thesis as a whole to the empirical 
literature on participatory governance and theory development for each paper individu-
ally (Section 7.1). Then, I discuss what policy recommendations can be derived from 
the key results of the thesis (Section 7.2). After that, I delineate the limitations of the 
thesis (Section 7.3). In the last section, I point out fruitful areas for future research on 
participatory governance (Section 7.4). 
 Key Results and Contributions 7.1
7.1.1 Paper 1: Literature Review on Participatory Governance 
Paper 1 addresses the question: what do we know about the impact of and the conditions 
for effective participatory governance from previous research in other contexts? To an-
swer this question I carry out a critical review of the different strands of literature that I 




The key findings of this review are that first, there is little evidence on the impact of 
participatory governance on the quality of government and access to high quality public 
services. In particular, there is a lack of theoretical models and quantitative studies for 
testing theoretical arguments systematically. Hence, a causal link between participatory 
governance and these outcomes has not yet been established.  
Second, the literature on the conditions for effective participatory governance is com-
prehensive, but it is also dominated by case studies. Moreover, much of the empirical 
work on participatory governance focuses on isolated successful experiences with par-
ticipatory governance in Brazil and India. From this literature a broad consensus has 
emerged that both civil society and public officials must be both capable and willing to 
establish a participatory governance mechanism. However, these conditions are not met 
in many developing country contexts and difficult to establish. 
The findings of the literature review imply that future research on participatory govern-
ance should aim at conducting studies with medium and large samples in a broader 
range of locations to test the explanations that have been proposed in case studies and 
thus to arrive at more general results. Besides, empirical studies on participatory gov-
ernance should state the theoretical approach of their investigation so that their findings 
can contribute to theory development. Finally, the literature review shows that more 
research is needed for establishing a common analytical framework that can be used for 
comparing and accumulating the findings of research on participatory governance from 
different disciplines. 
The literature review contributes to the empirical literature on participatory governance 
by summarizing and critically evaluating a large number of case studies and compara-
tive studies. Moreover, it shows how research from several disciplinary backgrounds 
has contributed to increasing the understanding of the impact of and the conditions for 
effective participatory governance. It also proposes a new classification for organizing 
existing research on participatory governance based on the normative perspective of a 
study. Thus, the literature review brings together and compares the results of several 





7.1.2 Paper 2: Refinement of the Main Empirical Method 
The second paper of the thesis develops the methodological foundation of the fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analyses (fsQCA) in Papers 3 and 4 further. It provides an 
answer to the question: how can qualitative data be collected systematically and cali-
brated reliably as fuzzy sets for fsQCA?  
In the paper Xavier Basurto and I address this question by proposing a procedure for 
calibrating qualitative interview data to obtain fuzzy-set values ready to be loaded into a 
computer program for performing a fsQCA. The procedure we propose leads research-
ers in six steps from the determination of the conditions and the outcome of a study to 
the assignment of fuzzy-set values to each of the studied cases. 
The contribution of the second paper is that the calibration of qualitative interview data, 
which is an important analytic step in the application of fsQCA, can be carried out sys-
tematically and transparently with the procedure we outline. So far the details of the 
preparation of qualitative data have not been made explicit in fsQCA applications, 
which makes it difficult to assess the validity, reliability, and replicability of the results 
of these studies. Hence, we contribute to best practice in the application of fsQCA by 
complementing the range of data calibration techniques. Last but not least, we also hope 
to initiate a debate among fsQCA scholars about the advantages and disadvantages of 
this procedure. Engaging in this debate will make the application of fsQCA more com-
prehensible. It would also increase the credibility of the results of fsQCA studies and 
facilitate the establishment of fsQCA as an accepted method for data analysis. 
7.1.3 Paper 3: Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Participatory Governance 
The first qualitative comparative paper addresses the research question: what is the im-
pact of participatory governance on local government responsiveness? It provides an 
empirical evaluation of the effect of participatory governance on local government re-





The first key finding of Paper 3 is that effective participatory governance is sufficient 
for local government responsiveness when it is combined with competitive elections. 
Case-level evidence shows that participatory governance forums reduce the information 
gap between voters and the mayor about the actions and decisions that the mayor has 
taken in office and, thus, make re-election incentives more effective. The information 
effect of participatory governance is especially relevant for people in rural areas in de-
veloping countries, because they usually have less access to information than people in 
urban areas. 
A second key finding of Paper 3 is that widespread access to local media is not suffi-
cient for bringing about local government responsiveness in the ten municipalities be-
cause these media do not provide independent coverage. As case level evidence shows, 
most local media companies are financed primarily by local government advertisements 
because they do not earn much with newspaper sales or radio and television connection 
fees. Hence, they cannot publish critical reports on local government actions. This find-
ing suggests that liberalizing state media regulation and strengthening press freedom is 
not enough for ensuring access to free and independent local media in developing coun-
tries. Demand side constraints to media growth need to be addressed as well, particular-
ly in rural areas. 
Paper 3 contributes to the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of local government responsiveness. It adds to the theoretical debate on the deter-
minants of good local government performance by highlighting the complementarity of 
participatory governance, competitive elections, and media. Moreover, it contributes to 
the body of empirical evidence on participatory governance by conducting a systematic, 
theory-led medium comparative study on the impact of participatory governance in 
Guatemala. Last but not least, the paper makes three methodological improvements: 
first, it measures the degree of implementation of participatory governance and, thus, it 
distinguishes between the effectiveness of the implementation of participatory govern-
ance and its impact. Second, it accounts explicitly for other accountability mechanisms 
that may interact with participatory governance. Third, it takes the socio-economic con-
text in which participatory governance is implemented systematically into account in 




7.1.4 Paper 4: Comparative Analysis of the Conditions for Participatory Governance 
The second qualitative comparative paper addresses the question what makes participa-
tory governance work in an unfavorable environment? Specifically, Paper 4 aims to 
answer what motivates a mayor to adopt participatory governance forums and what en-
ables civil society actors to exert pressure on their local government to establish and run 
a participatory governance forum effectively? 
The key finding of Paper 4 on the motivation of the mayor is that civil society enforce-
ment, mayoral self-enforcement, and mayoral interest in participatory governance are 
jointly sufficient for municipal government compliance with the mandate to establish a 
participatory governance forum. None of these conditions alone is found to motivate a 
mayor to run such a forum effectively.  
The key findings of Paper 4 on the capacity of civil society actors are: the most im-
portant resource for civil society enforcement of participatory governance is a high ca-
pability to engage in public discourse and the most important structural factor for this 
outcome is a large number of civil society organizations. Both conditions are found to 
be necessary but not sufficient for civil society enforcement when they are combined 
with a high population density and high poverty. The finding that the presence of pov-
erty is found to be necessary, but not sufficient for civil society enforcement seems to 
contradict the distributive bargaining theory argument that actors need resources to en-
force an institution. Yet, case level evidence shows that civil society enforcement can 
take place in spite of high poverty in municipalities that also have a high population 
density because short distances to meetings mitigate the cost of participation in such 
municipalities. 
These findings contribute to the empirical literature on participatory governance reforms 
by showing what conditions are required for implementing these reforms effectively in 
an unfavorable environment. They show that in the absence of central government en-
forcement the establishment of participatory governance arrangements can be effective-
ly enforced through informal enforcement mechanisms. The findings also imply that 
even illiterate citizens with little education can participate actively when they are in-




Furthermore, the results of the paper indicate that poverty affects participation in Gua-
temala mainly because people cannot afford the cost of traveling to meetings and not 
because people depend on government officials for welfare benefits as has been found 
in other contexts (Fung & Wright, 2001; Heller, 2001; Wampler, 2008). Lastly, the find-
ings suggest that the presence of a large number of civil society organizations attract 
resources, such as capacity building measures, which in turn foster the capacity of citi-
zens to participate. This finding points out the importance of taking into account benefi-
cial interactions between individual and group level conditions in explaining the civil 
society condition. 
The tested theories are by and large supported by the results of the paper. The results 
confirm that incentives for actors to adopt written institutions can be set by informal 
enforcement mechanisms and benefits of participation as behavioral and imperative 
theories of law emphasize (Cooter, 1998; Elster, 1989; Grasmick, Harold G., & Bursik, 
1990; Karayiannis & Hatzis, 2010; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999). What is more, the evi-
dence from Guatemala suggests that a combination of the incentives which are proposed 
by these theories may be required for implementing a law effectively. The results of 
Paper 4 also reinforce the theoretical argument that the implementation of institutions in 
practice depends on the power of the involved actors to impose their will on others 
(Knight, 1992; Moe, 2005).  
Finally, the results of the paper lend support to the relevance of both, structural and so-
cial factors that are predicted by collective action theory and distributive bargaining 
theory to influence civil society collective action and they point out interaction effects 
between these factors. 
In sum, the fourth paper of the thesis contributes to the literature on the conditions for 
effective participatory governance by spelling out and testing several enforcement 
mechanisms for motivating public officials to engage in participatory governance and 
by exploring interactions of structural and individual-level conditions for the capacity of 





7.1.5 Paper 5: Case Study on the Link between Participatory Governance and Re-
sponsiveness 
The case study in Paper 5 complements the two comparative analyses in Papers 3 and 4. 
In this paper Makus Hanisch and I examine the following questions: can participatory 
governance forums effectively reduce the information asymmetry between voters and a 
politician and contribute to local government responsiveness? How and under what 
conditions can they fulfill this task? And, which policy measures can improve these 
conditions? 
The case study shows that participatory governance forums can reduce the information 
gap between voters and the municipal government and, thus, strengthen the govern-
ment’s incentive to provide public services to the poor majority of voters. This finding 
explains the positive impact of the combination of participatory governance and com-
petitive elections that I find in Paper 3. 
The case study demonstrates that participatory governance forums increases voter 
knowledge about government performance in rural areas through the following mecha-
nisms: first, village representatives can mobilize their village not to vote for a candidate; 
with this threat they can move an incumbent to release sensitive information on projects 
and spending decisions. Second, village representatives pass on the information they 
obtain in the capital in village assemblies; thus, participatory governance forums can 
reach illiterate and immobile citizens in remote areas of a municipality. Third, infor-
mation is provided through familiar and trusted village members and it is discussed 
among village representatives, which facilitates collective action by voters to sanction 
an incumbent. Thus, participatory governance can change incentives in rural political 
markets. 
The case study results also confirm and refine the findings in Paper 4 on the conditions 
for effective participatory governance. They show that first, even illiterate and unedu-
cated village representatives can be aware of their rights and duties when they receive 
intense capacity building and when civil society organizations support them in under-
standing technical aspects of service planning and in organizing the participatory gov-




Second, village representatives in poor areas can mitigate and thus be able to meet the 
cost of participation when distances to meetings are small, when they rotate posts fre-
quently and, when their communities support them financially. 
Paper 5 contributes to the literature on the impact of participatory governance and to the 
literature on the conditions for effective participatory governance. By exploring how 
participatory governance complements competitive elections in bringing about govern-
ment responsiveness we complement previous research on the interaction between elec-
tions and other information provision mechanisms, such as the media, central govern-
ment audit reports and information campaigns. By discussing policy options for 
supporting the implementation of participatory governance we generate policy-relevant 
knowledge on the suitability of this reform for improving public service provision. 
7.1.6 Joint Contribution of the Five Papers 
The five papers of my thesis generate new insights on the impact of and the conditions 
for effective participatory governance and they add to the theoretical literature on gov-
ernment performance and the implementation of governance reforms. They also con-
tribute to increasing the validity and reliability of the application of fsQCA for conduct-
ing comparative studies on these topics in a developing country context. In the 
following I outline how these contributions emerge from the interplay of the papers. 
The first connecting theme of the thesis is the impact of participatory governance. Start-
ing from the insight in the literature review that there is a lack of evidence on the impact 
of participatory governance on local government performance, Paper 3 assesses this 
impact in Guatemala in a comparative perspective and Paper 5 analyses the mechanism 
behind the positive impact that is found in Paper 3. Together these two papers point out 
that effective participatory governance supports the function of elections to hold politi-
cians to account by providing information to voters in rural areas. Thus, my thesis 
shows that effective participatory governance has a similar impact on the quality of 





The joint contribution of Papers 3 and 5 to political agency theory is to point out that 
participatory governance forums can complement elections in overcoming the agency 
problem between an incumbent and the electorate. The two papers outline the theoreti-
cal argument that the combination of participatory governance and elections can foster 
local government responsiveness, they provide support for this argument in a compara-
tive empirical study and they examine the mechanism behind it in a case study. 
The second connecting theme of the thesis is the implementation of participatory gov-
ernance. The literature review in Paper 1 points out that we still lack information on 
how participatory governance could be implemented effectively in unfavorable con-
texts. The qualitative comparative analysis in Paper 4 evaluates what conditions need to 
be addressed to make such an endeavor successful in Guatemala. It shows what incen-
tives can motivate a local government to adopt participatory governance and what struc-
tural and individual-level conditions influence civil society enforcement of participatory 
governance. Paper 5 complements these findings by pointing out the micro-mechanisms 
behind the findings on the conditions for civil society enforcement and by critically 
evaluating policy options for strengthening these conditions in Guatemala.  
Together, Paper 4 and Paper 5 show that implementing participatory governance is a 
challenging and resource intensive task in places where civil society organization is 
weak and local governments are not motivated by an affiliation with a party with a pro-
participatory ideology. This finding is not only relevant for Guatemala but also for other 
countries in which participatory governance laws are neither enforced by a national 
government, nor the result of a strong bottom-up social movement, such as Uganda, 
Bolivia (Bland, 2000; Porter & Onyach-Olaa, 2000). 
The theoretical contribution of Papers 4 and 5 is to demonstrate that the theory of col-
lective action and the theory of distributive bargaining power can be fruitfully combined 
with theories of informal law enforcement for explaining differences in the functioning 
of participatory governance in a developing country context. Moreover, the findings of 
the papers suggest that a theoretical explanation of effective participatory governance 
needs to incorporate individual level factors, as well as institutional and socio-economic 




 Policy Recommendations 7.2
In the last two decades international development organizations, such as EuropeAid and 
the World Bank, political parties in developing countries, such as Brazil’s Workers’ Par-
ty and India’s Communist Party, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
such as Oxfam and Plan International have put participatory governance on their agen-
da. All these organizations actively support and implement participatory governance 
programs in a large number of developing countries in order to improve public service 
delivery, to strengthen the democratic capabilities of citizens, and to increase the legiti-
macy of the state (Blair, 2000; Evans, 2004). 
The findings of the thesis partly lend support to this strategy, but they also highlight the 
difficulties of implementing participatory governance effectively in developing coun-
tries. First, the results of the thesis show that effective participatory governance can im-
prove information flows between citizens and politicians. Thus, it allows voters to take 
a more informed voting decision and sets incentives for politicians to allocate public 
funds in accordance to citizen preferences. Yet, beyond this impact on the allocation of 
public spending there is no evidence so far that participatory governance can increase 
human well-being or lower poverty through improved access to services (Boulding & 
Wampler, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007). Hence, for improving indicators of human develop-
ment and poverty policymakers should consider turning to other policy options, such as 
increasing the revenues of local governments, which have been shown to contribute to 
these goals (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). 
But even if well-being and poverty cannot be influence with participatory governance 
mechanisms, policymakers may decide to support their implementation in order to in-
crease local government accountability and responsiveness. They should however take 
into account that the implementation of participatory governance is a time- and re-
source-intensive task in unfavorable socio-economic contexts. In such contexts policy-
makers should therefore also consider strengthening existing accountability mecha-
nisms, such as central government auditing of local government spending or legislative 
oversight of local governments. These alternatives may turn out to be faster and more 





Moreover, policymakers should take care that supporting participatory governance does 
not come at the cost of weakening existing accountability mechanisms. Finally, deci-
sion-makers should evaluate whether citizens can be motivated in the medium and long 
run to take over essential functions of the state. Otherwise, the implementation of partic-
ipatory governance may not be sustainable. 
Policy makers and donors who take the decision to promote effective participatory gov-
ernance in Guatemala or in similarly difficult contexts should take measures to support 
both, the capacity of civil society actors to participate and the motivation of local gov-
ernment officials to involve citizens in decision-making processes. The capacity of citi-
zens to engage in debates with public officials can be supported by increasing the inten-
sity and frequency of capacity building measures, by fostering the formation of civil 
society organizations and by compensating poor citizens from remote areas for their 
travel expenses. The motivation of local government officials can be increased by sup-
porting social and internal enforcement mechanisms for complying with participatory 
governance laws and by making them aware of the benefits of participatory governance. 
The internalization of participatory governance legislation by local government officials 
can be fostered by awareness raising campaigns about the duty of governments to estab-
lish participatory governance forums. Social enforcement by civil society actors can be 
supported with the proposed measures to strengthen the capacity of citizens to engage in 
public debates and with a strong communication strategy which informs citizens about 
the purpose and proper functioning of participatory governance forums. 
 Limitations of the Thesis 7.3
The range of research problems the thesis can address is limited by the normative per-
spective and the research approach I have adopted. In the following, I first describe re-
search problems that are closely related to the central research questions but are not ad-
dressed in the thesis. Then, I will outline the implications of the choice of the empirical 





The most crucial decision for delimiting the topic of my thesis was the decision on the 
normative perspective from which to examine participatory governance, i.e., the ex-ante 
judgment about how participatory governance is expected to function and what out-
comes it is expected to influence. After having completed a first review of the literature 
on participatory governance I decided to study it from a liberal perspective.1 In this per-
spective participatory governance is a second generation reform of the institutional set-
up of developing countries that is implemented with the aim to make the provision of 
public services more efficient, equitable, and sustainable. This view is commonly held 
by development economists and international organizations, such as the World Bank 
(Ackerman, 2004; Blair, 2000; Picciotto, 1997; Paul, 1992; World Bank, 2003). 
Taking a liberal perspective means that my research focuses on those functions of a par-
ticipatory governance forum that are most likely to have an impact on the process of 
public service provision. These functions are the exchange of information about prefer-
ences and decisions and the imposition of sanctions on the local government, i.e., the 
accountability mechanism of these forums. Other functions of participatory governance, 
such as the discussion of solutions for development challenges, of policy options and of 
regulation decisions for the municipality, were not part of my investigation. Moreover, I 
did not examine the impact of these functions on the democratic capabilities of citizens 
and the quality of the democratic process in a municipality, as scholars with a radical 
democratic perspective would do. 
  
                                                 
1 Other normative perspectives on participatory governance are the radical democratic, the leftist, and the 
conservative perspective (Goldfrank, 2007). In the radical democratic view participatory governance is a 
means to deepen democracy, to legitimize state involvement in re-distribution, and to reduce elite capture 
and clientelism (Fung & Wright, 2001; Schönleitner, 2006). In the leftist view, participatory governance 
as it is promoted by donor agencies is not radical enough for changing power relations and in the worst 
case it is a means for muting mass mobilizations (Chambers, 2006; Gaventa, 2006; Mohan & Stokke, 
2000; Veltmeyer, 1997). In the conservative view, participatory governance can weaken representative 
democratic institutions and support the co-optation of voters by the ruling party and, thus, destabilizing 




Adopting a liberal view also implies that I evaluate the extrinsic value of participatory 
governance for citizens instead of exploring the intrinsic value of participation. Hence, I 
do not compare deliberative forms of decision-making with representative forms of de-
mocracy, i.e., my research does not contribute to the normative discourse on the merits 
of different forms of aggregating preferences in a democracy that takes place in political 
theory and empirical studies of participatory democracy (Abers, 1998; Bucek & Smith, 
2000; Chappell, 2011; Fung & Wright, 2001; Schönleitner, 2006). 
Finally, details of the community-level dynamics in the case municipalities are by and 
large beyond the scope of the thesis. As I focus on the interaction between village repre-
sentatives and local government officials, I could not examine the dynamics of the in-
teractions between village representatives and the village population in depth. The ex-
tensive literature on the challenges of community-based development shows that this 
interaction can be affected by problems, such as elite capture, information distortion and 
co-optation of representatives (Conning & Kevane, 2002; Gerson, 1993; Platteau, 2009; 
Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Russell-Einhorn, 2007). Particularly, information distortion 
by village representatives would undermine the positive effect of participatory govern-
ance that I find in my research by interrupting the information between the mayor and 
voters. Therefore, I decided to take this aspect in the analysis of the case study in Paper 
5 into account (Chapter 6). 
Besides the normative perspective the choice of the empirical strategy for my thesis has 
several implications for the quality and the richness of the data that I could collect and 
analyze. Though the decision to study ten cases in a comparative analysis increased the 
external validity of the study, it comes at the cost of obtaining less detailed data on the 
cases than a case study would have yielded. To compare the conditions and outcomes of 
my study across ten cases I collected the data in each municipality in one week. This 
data collection design implied that I could not collect comprehensive data on the histor-
ical background and the process of implementation of a Municipal Development Coun-
cil. Moreover, for being able to assign fuzzy-set values to all cases I had to focus on 
measuring the conditions I had identified in my research hypotheses, which limited the 





Finally, choosing rural Guatemala as the study area turned out to limit the diversity of 
the selected cases, i.e., some theoretically possible combinations of conditions were not 
observed. For example, my data set does not include cases with formal state enforce-
ment or cases with critical media coverage that reaches a majority of the population. 
The limited diversity of cases in turn implies that some research questions, such as the 
importance of state enforcement of participatory governance or the interaction of inde-
pendent local media with elections, could not be explored. 
 Indications for Future Research 7.4
The papers of this thesis raise new questions for empirical and theoretical research on 
participatory governance. In the following I will first outline the research imperatives 
for future empirical work and then discuss indications for theory development and re-
finement. 
One of the key findings of the thesis is that local elections and participatory governance 
arrangements, which are often portrayed as independent approaches to good govern-
ance, only solve the agency problem in the case municipalities when they are combined. 
This finding should be re-examined in other contexts to evaluate its robustness. Moreo-
ver, exploring further synergy effects between elections and other accountability mech-
anisms, such as media, information campaigns, and central government audits would be 
a fruitful area of future empirical research. 
Another suggestion for further investigations is to carry out a systematic comparison of 
the effectiveness of several information provision mechanisms and the conditions under 
which they work. Besides participatory governance such a comparison should include 
access to media, information campaigns, citizen report cards, and the publication of the 
results of central government audits.  
A third fruitful area for future empirical research is to examine how participatory gov-
ernance influences the decision of politicians to pander to voters’ preferences when they 






As the theoretical literature on multitasking principal-agent problems suggests, increas-
ing the information about the policy choices of an incumbent can increase the incentive 
to withdraw resources from effective projects if they are not as visible and popular as 
other less effective projects (Azfar, 2002; Besley, 2007; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).2 
This implies that an increase in information through participatory governance can also 
have a negative effect on voter welfare according to theory. Yet, participatory govern-
ance forums do not only increase information, they also allow an incumbent to justify 
past policy decisions. This feature of participatory governance could offset the de-
scribed negative effect of a higher transparency about policy choices. Thus, ex ante it is 
unclear whether participatory governance would improve or worsen government deci-
sions when a government has better information than citizens about a policy option. 
Turning now to theory development, a promising area for future research would be the 
development of models that can make nuanced predictions on the impact of the different 
functions of participatory governance, such as information provision, joint decision-
making, and soft sanctioning on local government incentives. The principal-agent 
framework can serve as a starting point for such models, but existing agency models for 
elections (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986) or the media (Besley & Burgess, 2002; 
Strömberg, 2004) need to be extended and adapted to reflect the institutional set-up of 
participatory governance forums. A simple example of such a model is presented in 
Speer (2010).  
Future models of participatory governance should also account for the fact that individ-
uals with different preferences may not have an incentive to act collectively in holding a 
politician to account in participatory governance forums. Moreover, the inclination of 
higher levels of government to react to the complaints of members of a participatory 
governance forum about corrupt behavior has been shown to be crucial for their bar-
gaining power (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003; Olken, 2006). Therefore, these aspects 
should be incorporated in models of participatory governance.  
  
                                                 
2 This problem is likely to make politicians invest more in targeted local public goods than in broadly 




More generally, the explanatory power of political agency models for analyzing political 
accountability relationships could be increased if these models accounted for aspects of 
bounded rationality beyond imperfect information. This would require that we find 
ways to model selection mechanisms beyond optimization (e.g., satisficing or heuris-
tics) and that we develop strategies to incorporate human limitations in information pro-
cessing. 
The development of a comprehensive institutional rational choice based explanation of 
effective participatory governance outcomes will need to draw on several theories for 
explaining the ability and the willingness of both groups of actors to contribute to this 
governance structure. In Paper 4, I propose and test a set of theories that address these 
aspects in the Guatemalan context. Yet, further research is needed to complement this 
effort. For example, a comprehensive explanation of the motivation of government offi-
cials for compliance needs to incorporate theories on all types of compliance incentives 
and not only those that are relevant in the Guatemalan context. Besides, such an expla-
nation should explicitly take into account interaction effects between different forms of 
enforcement, such as crowding out of internal motivations for compliance by state en-
forcement and crowding in of social enforcement by public support for participatory 
governance as has been pointed out by Crawford & Ostrom (1995) and Stout (2006). 
All in all, the literature on the impact of and the conditions for participatory governance 
could be greatly advanced by systematic, theory-led empirical analysis of these issues in 
a broad range of contexts. Meta-analyses of case studies, comparative and quantitative 
studies are only some options for carrying out such analyses and, thus, generating 
much-needed generalizable knowledge on participatory governance. This knowledge 
would eventually enable the research community to judge whether Ackerman is right in 
claiming that “opening up of the core activities of the state to societal participation is 
one of the most effective ways to improve accountability and governance” (2004, 
p. 448). 
With this thesis I make some progress towards this goal. To begin with, the thesis con-





In Paper 3 I detail the frequently used theoretical argument that participatory govern-
ance has a positive impact on local government performance because it helps to over-
come agency problems between a politician and the electorate. The detailed theoretical 
analysis of this argument shows that the positive effect of participatory governance 
needs to be evaluated in light of other accountability mechanisms, in particular competi-
tive elections. In Paper 4, I show how theories of law enforcement can be combined 
with the theory of distributive bargaining power and collective action theory for ex-
plaining differences in effective participatory governance. Thus, I incorporate several 
factors that have been proposed in former case studies as explanations for effective par-
ticipatory governance into one coherent theoretical explanation. In the empirical part of 
the thesis, I test the theoretical explanations in two transparent and systematic compara-
tive analyses of ten Guatemalan municipalities (Papers 3 and 4), and in a case study 
(Paper 5). The findings of these tests can now inform the design of surveys for quantita-
tive data collection and the specification of models for econometric analyses which will 
allow researchers to arrive at more general conclusions about the conditions for and the 
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Appendix 1: The Guatemalan Accountability Mechanisms 
The three accountability mechanisms that I examine in my thesis, i.e., participatory 
governance, local elections, and better access to information for the media, were formal-
ly strengthened following the signature of the Peace Agreement in 1996. With this 
agreement the Guatemalan government and the guerrilla forces ended a brutal civil war 
that lasted 36 years and cost more than two hundred thousand lives (Jonas 2000). In the 
Peace Agreement the government promised to increase the transparency of the public 
policy process, to decentralize the state and to allow for more citizen participation. The-
se measures were supposed to overcome Guatemala’s long history of oligarchic and 
authoritarian rule1 (Gobierno de Guatemala & Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guate-
malteca, 1996; Bland, 2002). 
To facilitate understanding of the following descriptions of the reforms, Table 1 illus-
trates the administrative organization of the Guatemalan state. Guatemala is a constitu-
tional democratic republic. Elections for the central and municipal government positions 
are held every four years on the same day. The municipality is the lowest administrative 
level of the state. The villages within a municipality are territorial, but not administra-
tive units. They have different names depending on their size which ranges from less 
than ten households (asentamiento) to 500 households (aldea). 
Table 1: Administrative structure of the Guatemalan state 
Level Executive Legislative Units 
Country President Directly elected for 4 years 
Congress 
Delegates elected for 4 years 
1 
Region Administrative level No legislative body 8 
Department Governor Named by the President for 5 years 
No legislative body 22 
Municipality Mayor Directly elected for 4 years 
Municipal Council 
Councilors elected for 4 years 
333 
Source: author‘s elaboration. 
  
                                                 
1 In the three decades of the civil war Guatemala was officially governed by a democratically elected 
government, but in practice the governments ruled in an authoritarian manner and their election was 





The System of Development Councils is the main channel for the participation of the 
Guatemalan population in the public policy process and the democratic planning of de-
velopment projects (Articles 1 and 4, Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002b). 
Thus, together with the decentralization process the development councils currently 
constitute the most important public service governance reform in Guatemala. Both re-
forms received a major impetus from the adoption of the trilogy of decentralization laws 
in 2002 which comprised the General Law on Decentralization, the Municipal Code, 
and the Urban and Rural Development Council Law (Congreso de la República de Gua-
temala, 2002a-c Eguren, 2008). 
The 2002 Development Council Law reformed the existing System of Development 
Councils substantially. According to this law, the System of Development Councils now 
comprises the Communal, Municipal, Departmental, Regional and National Develop-
ment Councils (Article 4, Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002b). The five 
levels of the system and the corresponding administrative levels of the Guatemalan state 
and its key government actors are illustrated by Figure 1. The Municipal Development 
Council (MDC) is the arena where civil society actors are directly involved in the pro-
cess of public service provision and interact with elected municipal governments. My 
thesis analyzes this level of the System of Development Councils because it seeks to 
explain how changes in local governance structures affect the accountability and re-
sponsiveness of local governments. 
 
Figure 1: The System of Development Councils and the administrative division of the state 




The MDC is a discussion forum for planning and evaluating municipal public service 
projects and programs. MDC decisions are not binding for the municipal government 
(Article 44, Presidencia de la República de Guatemala, 2002). The mayor is in charge of 
calling MDC meetings, coordinating these meetings and setting the agenda for the de-
bate (Article 11, ibid.). The meetings should take place once a month and include 
Communal Development Council2 (CDC) representatives, representatives of civil socie-
ty organizations, municipal government members, and representatives of central gov-
ernment agencies. 
In these meetings the members of the MDC are supposed to plan and evaluate public 
service programs and projects for building or repairing social infrastructure within the 
municipality. For the participatory planning in the MDC, the most important articles of 
the law are Articles 12 b) and 12e), which foresee that the municipal government takes 
the needs and priorities of its electorate into account: 
Article 12: The functions of the Municipal Development Councils are: (…) 
b) Promote and enable the organization and effective participation of the communities and their 
organizations in the prioritization of the needs, problems and their solutions, for the development 
of the municipality. (…) 
e) Grant that the municipal development politics, plans, programs and projects are formulated 
based on the needs, problems and their solutions as prioritized by the Communal Development 
Councils, and send them to the Municipal Government for its incorporation in the development 
politics, plans, programs and projects of the department. 
(Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002b; author’s translation) 
Once a year, the municipal government presents the outcome of the participatory plan-
ning in the form of a list of prioritized development projects to the Departmental Devel-
opment Council. The final decision over which projects are approved and how much 
money will be allocated to each municipality for implementing them is taken at the cen-
tral level by the delegates in congress (Mazariegos Rodas, 2003). The municipal gov-
ernments then receive the funds for the development projects that have been approved 
for their municipality and their planning office organizes and oversees the implementa-
tion of these projects. 
                                                 
2 Communal Development Council representatives are elected in the villages within a municipality. They 
are supposed to hold a community assembly every month to discuss and prioritize the needs of the com-




Besides involving citizens in the planning of municipal spending, the MDC is supposed 
to increase the accountability of the municipal government in various ways. The most 
important articles for this assignment are Articles 12f), 12g), and 12i): 
Article 12: The functions of the Municipal Development Councils are: (…) 
f) Follow up on the municipal and communal development politics, plans, programs and projects, 
verify their implementation and, when appropriate, propose corrective actions to the Municipal 
Government, to the Departmental Development Council or the responsible entities. 
g) Evaluate the execution of the municipal development politics, plans, programs and projects, and 
when appropriate, propose corrective actions to reach the foreseen objectives to the Municipal 
Government, to the Departmental Development Council.(…) 
i) Know and inform the Communal Development Councils about the spending of the part of the 
general national budget destined to public pre-investment and investment from the past fiscal year 
(Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002b; author’s translation) 
Article 12i) foresees that the mayor informs the CDCs about spending on public in-
vestments in the municipality. At the same time, Articles 12e) and 12f) assign the MDC 
the responsibility to monitor and evaluate the activities of the municipal government. 
These articles are complemented by Article 135 of the Municipal Code, which states 
that the mayor reports about the revenues and expenditures of the municipal government 
in the MDC every three months (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002a). 
In sum, the formal rules establish MDCs as participatory governance forums that inform 
the municipal government about citizen preferences and strengthen their accountability. 
Whether these rules are complied with and whether the MDCs make local governments 
more responsive to the needs of the rural poor is analyzed in Papers 3 and 5. 
Decentralization 
The municipal governments are the main actors in the Guatemalan decentralization pro-
cess. Municipalities have been autonomous entities since 1945, but until recently only 
few responsibilities and resources have been a transferred to them. Until today, the Gua-
temalan state is characterized as centralized and authoritarian (Barrientos, 2007). In 
2002, the Municipal Code was passed to promote the administrative decentralization 
process by shifting more responsibilities and decision-making powers to the municipal 
governments (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002a). Article 68 of this law 
assigns the municipal governments the responsibility to provide a large range of ser-
vices. Among these services are drinking water, sanitation, waste management, con-
struction and maintenance of roads, pre-school education, recreational spaces, and pub-




The main source of revenue of the municipalities is the so-called aporte constitucional, 
through which 10% of the national budget are transferred to the municipal governments. 
Their own revenues make up less than half of their budgets because they struggle with 
levying taxes and fees effectively (Jurado & López, 2007). 
As has been argued in the literature on decentralization, the transfer of responsibilities 
and resources needs to be accompanied by effective accountability mechanisms to 
achieve more efficient and responsive public service provision (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; 
Crook & Manor, 1998). The principal mechanism for holding municipal governments 
accountable is holding municipal elections. The mayor and the municipal council are 
elected according to a simple plurality system with no term limits since 1985. Every 
four years numerous political parties and civic committees compete for votes. Whether 
this mechanism is effective in holding local governments accountable is examined in 
Paper 3. 
Access to Information and Press Freedom 
The Guatemalan Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech, press freedom and free 
access to official documents (Articles 30 and 35, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 
1985). At the local level, the Municipal Code mandates that the municipal government 
provides ample information to its electorate: Article 17 foresees that the municipal gov-
ernment informs the public about its plans and the results of its activities. Article 132 
demands that the municipal government explains the criteria that have led to the inclu-
sion or exclusion of the projects that have been proposed by the representatives of the 
communities. Besides, municipal governments are required by Article 139 to provide 
copies of official documents to citizens and journalists who seek such information e.g., 
for carrying out a social audit (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 2002a). 
These and other provisions the legal framework on public information and media were 
ignored or reinterpreted by public officials in many instances. This observation motivat-
ed several civil society organizations and delegates to propose a new Right to Infor-
mation Act to increase the transparency of government activities. In September 2008 the 
battle in Congress about the content of this law was finally settled and the Right to In-





It grants every Guatemalan citizen the right to information that is in the hand of the pub-
lic administration (Art. 1, ibid.). It also specifies deadlines for the delivery of the solicit-
ed information and sanctions for non-compliance with these deadlines. 
Overall, the legal framework thus supports free and independent reporting by the media 
and has recently strengthened access to information for citizens and journalists. Whether 
this is sufficient for granting citizens access to local media coverage about local gov-






Appendix 2: Historical and Political Context of Participatory Governance in 
Guatemala 
There are a few international studies and some studies from Guatemalan scholars on the 
history of the Development Council Law and the historical, social, and political context 
for implementing it. This literature provides important background information on the 
conditions for implementing participatory governance in Guatemala. Therefore, I will 
summarize its key insights here. 
To begin with, the “civil society condition” is unlikely to be met in large parts of Gua-
temala because a capable and well-organized civil society has been found to be widely 
absent. Quantitative cross-country studies find that the overall level of civil society par-
ticipation in Guatemala is lower than in its neighboring countries (Barrientos, 2007; 
Booth, 2000). Moreover, case-studies from Guatemala consistently report about low 
levels of participation and social capital (Abom, 2004; Grant, 2001). Finally, several 
donor reports agree that “[a]ssociational initiatives and civil engagement in participa-
tory spaces opened up by a protracted and uncertain process of democratization is far 
from being vibrant and capable of effectively influencing power relations” (Gish, Navar-
ro, & Pearce, 2005, p. 19). 
Against the background of Guatemala’s history this finding is hardly surprising: as his-
torical accounts and case studies report citizens are still intimidated by the long civil 
war and the repression by authoritarian regimes and many have given up hope in the 
face of repeated experiences with corrupt politicians and an ineffective judicial system 
(Borrell, 2002; Jonas, 2000; Kaur, 2003; Sieder, 1999). 
Historical accounts show that for the last decades an alliance between economic elites 
and the military at the top of the state has systematically prevented citizen participation 
in the public policy process, because such behavior was regarded as subversive (Nick-
son, 1995). Also, the civil war had split many communities into those who supported the 
military government and those who supported the guerrilla forces. In many instances 
civilians were forced to participate in killings and in case they rejected the command 
they were labeled guerrillas themselves (Durston, 1998; Kaur, 2003). Thus, community 
ties which have a long tradition in indigenous communities have been weakened and 




Besides the legacy of the war, a so-called ‘culture of dependency’ affects social organi-
zation in Guatemala. As case studies show, the historically top-down, authoritarian po-
litical system has often supplanted horizontal ties with vertical networks of clientelism 
(Abom, 2004; Grant, 2001). As a result, many Guatemalans tend to expect help from the 
government or a donor agency and do not take on the responsibility for their own fate.  
Finally, repeated experiences with corrupt political leaders who continue to satisfy the 
needs of the elite instead of those of the poor majority have left a part of the population 
without hope for change (Barrientos, 2007). In Guatemala, “[p]ost-colonial social and 
political practices have shaped historically how politics are done for the benefit of the 
few and the disgrace of the many” (Eguren, 2008, p. 325).  
In spite of the fact that all forms of civic organization and community orientation have 
been severely affected by the long internal conflict and corrupt political practices, civil 
society activity has varied within Guatemala before, during and after the civil war.3 This 
diversity could be caused by differences in social, cultural or economic factors, such as 
the level of education or poverty (Abom, 2004; Wiebe, 2000). 
The literature also indicates that the “political economy condition” is likely to be diffi-
cult to meet in Guatemala. Several Guatemalan scholars state that many mayors are re-
luctant to establish the MDC, which explains according to them why the MDCs are not 
implemented effectively in many municipalities. The mayors, they argue, replicate the 
vertical structure and the authoritarian mode of decision-making of the central govern-
ment. Moreover, they argue that many mayors perceive the MDC as a forum for the 
opposition to voice criticism and an illegitimate restriction of the decision-making pow-
er they have been granted through elections (Barrientos, 2007; Puente Alcaraz & Lina-
res López, 2004; Velásquez & Tavico, 2003; Velásquez, 2002). 
  
                                                 
3 For example, “[t]here is a widespread perception in Guatemala that the Mayan corporate communities 
in the western highlands are more ‘civic’, more organized and more oriented toward collective decision-
making and action, while the eastern lowlands are described as being ‘individualistic’ with little partici-
pation in community organizations and much resistance to the idea of collective action” (Durston, 1998, 




Another reason why the “political economy condition” is unlikely to be fulfilled in Gua-
temala is that two key incentives for them to implement the MDCs are absent: first, 
Guatemalan mayors are unlikely to be motivated by their party affiliation and their elec-
toral base to implement the MDCs well. The presidential electoral system and the ab-
sence of ideology-based political parties imply that mayors cannot reap large political 
benefit from promoting participatory governance (Miños Chavez, 2001; Prensa Libre, 
2011). Second, in the history of the Development Council Law there has never been a 
strong commitment from the central government to support participatory planning at the 
local level. 
The second point is illustrated by a brief overview of the history of participatory gov-
ernance in Guatemala. The current System of Development Councils has its roots in the 
1970s when the military regimes relied on “inter-institutional coordinators” in rural are-
as to reduce support of the guerrilla forces in the population. The inter-institutional co-
ordinators organized the exchange of information, resources and infrastructure works 
between mayors, public sector officials and the population to control these actors politi-
cally (Borrell, 2002; Velásquez, 2002). The idea of involving citizens in the planning of 
public works projects survived was reinforced in the 1980s and incorporated into the 
constitution in 1985. In 1987 the first law on regionalization and development councils 
was passed and the inter-institutional coordinators were replaced by provincial, depart-
mental and municipal development councils. In the early 1990s however the develop-
ment councils were highly contested and the municipal development councils were 
banned by the Supreme Court, because several parties argued that they violate the au-
tonomy of the municipal governments (Amaro, 1990).4  
In the following years no important decisions were taken and hardly any funds were 
channeled through the System of Development Councils (Nickson, 1995; Fundación 
Centroamericana de Desarrollo (FUNCEDE), 2002).  
  
                                                 
4 At that time municipal autonomy was mainly understood as the autonomy of the municipal government 




Then, in the negotiations of the Peace Agreement, the military backed government was 
put under pressure by the guerrilla and international organizations to strengthen the Sys-
tem of Development Councils. Particularly, they insisted on activating the local devel-
opment councils to enable the formerly excluded rural and indigenous population to 
participate in the public policy process (López, 2002). After the agreement it took the 
government another six years to pass the reform of the Development Council Law. 
As to the current administration, an official note by the Ministry of Finance in which it 
states that 85 municipalities had not established a MDC did not mention any measures 
that the central government was going to take to change this state of affairs. It merely 
announced that in those municipalities where a MDC does not exist, decisions about 
project allocation would be taken by the Departmental Development Council (Minis-
terio de Finanzas Públicas, 2008). A second, more indirect indicator for the low com-
mitment of the current administration to enforce the System of Development Councils is 
the diversification of public investments and the bypassing of the development council 
planning processes. The central government under President Alvaro Colom continues to 
create and support all kinds of parallel public spending schemes including campaigns 
during which the president hands out financing promises to the population directly. As a 
result, only 11% of the national budget for public investments was channeled through 
the System of Development Councils in 2008 (Congreso de la República de Guatemala, 
2007). The remaining 89% of the budget for public investments are spent by a large 
number of national programs, social funds, national councils and ministries (Velásquez, 
2002). 
All in all, the literature suggests that the context for implementing participatory govern-
ance forums at the local level in Guatemala is challenging: local civil society actors and 
local governments are likely to be unable or unwilling to play their part in the MDCs in 
many municipalities. In this context it is very important to examine first, whether effec-
tive participatory governance yields tangible benefits for the Guatemalan population, 
e.g., in the form of more responsive local public service provision. This question is tack-
led in Paper 3 and 5. As it is answered affirmatively, Paper 4 explores how participatory 




Appendix 3: Case Selection and Characteristics of the Selected Cases  
Details of the Case Selection 
The idea behind Mill’s (1967 [1843]) method of difference is that an analyst can identi-
fy the factors that cause the differences in outcomes by eliminating the factors that the 
cases share, i.e., by discovering in which factors cases differ in spite of their similarity 
(Blatter, Janning, & Wagemann, 2007; Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 
2009).  
A selection of cases according to the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) has to ful-
fill three main criteria: 
1) The cases must be selected from a sufficiently homogeneous population, i.e., 
basic characteristics need to be shared by all cases. This guarantees that similar 
cases are compared. 
2) The selected cases must display positive and negative outcomes, i.e., cases with 
well performing and badly performing local governments need to be included in 
the analysis. 
3) The selection should include “most likely” and “least likely” cases, i.e., cases 
that are very likely and cases that are very unlikely to display the outcome ac-
cording to their configuration of causal conditions (Blatter, Janning, & Wage-
mann, 2007). 
The selection of the ten cases has been carried out based on these criteria. The universe 
of municipalities consists of the 333 Guatemalan municipalities. Since one of the main 
goals of my thesis is to identify the causal conditions for local government responsive-
ness towards the mainly poor rural population the main criterion that was used for con-
stituting the population of municipalities under study was that more than 70% of its 
population lived in rural areas. Applying this criterion reduced the number of Guatema-
lan municipalities from which to select cases from 333 to 155 (Step 1).  
For including cases with positive and negative outcomes, the main challenge was the 
lack of data on the outcomes of interest. The best indicator for local government respon-
siveness that could be identified by the research team is the share of municipal expenses 
that was dedicated to investment in social services in 2006 (United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) & Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales 




For a publication on municipal spending the team from USAID and ICEFI cleaned and 
reclassified the official budget data for all municipalities. For this reason, they are the 
most reliable data on municipal spending that are available for Guatemala to date. The 
share of spending on social services is likely to reflect the effort of the municipality to 
provide social services to the rural poor. Therefore, this indicator was used to divide the 
155 rural municipalities into three strata. Then, we randomly sampled 15 municipalities 
from each of the three strata. Thus, we made sure that municipalities with higher and 
lower spending on social services are included in the selection (Step 2).5 
To ensure sufficient homogeneity across the cases for the qualitative study, cases that 
differed strongly from the others in terms of the capacity of an administration to deliver 
services to its population and the difficulty of this task were then eliminated from the 
pool of randomly sampled municipalities. Both conditions are likely to influence how 
well a government can satisfy the preferences of its electorate and thus as how respon-
sive the population perceives it. Hence, ten municipalities with municipal budgets per 
head and numbers of villages outside the range of +/-1 standard deviation of the 45 mu-
nicipalities were excluded (Step 3) (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2010; Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE), 2002). 
Next, cases that are likely and cases that are unlikely to display the outcome were se-
lected from the remaining 35 municipalities. For this step I drew on data from the 2002 
Census of the National Statistics Institute (INE, 2002).6 The following conditions were 
used for judging whether a case is most or least likely to display the outcome: popula-
tion density (inhabitants/km2), level of education (illiteracy rate), level of income (% of 
the population below the national poverty line), economic inequality (Theil index of 
income inequality), and ethnic heterogeneity (ethnic fractionalization index) (Step 4).  
                                                 
5 A difficulty with the stratification indicator is that the 2006 budgets were passed by the municipal ad-
ministrations that were in power between 2003 and 2007. Hence, they do not reflect the responsiveness of 
the current municipal governments. This may imply that the desired variation in outcomes is in fact lower 
in the selection than the 2006 data imply. To check whether this problem occurred, we compared the share 
of municipal spending on social services in 2006 and 2008 for the ten municipalities we selected in the 
end. This comparison showed that there is also sufficient variation in spending on social services in 2008 
in the selection of cases. 
6 The 2002 are drawn upon because they are the latest data that are available at this level of disaggrega-





Municipalities with favorable values of these conditions were classified as “most likely” 
and municipalities with unfavorable values as “least likely”. In this step, eight cases 
were eliminated from the selection because they fell in neither of these two categories. 
Finally, the last step of the selection procedure consisted in choosing ten cases from the 
remaining 27 municipalities, such that at least five municipalities where the majority of 
the population is indigenous and that the selection reflects Guatemala’s main geographic 
regions, ethnicities, languages and socio-economic zones (Step 5). The final selection of 
cases thus reflects Guatemala’s ethnic composition7 and its geographical and cultural 
diversity. Table 2 sums up the five steps of the case selection. 
Table 2: Summary of the case selection method 
Summary of the case selection method 
Step Criterion Output 
  333 Guatemalan municipalities 
Step 1: Selection of  
rural municipalities 
 >70% of the population lived in 
rural areas in 2002 
155 rural municipalities 
Step 2: Stratified  
random sampling based 
on outcome proxy 
 Share of municipal budget that is 
allocated to investment in social 
services in 2006 
45 municipalities with different 
outcomes (15 in each stratum) 
 random sampling of 200 vil-
lages for IFPRI survey 
Step 3: Homogenizing 
population of cases 
 Within +/- 1 standard deviation of 
the 45 cases regarding 
 Municipal budget/head 
 No of villages 
35 sufficiently homogenous 
municipalities with different 
outcomes 
Step 4: Diversify selec-
tion according to con-
text conditions 
 High population density/low illiter-
acy, poverty, income inequality and 
ethnic heterogeneity 
 Low population density/high illit-
eracy poverty, income inequality 
and ethnic heterogeneity 
27 most or least likely cases 
Step 5: Ensure that 
selection reflects ethnic 
and geographic compo-
sition of Guatemala 
 Include indigenous / non-
indigenous municipalities 
 Include municipalities from all 
regions of the country 
10 selected municipalities 
Source: author’s elaboration 
  
                                                 





The ten selected municipalities have been renamed in all papers and the appendix to 
ensure that no interview partner faces any negative consequences from sharing sensitive 
information in an interview. For this reason, all information that identifies the munici-
palities or interview partners, e.g., the map of the location of the municipalities or the 





Characteristics of the Selected Cases 
Table 3: Raw data of the characteristics of the selected municipalities 
















Share of  
the Population 
















Bequita 72,70% 114,54 30,95% 80,44% 21,37 0,01 0,68% Southeast 
La Selva 64,60% 342,54 40,82% 76,87% 38,3 0,33 79,35% North 
Mayan 43,60% 290,26 27,61% 70,19% 19,07 0,15 92,25% Central 
Buenas Hermanas 36,80% 161,48 42,68% 82,89% 16,11 0,24 88,17% Southwest 
Victoria 31,00% 202,12 52,83% 88,58% 16,64 0,06 96,87% Northwest 
Aurora 27,00% 225,47 28,15% 77,44% 25,05 0,03 98,50% Southwest 
Villa Beni 24,70% 3,89 34,21% 79,96% 14,62 0,22 15,14% Petén 
Mar Azúl 20,70% 234,02 29,45% 48,15% 16,06 0,02 1,31% Southwest 
La Villa 20,40% 81,00 28,85% 59,15% 14,02 0,09 5,72% Central 




Table 4: Classification of the selected cases 
The basis for assigning the cases to a stratum of social spending is the totality of the 155 rural municipalities. The basis for classifying the cases to a stratum of the context condi-














Bequita 1st tercile 3rd quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 3rd quartile 1st quartile Most likely No Southeast 
La Selva 1st tercile 1st quartile 3rd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 4th quartile Least likely Yes North 
Mayan 1st tercile 1st quartile 1st quartile 2nd quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile Most likely Yes Central 
Buenas Hermanas 2nd tercile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 4th quartile 2nd quartile 4th quartile Least likely Yes Southwest 
Victoria 2nd tercile 2nd quartile 4th quartile 4th quartile 2nd quartile 2nd quartile Least likely Yes Northwest 
Aurora 2nd tercile 2nd quartile 1st quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 2nd quartile Least likely Yes Southwest 
Villa Beni 3rd tercile 4th quartile 3rd quartile 3rd quartile 1st quartile 3rd quartile Least likely Partly Petén 
Mar Azúl 3rd tercile 2nd quartile 2nd quartile 1st quartile 2nd quartile 1st quartile Most likely No Southwest 
La Villa 3rd tercile 4th quartile 2nd quartile 1st quartile 1st quartile 3rd quartile Most likely No Central 




Appendix 4: Interview Guideline 
 
 
Interview Guideline for Data Collection on Participatory Governance of Rural 




















Contact person:  
Johanna Speer 
Humboldt University Berlin 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences 












Department: _________________ Interviewer(s): ________________________ 
Municipality: _________________ Name of the Mayor: ____________________ 
Location: ____________________ Date: ________________________________ 
Start of the interview: __________ End of the interview: ___________________ 
 
Introductory Statement 
Thank you very much for taking the time for this interview! We appreciate it a lot. First, 
let me introduce us. My colleague is…..and I am Johanna Speer, a researcher from 
Humboldt University Berlin, Germany. We work with the Instituto de Investigaciones 
Económicas y Sociales (IDIES) at the Universidad Rafael Landívar in Guatemala City 
and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington. We are not 
affiliated with any institution of the Guatemalan government. 
The research project we are engaged with seeks to find out how the planning of social 
infrastructure (drinking water, sanitation, roads, etc.) works at the local level in Guate-
mala. We are interested in the strengths and weaknesses of the system that is currently 
in place. The project has the aim to point out ways to improve the process of develop-
ment planning. 
We carry out interviews with mayors and representatives of the civil society in 10 mu-
nicipalities. Our project partners administer a survey in 200 Guatemalan villages, some 
of which are located in your municipality. 
The information that you give us in this interview will be handled confidentially and 
will be used for scientific purpose only. It will be summarized in scientific articles. The 
data will be published anonymously, i.e., it will be impossible to know from which mu-
nicipality in Guatemala they were collected. If you are interested in the results of the 
analysis, we would be happy to send them to you. 
In the following we will ask open questions on some topics of interest for our research. 
Please feel free to skip a question if you do not want to talk about a topic. We have as 
much time as your schedule allows for the interview.   




Table 5: Interview Guideline 
Bridging Card 
Could you please name the most important activities that your administration carried out in 
the municipality since you came into office in 2007? 
Pri-
ority 
Module Entry question 
2 1. Mayor What is your opinion on the Municipal Development Coun-
cil? 
8 2a. Civil Society Who are the most important civil society actors in this mu-
nicipality? 
7 2b. Community Rep-
resentatives 
How would you describe your relationship with the CDC 
presidents? 
1 3. Central Govern-
ment 
Who do you consider as the most supportive central gov-
ernment actors for your administration? 
9 4. Social and Eco-
nomic Conditions 
How well are the CDC organized? 
5 5. Information Flows As a citizen of your municipality how could I get infor-
mation on the activities and decisions of the municipal cor-
poration? 
6 6. Elections What do you think was the main reason that you won the 
election in 2007? 
3 7. Municipal Devel-
opment Council 
How does the Municipal Development Council in this mu-
nicipality work? 
4 8. Allocation of Pub-
lic Funds 
Which institution do you think has most influence on how 




0.1 Could you please name the most important activities that your administration carried out 
in the municipality since you came into office in 2007? 









0.2 What were the main projects that 
your administration has implemented? 
0.3 What are the main priorities for 
your administration? 
- Is there anything else? 
- What do you mean when you 
are saying….? 
- And then?-  
- What else? 





Module 1: Mayor 
1.1 What is your opinion on the Municipal Development Council? 




Costs and benefits of 



















1.3 What do you see as the ad-
vantages of having an active 
MDC for a municipal govern-
ment? 
1.4 What do you think are the 
disadvantages? 
 
1.6 In the early 90s local DCs 
were declared unconstitutional 
since they were said to unduly 
restrict municipal autonomy-what 
is your opinion on this decision? 
 
1.8 Who do you think should 
make the laws that rule how mu-
nicipal governments are run, how 
investment decisions are made, 
how account is given, etc?  
1.2 Why did you (not) set up the 
MDC in your municipality? 
 
1.5 By how far do you think the 





1.7 How freely do you think can 
a Mayor decide whether he sets 




1.9 What do you think of na-
tional legislation on the man-
agement of municipal govern-
ments? 
Module 2a: Civil Society 
2a.1 Who are the most important civil society actors in this municipality? 






Cost-benefit ratio of partici-





Public demand from civil 
society actors to hold MDC 
meetings 
Civil society actors meet 
with the mayor to convince 
him to hold the MDC 
 
 
2a.3 How well are these groups 
organized? 
 
2a.4 Does your organization par-
ticipate in MDC meetings? 
2a.6 Do you know of any organi-
zation that would be interested in 
participating in the MDC but is 
not invited? 
2a.7 Do you know of any civil 
society actors that have demanded 
from the Mayor in any way to 
establish the MDC or to call it 
more often? 
2a.2 Are there any cam-
pesino, indigenous, 
women’s, workers, SME 
organizations? 
 
2a.5 If yes: why? 





2a.8 If yes: Who? How? 







Module 2b: Community Representatives 
2b.1 How would you describe your relationship with the CDC presidents? 
Indicator Follow-up questions Specifying ques-
tions 
Cost-benefit ratio of partic-
ipation for civil society 
 
 
Public demand from civil 
society actors to hold MDC 
meetings 
2b.2 What do you think are the ad-
vantages of participating in the MDC 
for the CDCs? 
2b.3 What are the disadvantages? 
2b.4 Have any CDC members ever 
demanded from you to establish the 





2b.5 Who? How? 
How often? When? 
Module 3: Central Government 
3.1 Who do you consider as the most supportive central government actors for your admin-
istration? 
Indicator Follow-up questions Specifying questions 
Public demand from 
the delegate of the 
district or the gover-






Decrease of central 
government trans-
fers in response to 
failure to set up 
MDC. 
3.2 Can you think of any central 
government actor who interfered in 
any way with the decisions of your 
administration since you came into 
office? 
 
3.4 What is the role of the delegate 
and the governor in your municipal-
ity?  
3.5 How have central government 
transfers to the municipality devel-
oped since you came into office?-  









3.6 Has the central government 
changed its transfers to the 
municipality from 2008 to 
2009? 






Module 4: Social and Economic Conditions 
4.1 How well are the CDCs organized? 




































Proportion of the 
population that is 
not poor  






4.4 What do you see as the main dif-
ficulties in organizing the CDCs? 
 
4.5 How does the collaboration with 




4.6 How does collaboration with 
CDC presidents from poorer and 
richer villages work? 
 
4.7 What role do different mother 
tongues play in organizing the CDC 
presidents? 
 
4.9 Do language differences affect the 
relationship between the municipality 
and the CDCs? 
 
 
4.11 “Illiteracy hinders participation”- 
what do you think about this state-
ment? 
4.13 What level of school education 
do you think one needs to have to be 
able to participate actively in the dis-
cussion in the MDC? 
 
4.14 Can you think of any financial 
constraints to the CDC president’s 
ability to participate/represent their 
village at the municipal level?  
4.3 If yes: what purpose do 
these meetings have? 
Where do they meet? 
How often have they met in 














4.8 Do CDC presidents have 
any difficulties in communi-
cating with each other? 
 
4.10 How does the municipal 
corporation communicate with 
CDC presidents that do not 
speak Spanish? 
 








4.15 Can they afford the trips 






Module 5: Information Flows 
5.1 As a citizen of your municipality how could I get information on the activities and deci-
sions of the municipal corporation? 


















5.2 How does the municipal corporation in-
form the population about its activities, spend-
ing decisions and plans for investment in so-
cial infrastructure next year? 
 
5.3 How much do local media report on the 
activities and plans of your administration? 
 
5.5 What role do NGOs/donors play in dis-
tributing information about your administra-




5.9 How does the municipality implement the 
new Right to Information Act? 
5.11 To which documents do citizens have 






5.4 Which media re-
port most? 
 
5.6. Who distributes 
information? 
5.7. In what form? 
5.8 How often in the 
last 12 months? 
 
5.10 What (physical) 
changes were made? 
 
Module 6: Elections 
6.1 What do you think was the main reason that you won the election in 2007? 
Indicator Follow-up questions Specifying questions 







Number of candidates 
for mayor 
6.2 How many times have you 
been elected as a mayor? 
 
6.3 Which group of voter was par-
ticularly important for your elec-
tion? 
 















Module 7: Municipal Development Council 
7.1 How does the Municipal Development Council in this municipality work? 
Indicator Follow-up questions Specifying questions 







Compilation of annual 
list of projects ( Mod-
ule 8) 
 






Provision of information 
from CDCs to Municipal 
Corporation  
 
Provision of information 
from Municipal Corpora-













Acceptance of the 
judgement / implementa-
tion of corrective actions  
7.2 How many times did the 
MDC meet last 12 months? 
 
7.3 Which actors usually par-
ticipate in these meetings? 
 
 
7.5 Which documents summa-
rize the results of the discus-
sions that have taken place in 







7.10 How much information 
about their priorities do you 
get from the CDC presidents 
in the MDC meetings? 
7.12 What information about 
the activities of the municipal 
corporation is given to the 
members of the MDC?  
 
7.15 Did the MDC review any 
of the activities/finances of the 
municipal corporation in the 
last 12 months? 
 
7.17 What can members of the 
MDC do if they do not agree 
with the actions of the munic-
ipal corporation? 
 
7.18 Has the MDC ever criti-
cized the municipal corpora-
tion?  
7.20 What was the reaction of 
the municipal corporation 




7.4 Are there any actors that 
have been invited but do not 
attend the meetings? 
 
7.6 Has an annual list of devel-
opment projects been compiled 
in 2009? 
7.7 If yes, when was it com-
piled? 
7.8 Does this municipality have 
a MDP? 
7.9 How and when was it elabo-
rated? 
 
7.11 From how many villages 
have you received a written list 
of priorities in the last 12 
months? 
 
7.13 In what form?  
7.14 How often? 
 
 
















Module 8: Allocation of Public Funds 
8.1 Which institution do you think has most influence on how public funds are allocated to 
the villages in your municipality? 
























8.2 How were the development projects 
that you proposed to the Departmental 
Development Council prioritized? 
 
 
8.6 Has there been a conflict about the 





8.8 Were any changes made to the MDC 
list before you presented it to the De-
partmental Development Council? 
 
8.10 What role did the list of MDC prior-
ities in 2008 play for the allocation of 
municipal funds for investment in the 
budget 2009? 
 
8.12 In how far have projects that were 
approved by Congress for funding in 
2009 been implemented? 
8.3 Which actors were 
involved? 
8.4 Whose opinion had 
most weight in these dis-
cussions?  
8.5 How many of the 
villages could put a pro-
ject on the list? 
8.7 If yes, how was it 
solved? 
 
8.9 What changes did 
you/ the Municipal Coun-
cil make? 
 
8.11 Were any of the pro-
jects from the list incor-
porated into the municipal 
investment plan? 
 
8.13 What % of the pro-
jects has been realized so 
far (maybe ask OMP) 
Concluding Question 
If you could make a new national law, how would you reform the system of development 
councils? 
Personal Information: 
How long have you been living in this municipality? _____________________________ 
How long have you been mayor? / In which periods? _____________________________ 
To which ethnic group do you belong? ________________________________________ 
Which languages do you speak? ______________________________________________ 
How many years did you go to school? ________________________________________ 
What profession did you exercise before you became mayor? ______________________ 
 
That’s it from my side: do you want to add anything that has not been mentioned be-
fore? 
Interview Review 
How was the interview for you? 
What made you participate in this interview? 
 
- Many thanks for participating in this interview! 
- Ask whether he/she is interested in the results of the research. If YES ask for contact details 
- Ask for permission to get secondary data at the municipal offices (list of development projects, 




Appendix 5: Codes for Qualitative Content Analysis 
Code name Code Description Measure 
Mayor_Competit
ors 
Number of candidates for mayor Difficulty for each candidate to win 
enough votes / elite capture 
Mayor_Power Winning party margin / majority in 
municipal council / proportion of seats 
in municipal council 
Degree of competition in election / 




Share of rural voters Importance of winning over rural vot-
ers for the mayor 
Mayor_Turnover Turnover of mayors Degree of competition in election / 
elite capture 
Role_Parties Importance of party ideology for voting 
decision 
Importance of partisan policies / party 
affiliation of politicians  
CG_Enforcepol Public pressure from the delegate of 
the district or the governor to hold 
MDC meetings 
Central government encouragement 
and discouragement of participatory 
governance 
CG_Enforcefin Change in discretionary central gov-
ernment transfers to municipalities 
Financial rewards and sanctions for 
establishing an MDC 
CS_Enforcepol Public pressure from civil society ac-
tors to hold MDC meetings 
Social enforcement of the MDC proce-
dures by civil society actors 
VR_Enforcepol Public pressure from community lead-
ers to hold MDC meetings 
Social enforcement of the MDC proce-
dures by village representatives 
CS_Inforules Knowledge of citizens about their 
rights and duties in the MDC 
Actors knowledge of the formal rules 
of participatory governance 
NGO_Capacityb
uild 
Intensity of NGO capacity building on 
system of development councils 
Knowledge of rules among CDCs; 
technical and organizational support 
VR_Orga Share of villages that have a CDC and 
degree of cooperation between them 
Intensity of village level/community 
organization 
CS_Orga Number of CSOs, areas of work, de-
gree of activity 
Depth and breadth of civil society 
organization 
CS_CBpart Cost-benefit ratio of participation for 
civil society 
Interest of civil society to participate in 
the MDC 
VR_CBpart Cost-benefit ratio of participation for 
CDCs 
Interest of CDCs to participate in the 
MDC 
Media_Coverage Amount of coverage of local politics in 
local media 
Availability of news about government 
performance 
Media_Use Circulation (newspapers, radio, TV) Likelihood that a voter has access to 
the information contained in the media 
EIP_Outcome Voter knowledge about parties and 
candidates 
Success of the information provision 
mechanism in a municipality 
Politicians_Visit Direct information provision about 
aims and ideas by politicians 




Knowledge of citizens about the Right 
to Information Act 
Citizen knowledge of their formal 
rights to information 
LAIP_Access Availability of documents on plans, 
revenues, expenses at municipality 
Accessibility of official documents. 
LAIP_Use Use of the Public information unit by 
citizens 
Demand from citizens for obtaining 
access to information 
NGO_Info NGO/donor information campaigns Functioning of other information 





Independence of local media from 
influence of local government 





Code name Code Description Measure 
 
MDC_Frequency Frequency of MDC meetings in the last 
12 months 
Physical establishment of the MDC 
MDC_Inclusiveg
roups 
Exclusion / inclusion of interested civil 
society groupings 
Inclusiveness of the MDC 
MDC_Inclusivev
illages 
Exclusion / inclusion of representatives 
from all villages 
Inclusiveness of the MDC 
MDC_Activitygr
oups 
Active participation of disadvantaged 
groups in MDC meetings 
Inclusiveness of the MDC 
MDC_List Participation of MDC in elaboration of 
annual list of DC projects 
Participatory prioritization of needs; 
planning function of the MDC 
MDC_Partbudge
t 
Participation of MDC in elaboration of 
municipal budget 
Participatory prioritization of needs; 
planning function of the MDC 
MDC_Developm
entPlan 
Existence of a Municipal Development 
Plan elaborated with MDC 
Participatory prioritization of long-term 
needs; planning function of the MDC 
MDC_Commissi
ons 
Functioning of the commissions of the 
MDC 
Organization within the MDC; physical 
establishment of the MDC 
MDC_Topics Treatment of development issues in 
MDC 
Breadth of MDC debates 
MDC_Downwar
dinfo 
Provision of information from Munici-
pal Corporation to MDC about alloca-
tion of funds 
Downward information flow 
MDC_Upwardin
fo 
Provision of information from CDCs to 
Municipal Corporation about needs and 
priorities 
Upward information flow 
MDC_Disapprov
al 
Disapproval of MDC members in case 
that development plans and projects are 
not properly implemented  
Application of sanctions 
MDC_Demandc
orractions 
Demand for corrective actions by MDC 
members in case that development 
plans and projects are not properly 
implemented 
Application of sanctions 
MDC_Acceptsan
ctions 
Acceptance of the judgment / imple-
mentation of corrective actions by the 
Municipal Corporation 
Justification and acceptance of sanc-
tions 
MDC_Power Integrity of the MDC list; whether the 
mayor changes the MDC list 
Mayor's respect for the preferences of 
the population 
Role_PopDen Population density Distances that people have to travel to 
talk to each other personally and to 
coordinate collective action 
Role_Education Relevance of formal education for 
participation in the MDC 
Type of skills that are necessary for 
participation in the MDC 
Role_Poverty Influence of poverty on the ability to 
participate 
Role of resource constraints for partici-
pation 
Role_Inequality Relevance of economic inequality for 
collaboration between villages  
Mechanism behind the relationship 
between government responsiveness 
and inequality 
Role_Ethnicfrag Relevance of ethnic divisions for col-
laboration between villages in the 
MDC 
Mechanism behind the relationship 
between government responsiveness 
and ethnic fractionalization 
Role_Languagef
rag 
Relevance of language divisions for 
collaboration between villages in the 
MDC and for communication between 
the municipal government and CDCs 
Mechanism behind the relationship 
between government responsiveness 
and language fractionalization; exclu-






Code name Code Description Measure 
Mayor_CBMDC Costs-benefit ratio of holding the MDC 
for the mayor 
 
Interest of the mayor in MDC 
Mayor_Perceptla
w 
Mayor’s perception of the justness of 
the law that mandates him to set up and 
run the MDC 
Internal punishment of the mayor when 
he breaks the law 
Mayor_RelCG Mayor’s general attitude about the 
legitimacy of national legislation 
Internal punishment of the mayor when 
he breaks the law 
MDC_Distributi
onprojects 
Equality of distribution of projects 
across villages 
Likelihood that the mayor responds 
equally to the needs of all villages  
VR_Preferences Preferences of the village members on 
how municipal funds should be spent 
Voter preferences on allocation of mu-
nicipal spending 
VR_Commrel Relationship CDC-community Representation of community prefer-
ences in MDC / Existence of parallel 
authorities, such as Alcaldes Auxiliares 
Mayor_Perform
ance 
Satisfaction with local government 
actions and development projects 
Citizen satisfaction with municipal 
government performance 
Gender Differences between women and men 
in influence and political activity 
Discrimination of women in political 
life 
History DCL Information on the history and context 
of the creation of the law in 2002 
Guatemalan context for implementing 
participatory governance 
Data Issues Code for additional data sources for the 
study 






Appendix 6: Glossary of FsQCA Terms 
Term Explanation 
Anchor points The three thresholds that structure a fuzzy set: 1 (threshold for full member-
ship), 0.5 (cross-over point), and 0 (threshold for non-membership). 
Boolean algebra Algebra for calculating relationships between sets that take on only the values 0 
and 1.  
Complex solution The result of the application of a truth table algorithm that does not use any 
counterfactuals for minimizing the truth table. 
Condition The explanans or independent variable. 
Consistency The degree to which the cases that share a condition or a combination of condi-
tions agree in their outcome. A measure of the accuracy of the subset relation of 
necessity or sufficiency in the solution formula. 
Coverage The degree to which a cause or a combination of causes in the solution formula 
covers instances of the outcome. A measure of the empirical relevance of the 
solution formula. 
Fuzzy logic A superset of Boolean algebra, i.e., a form of multi-valued logic that can also 
calculate sets with values between 0 and 1. Fuzzy logic is derived from fuzz-set 
theory. 
Fuzzy-set scale The precision of a fuzzy-set, i.e., the number of values it is defined to take on. 
The crudest scale has only two values (crisp set); the most detailed scale has an 
infinite number of values (continuous set). 




The result of the application of a truth table algorithm that uses only so-called 
easy counterfactuals that are theoretically justified for minimizing the truth 
table. 
Limited diversity The existence of empty rows in the truth table, i.e., a situation where we do not 
observe all logically possible combinations of conditions in our empirical cases. 
Logical operator Algebraic symbols that indicate how the elements of a solution formula are 




A pattern of causation in which several combinations of conditions can generate 
the outcome (equifinality), a combination of conditions can lead to the outcome 
(non-additivity), and the presence and absence of a condition can lead to an 
outcome in different contexts (non-uniformity). 
Necessity A cause is necessary if it is always present when the outcome occurs. When a 
cause is necessary the outcome is a subset of the cause. 
Outcome The explanandum or dependent variable. 
Parsimonious 
solution 
The result of the application of a truth table algorithm that uses any counterfac-
tual that simplifies the solution for minimizing the truth table. 
Qualitative  
classification 
The verbal statement that summarizes the qualitative evidence on a case and 
thus indicates the expression of a qualitative measure for a case. The quantita-
tive equivalent of a qualitative classification is the numerical score of a case on 
a measure or indicator 
Solution formula The reduced expression that results from applying the truth table algorithm. It 
shows how the conditions and the outcome are causally linked according to the 
data. 
Sufficiency A cause is sufficient if the outcome always occurs when the condition is present. 
When a cause is sufficient, the cause is a subset of the outcome. 
Truth table A table that lists all logically possible combinations of conditions. It has 2k 
rows, when k is the number of conditions. 
Truth table   
algorithm 
An algorithm that compares the entries of a truth table pairwise and thus to 
minimize it to the solution formula. 
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